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This dissertation examines the legal status of refugees from the National Socialist (NS) 
regime and explores thereby the implications of statelessness for the refugee’s experience in 
exile, specifically his sense of belonging and place in the world, as manifest in select works of 
German exile literature of the period 1933-1945.  The thesis pursued in this analysis is that the 
identity of the individual is inextricably tied to notions of time and space.  The loss of the legal 
right to exist in a specific space at a specific time, a loss that defined the exile experience of 
refugees from the NS-regime, meant the expulsion of the refugee from a time-space continuum at 
a given moment to which he could never return.  This loss calls into question the possibility of 
reintegration into this societal continuum, of the possibility of notions of self and place in the 
world independent of a legally recognized and sanctioned existence.  The analysis of select 
German autobiographical and literary works of the NS-period evidences that the existence of the 
refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural 
Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s 
notions of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the world.  
Integral to a discussion of the legality of existence in exile and its implications for identity 
is a comprehensive definition of identity itself.  For this purpose, Richard Jenkins’ tripartite 
model of individual order, interaction order, and institutional order, as outlined in his work Social 
Identity (Third Edition), serves as a definition of identity and a foundation for the historical 
discussion and literary analysis of the four chapters.  
Chapter One, entitled “The Necessity of a Legally Documented and Sanctioned Existence: 
The Legal Status of German Refugees of the National Socialist Period (1933-1945),” provides a 
historical foundation for the subsequent three chapters in its discussion of the processes of legal 
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erasure evident during the NS-period and the implications thereof for the legal status of the 
refugee in exile from the NS-regime.  In the following chapters, representative works of German 
exile literature in which the experience of the in-between in Niemandsland proves to be of 
particular significance are discussed under various sub-points of analysis.   
Egon Schwarz’s autobiography is the focus of Chapter Two, which is titled “The 
Implications of Legal Otherness for the Refugee’s Notion of Identity: A Case Study of Egon 
Schwarz’s Keine Zeit für Eichendorff.”  In this chapter Schwarz’s experiences in Niemandsland 
are discussed within the analytical framework of Jenkins’ tripartite model in order to determine 
the implications of exile and the consequent ruptures in the institutional order for Schwarz’s 
identity formation in the individual order, specifically his sense of personal agency in processes 
of identification and the interplay thereof with his notions of belonging and place in the world.   
Chapter Three focuses on the legal dimension of Niemandsland, specifically how 
statelessness affects the refugee’s sense of belonging to the national community from which he 
has been legally expunged.  Entitled “The Interplay between Legally Sanctioned Space and 
Notions of Place in the World as Manifest in Select Works of German Exile Literature, 1933-
1945,” this chapter explores the incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural and 
historical ties that endure between the stateless individual and his national community of origin 
as manifest in select works.  The chosen works are representative of the diversity of German 
writers’ responses to the experience of statelessness in exile from the NS-regime across several 
genres.  The argumentation of the chapter is supported by the analysis of excepts from these 
works: non-fiction political writings and speeches by Thomas Mann, including “Schrifsteller im 
Exil” and Deutsche Hörer!, the novels Kind aller Länder by Irmgard Keun and Transit by Anna 
Seghers, the drama Jacobowsky und der Oberst by Franz Werfel, and the “dialogisierte 
Tagespolitik” Flüchtlingsgespräche by Bertolt Brecht (White 137).  This chapter investigates 
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how the authors of these works employ various techniques to demonstrate the ruptures in the 
institutional order and their implications for the individual order and identity in exile.  The 
existing scholarship on these works is extensive, but the contribution of this dissertation lies in 
the fact that these works and their authors are being discussed within a unified analytical 
framework.  In contrast to Chapters Two and Three, the analyses of which deal predominantly 
with the legal complications faced by the refugee of the NS-period and the implications of 
statelessness for processes of identification, Chapter Four, in its discussion of Mascha Kaléko’s 
exile poetry, focuses primarily on the devastating and irretrievable loss of home that exile 
represented for Kaléko.  Titled “Exile in Nirgendland: The Poetry and Exile Experience of 
Mascha Kaléko,” this chapter explores a leitmotif in Kaléko’s poetry that the refugee is 
perpetually trapped in a Niemandsland, an in-between space that she refers to as Nirgendland.     
The four chapters of this dissertation explore the varying implications of legal erasure and 
statelessness for the refugee’s sense of belonging in the world, proving that the existence of the 
refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural 
Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s 
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1.1 Presentation of Topic 
 
The refugee from the National Socialist (NS) regime faced innumerable challenges in his 
pursuit of the legal right to exist.  The NS-regime sought to legitimize their agenda to ‘restore’ 
the racial and ideological homogeneity of the German people through the legal appropriation and 
codification of ‘German’ in the context of desired similarity and malignant difference.  Refugees 
from the NS-regime, whose political views or race, if not both, left them with the designation of 
malignant other under NS-legal code, as outlined in the Nürnberger Gesetze of 1935, experienced 
in the period of 1933-1945 processes of legal erasure that often resulted in statelessness.  Under 
the precarious designation of stateless, the refugee fled NS-Germany and entered into a world, 
divided into territories delineated along national boundaries, in which he was legally invisible.  
The innumerable complications encountered by the refugee in his attempt to secure for himself 
the legal right to exist within the borders of given national territories, whether temporarily or 
indefinitely, is a recurrent theme in German exile literature of the NS-period.  It is in this 
depiction of the incessant pursuit to obtain valid identification and travel documentation that the 
profound significance of a legally sanctioned existence manifests itself in this literature.  For the 
stateless refugee, to whom no nation would provide a legally sanctioned space in which to exist, 
the paradox arose that, despite this lack of sanctioned space, he still occupied, as a living human 
being, a physical and intellectual space in the world. 
This official and legal denial of sanctioned space created more than just legal 
complications for the refugee; as is evident in many works of German exile literature of this 
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period, the process of legal erasure and the flight into exile indelibly affected the refugee’s sense 
of belonging in the world.  It became readily apparent to the refugee that, given the inextricability 
of time and space and their coalescence into a sense of place, exile represented his expulsion 
from a time-space continuum at a point in time to which he can never return.  In numerous 
literary works, the estrangement resulting from this impossibility of return is heightened by the 
consequent further impossibility of reintegration into that time-space continuum from which he 
has been expunged.  The impossibilities of return and reintegration after exile proved for many 
refugees to have a profound effect of loss, a loss encompassed in the famous description by Carl 
Zuckmayer: 
Die Fahrt ins Exil ist ‘a journey of no return’.  Wer sie antritt und von der 
Heimkehr träumt, ist verloren.  Er mag wiederkehren –  aber der Ort, den er dann 
findet, ist nicht mehr der gleiche, den er verlassen hat, und er ist nicht mehr der 
gleiche, der fortgegangen ist.  Er mag wiederkehren, zu Menschen, die er 
entbehren mußte, zu Städten, die er liebte und nicht vergaß, in den Bereich der 
Sprache, die seine eigene ist.  Aber er kehrt niemals heim. (539) 
For Zuckmayer, exile represents the irretrievable loss of home (Heim); the linear and perpetual 
unfolding of events and relationships in time renders impossible a return to the home from which 
he was expunged.  Exacerbating the ramifications of this impossibility of return after exile on the 
refugee’s sense of belonging in the world is the simultaneous impossibility of arrival that 
manifests itself as the refugee attempts to integrate himself into the time-space continuum of a 
new place while in exile.  Stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of return and 
arrival, the refugee occupies in exile an in-between space.  The refugee’s perceived inability to 
reconstruct a sense of belonging in the world after exile manifests itself in several works of 
German exile literature of the NS-period in the refugee’s “extraterritorial existence without end,” 
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a notion evident in Kaléko’s formulation, “Wohin ich immer reise, / ich komm nach 
Nirgendland.” (Koepke 37; “Kein Kinderlied,” Werke 310).  The experience of the refugee in the 
space of the in-between consists of multiple dimensions, and it is in the space where the legal, 
physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce that the refugee exists.  
The analysis of this dissertation focuses on the depiction of Niemandsland in select works of 
German exile literature of the NS-period as a means to explore the question of how and to what 
extent the Niemandsland of exile affects the refugee’s sense of belonging and place in the world.   
 
1.2 Thesis Statement 
 
The refugee’s frantic pursuit of identification and travel documentation, as depicted in 
various works of German exile literature of the NS-period, is suggestive of an inherent paradox in 
statelessness, a legal Niemandsland in which the simultaneous incongruous realities of legal 
erasure and human embodiment coalesce.  As Jenkins posits, individual identity is inconceivable 
independent of the human world.  For the refugee, statelessness represents the official and legal 
rejection of his person by the governments of national communities.  The refusal of these 
governments to provide the refugee with the travel and identification documentation necessary to 
exist either temporarily or indefinitely within their given national territories represents the 
exclusion of the refugee from the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of 
identification.  Inherent in statelessness is thus a rupture in this dialectic of identification, and the 
exclusion of the individual from the institutional order calls into question the possibility of 
identity formation for a stateless refugee.  The thesis pursued in this dissertation is that the 
identity of the individual is inextricably tied to notions of time and space.  The loss of the legal 
right to exist in a specific space at a specific time, a loss that defined the exile experience of 
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refugees from the National Socialist Regime, meant the expulsion of the refugee from a time-
space continuum at a given moment to which he could never return.  This loss calls into question 
the possibility of reintegration into this societal continuum, of the possibility of notions of self 
and place in the world independent of a legally recognized and sanctioned existence.  The 
following analysis of select German autobiographical and literary works of the NS-period 
evidences that the existence of the refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the 
legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound 
implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the 
world.   
 
1.3  Methodology 
 
The methodology that will guide the literary analysis of this dissertation will be a close 
reading of these selected texts with consideration of relevant secondary literature.  Integral to a 
discussion of the legality of existence in exile and its implications for identity is a comprehensive 
definition of identity itself.  For the purposes of the current analysis, Richard Jenkins’ tripartite 
model of individual order, interaction order, and institutional order, as outlined in his work Social 
Identity (Third Edition), will serve as a definition of identity and a foundation for the historical 
and literary analysis.  This model is based on the notion that the world, “as constructed and 
experienced by humans,” is composed of three distinct yet inextricably intertwined orders that 
“are simultaneous and occupy the same space, intersubjectively and physically:” 
• the individual order is the human world as made up of embodied individuals, 
and what-goes-on-in-their-heads;     
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• the interaction order is the human world as constituted in relationships 
between individuals, in what-goes-on-between-people; and 
• the institutional order is the human world of pattern and organisation, of 
established-ways-of-doing-things. (39-40) 
Jenkins’ model is informed by the work of American Pragmatism, specifically that of C.H. 
Cooley (1962, 1964) and G.H. Mead (1934) (40).  In this scholarship, selfhood is understood as 
an “ongoing and…simultaneous synthesis of (internal) self-definition and the (external) 
definitions of oneself offered by others” (40).  Although individuals are unique and dynamic, 
individual identity is “embodied in selfhood” and thus cannot exist in a vacuum; individual 
identity is inconceivable independent of the human world (40).  Jenkins derives from these 
concepts of individual identity and selfhood the premise that is fundamental to his tripartite 
model of identity, a process that he terms the “internal-external dialectic of identification” (40).  
The internal-external dialectic of identification is presented as the “process whereby all identities 
– individual and collective – are constituted” (40).  Jenkins suggests a “unitary model of 
selfhood,” however this unity is derived from a synthesis of internal and external definitions (41).  
Paraphrasing Mead “in everyday terms,” Jenkins explains that “we can’t see ourselves at all 
without also seeing ourselves as other people see us,” further underscoring that individual 
identity is inconceivable independent of the human world.  In terms of the individual order, it is 
imperative to note that individual identity and selfhood are inextricably tied to embodiment: 
That human beings have bodies is among the most obvious things about us, as are 
the extensive communicative and non-utilitarian uses to which we put them. The 
human body is simultaneously a referent of individual continuity, an index of 
collective similarity and differentiation, and a canvas upon which identification 
can play.  Identification in isolation from embodiment is unimaginable. (41)  
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As stated, the individual order, composed of embodied individuals and the processes of their 
individual minds, cannot exist in a vacuum, as outlined in the theory of a continuous internal-
external dialectic.  Rather, the individual order coexists simultaneously with the interaction and 
institutional orders, all three of which are in a state of continuous dynamism and interplay with 
one another.  
The interaction among and between embodied individuals comprises the interaction order; 
as Jenkins states, in terms of identification, it does not suffice to “simply assert an identity; that 
assertion must also be validated, or not, by those with whom we have dealings” (42).  In his 
explanation of the interaction order, Jenkins cites the scholarship of E. Goffman (1969), whose 
work dealt with the “presentation of self” and “impression management strategies” during 
interaction.  Although people have, to a certain extent, control over how they present themselves, 
they cannot be certain of how others will interpret their presentations of self.  Thus, impression 
management strategies, “the performative aspects of identity,” come into play, and an internal-
external dialectic between self-image and public-image emerges (42).  Integral to Goffman’s 
assertions is the assumption that people “consciously pursue goals and interests” (42). 
Individuals, through presentation of self and the utilization of impression management strategies, 
seek to be perceived as a “something” or “somebody,” to “assume particular identities” (42).  
 The institutional order and its implications for selfhood are of particular importance for 
the current analysis given the relevant historical context of the NS-period.  Jenkins appropriates 
the distinction made by Karl Marx between a “class in itself” and a “class for itself” in his 
presentation of the distinction between groups and categories, “a distinction [that] can be made 
between a collectivity which identifies and defines itself (a group for itself) and a collectivity 
which is identified and defined by others (a category in itself)” (43).  Related to this group-
category distinction is the distinction drawn between “nominal identity” and “virtual identity”: 
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The name [nominal identity] can stay the same – X – while what it means in 
everyday life to be an X can change dramatically. Similarly, the experience 
[virtual identity] may stay relatively stable while the name changes.  Both can 
change.  Either group identification or categorization, or both at the same time, can 
contribute to the array of possibilities. (44) 
Important to note in consideration of these processes is the influence of power and politics.  As 
asserted by Karl Marx, it is a political process by which a category is transformed into a group, a 
process that may be influenced from either within or without, or both.  The transformation from a 
category into a group is a change in virtual identity that may also be accompanied by a change in 
nominal identity (44-45). 
 Institutions are key players in these above-outlined processes of identification. Jenkins 
defines institutions as “established patterns of practice” that are recognized as such and are 
influential in the human world in so far as they “are the way [that] things are done” (45).  An 
organisation is a type of institution; it is “task-orientated” and can be termed a group (45). 
Composed of “networks of differentiated membership positions which bestow specific individual 
identities upon their incumbents,” organisations exhibit a bureaucratic nature (45).  Especially of 
significance is that organisations have the capacity to classify, in that they possess a 
“classificatory lexicon” (positions and categories) (45).  The distribution of these positions and 
categories is determined by the political situation within and outside of a given organisation. 
Jenkins concludes: 
Thus individual and collective identities are systematically produced, reproduced 
and implicated in each other. Following Foucault, Hacking (1990) argues that the 
classification of individuals is at the heart of modern, bureaucratically rational 
strategies of government and control…Identities exist and are acquired, claimed 
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and allocated within power relations. Identification is something over which 
struggles take place and with which stratagems are advanced – it is means and end 
in politics – and at stake is the classification of populations as well the 
classification of individuals. (45) 
In the context of Jenkins’ model, the NS-regime can be interpreted as an organisation and 
“vehicle of classification” (45).  Much scholarship has focused on the demonstrated capacity of 
NS-ideologues to manipulate processes of identification through classifications, such as the NS-
legal classification of that which constituted a desirable citizen (Reichsbürger) in the Nürnberger 
Gesetze of 1935, in which spheres of desired similarity and malignant difference were clearly 
delineated.  A less explored question is how the lack of a legally sanctioned existence, as 
experienced by many German exiles of the period 1933-1945, affected the individual’s notions of 
identity and place in the world.  Of critical importance to the current analysis’ pursuit of this 
question is a further aspect of Jenkins’ tripartite model, namely the role of time and space in 
processes of identification.  Jenkins asserts the “centrality of time and space to identification” and 
draws a direct connection between the internal-external dialectic and time and space: 
The three dimensions of space, and their material coalescence into a ‘sense of 
place’, are implied by the interior-exterior metaphor.  Identification is always from 
a point of view.  For individuals this point of view is, in the first instance, the 
body. Individual identification is always embodied, albeit sometimes 
imaginatively, as in fiction or myth, or Internet chat rooms.  Collective identities 
are usually located within territories or regions, and these too can be imagined, as 
in diasporic myths of return or charts of organisational structure.  In that bodies 
always occupy space, the individual and the collective are to some extent 
superimposed. (48) 
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Time and space are the medium through which the individual experiences the human world, and 
as such time and space are inextricably bound.  Time itself is a defining factor in processes of 
identification in that “continuity,” in which a notion of time is inherent, is attributed to identity 
(48).  Continuity suggests a “meaningful past” and “possible future,” and further, it provides a 
lens through which to perceive and make sense of the human experience; the notion of continuity 
is at the pith of how the human world understands itself.  
The indelible connection between identification and notions of time and space that 
Jenkins posits begs the question of the implications of the exile experience for identity, given the 
fragmented nature of time in exile.  Günther Anders, who lived in exile from the NS-regime, 
touches directly on this impact in his autobiographical essay “Vitae, nicht vita,” asserting that, 
“Deine Bitte um eine ‘vita’ versetzt mich in Verlegenheit.  Ich hatte keine vita.  Ich kann mich 
nicht erinnern.  Emigranten können das nicht.  Um den Singular ‘das Leben’ sind wir, von der 
Weltgeschichte Gejagte, betrogen worden” (64).  In this essay Anders explains that, in exile, the 
refugee experiences numerous ruptures in the time-space continuum as he is forced to move from 
one location to the next.  Characteristic of exile from the NS-regime, he explains, is the collapse 
of a unified life into what seems to be numerous separate and disjointed lives.  Anders’ 
description of exile touches on the question of the significance of spatial and temporal continuity 
for identity formation.  The experience of continually changing location results in a perceptual 
loss of continuity for the refugee; although the continuity of time is inherently present, the 
refugee can no longer perceive it, and thus arises the notion of multiple disjointed lives 
experienced through a singular body.  Edward W. Said’s discussion of the inherent discontinuity 
of exile in his essay “Reflections on Exile” resonates with Anders’ formulation of exile as an 
experience of innumerable ruptures:  
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[…] exile, unlike nationalism, is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being.  
Exiles are cut off from their roots, their land, their past.  They generally do not 
have armies or states, although they are often in search of them.  Exiles feel, 
therefore, an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to 
see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people. (177)   
Said’s description rests on the notion that refugees, in an attempt to reconcile the discontinuity of 
exile, seek to restore the sense of belonging and place in the world that they lost through exile.  
Given the realities of the nature of time, however, restoration is impossible; the perpetual and 
irreversible unfolding of time renders a return to – or restoration of – the past inconceivable.  
Consequent of the impossibility of restoration is the notion of tenuousness that develops in the 
refugee’s relationship to the world.  This seemingly warped nature of time and space in exile is a 
notion evident in numerous works of German exile literature of the NS-period, and the question 
of lost continuity is at the heart of this experience.  
 
1.4  Gap in Existing Research 
 
 Niemandsland is a concept that found resonance with both German writers in exile from 
the NS-regime as well as the scholars who would later study their works.  In his autobiography, 
Keine Zeit für Eichendorff: Chronik unfreiwilliger Wanderjahre, Egon Schwarz poignantly 
applied the concept of Niemandsland in the description of his experience trapped between the 
Hungarian and Slovakian borders in what had become a ‘dumping ground’ for the governments 
on either side, who pushed into this territorial in-between space the refugees whom no nation 
wanted.  In what was “eine der absurdesten, ganz aus dem Rahmen der Herkömmlichkeiten 
fallende Episode [s]eines Lebens,” Schwarz experienced the materialization of legal erasure.  In 
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the physical in-between space between Hungary and Slovakia, Schwarz realized that he, his 
family and the other Jewish refugees were “Niemande im »Niemandsland«” (51).  The 
experience of erasure that Schwarz touches on here proves later in his autobiography to have 
rendered his sense of belonging and place in the world tenuous at best.  Schwarz’s use of 
Niemandsland resonates with Kaléko’s formulation of exile as a perpetual journey through 
Nirgendland, a space from which the refugee cannot escape.  Tied to notions of Niemandsland in 
German exile literature is the refugee’s experience of a warped sense of time once trapped in this 
in-between space of exile.  Many scholars of German exile literature have discussed the 
perversion of time and space in exile, often in the context of making a distinction between the 
traveler and the refugee (C. Kaplan, W. Koepke, E. Said, H. Schreckenberger, J. Vansant).  It is 
Wulf Koepke’s work on this subject, specifically “On Time and Space in Exile – Past, Present 
and Future in a No-Man’s Land,” that is of greatest relevance for this dissertation.  In this article 
Koepke argues that the experience of time in exile is marked by the paradoxical simultaneity of 
rushed flight and indefinite waiting.  Although the act of departure into and during exile assumes 
the quality of panicked flight, this is juxtaposed with the reality that the refugee must wait: “The 
arrival in a new land is mostly a non-arrival.  The refugee is not welcome.  He is told to wait.  
Waiting rooms, ugly, unfamiliar, unpleasant, are typical for the new condition.  Exile turns into a 
‘waiting room’ period without real hope for an ending” (35).  Exile, characterized by this 
dissonance between flight and waiting, materializes in the image of the waiting room.  It is in the 
seemingly endless repetition of waiting, flight and non-arrival that the devastating reality of exile 
reveals itself to the refugee: he is forever stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of 
return and arrival in Niemandsland.  The connection that Koepke draws between the warped 
experience of time and space in exile to the concept of Niemandsland is integral to the analytical 
framework of this dissertation.  The contribution of this dissertation lies in its pursuance of the 
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question that Koepke implores his fellow scholars to answer in the conclusion of his article: “The 
legacy of the exiles has not yet been adequately understood, and it may just fade away in the 
turmoils of the ‘postmodern’ mentality of the 21st century.  Yet the perception of time and space 
of the ‘exterritorial man’ is so close to the life and mind of the present age that it cannot and 
should not be ignored” (49).  This dissertation picks up where Koepke leaves off, pursuing the 
implications of exile in Niemandsland for the individual’s sense of place and belonging in the 
world, as manifest in select works of German exile literature of the National Socialist Period.   
 The thesis that informs this dissertation is pursued through an analysis of select works of 
German exile literature of various genres within a common analytical framework.  Chapter One, 
entitled “The Necessity of a Legally Documented and Sanctioned Existence: The Legal Status of 
German Refugees of the National Socialist Period (1933-1945),” provides a historical foundation 
for the subsequent three chapters in its discussion of the processes of legal erasure evident during 
the NS-period and the implications thereof for the legal status of the refugee in exile from the 
NS-regime.  In the following chapters, representative works of German exile literature in which 
the experience of the in-between in Niemandsland proves to be of particular significance are 
discussed under various sub-points of analysis.  As indicated by its title, “The Implications of 
Legal Otherness for the Refugee’s Notion of Identity: A Case Study of Egon Schwarz’s Keine 
Zeit für Eichendorff,” Chapter Two is a case study of Egon Schwarz’s autobiography.  Schwarz 
explores in Keine Zeit für Eichendorff his identity formation prior to, during and after exile from 
the NS-regime, providing compelling insight into the irreparable rupture that exile in 
Niemandsland represents for such processes of identification.  Some scholars, such as Linda 
Maeding, have formulated their analyses of Keine Zeit für Eichendorff from the perspective of 
genre, suggesting that the act of autobiographical composition in itself represents Schwarz’s 
attempt to discern unity and continuity in a life left seemingly fragmented by exile.  Maeding 
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argues that Schwarz assumes a picaresque role in his autobiography that is evident in his 
depiction of self relative to the overarching socio-historical and -political forces that he must 
navigate in exile.  Helga Schreckenberger makes a similar comparison of Schwarz’s 
autobiography with the genre of the picaresque novel in “Erwachsenwerden im Exil: die 
ungewöhnliche Bildung von Egon Schwarz” (200-202).  Her argumentation in this article 
parallels that of Maeding to the extent that she interprets Schwarz’s autobiography, and his 
depiction therein of specific events over the course of his life, as a means through which Schwarz 
reformulates his experiences in exile as a means of self-realization.  Schreckenberger’s analysis 
would seem to find confirmation in that of Hinrich C. Seeba, who notes in “Heimweh im Exil: 
Anmerkungen zu einer verdrängten Sehnsucht” that Schwarz mitigated the effects of exile 
through his career as a student and then scholar of German literature within the American 
university system, specifically the insatiable Heimweh and impossibility of reestablishing a sense 
of belonging in the world.  Although the current analysis recognizes the validity in several of 
Schreckenberger’s points of analysis, upon close consideration of the conclusions that she draws 
in the above mentioned article, it is apparent that she does not adequately address Schwarz’s 
discussion of the implications of exile for his sense of belonging in the world.  In her focus on 
Schwarz’s reformulation of his exile experiences in an attempt to determine to what extent exile 
had a positive effect on his conception of self, Schreckenberger disregards Schwarz’s enduring 
notion of the tenuousness of his belonging in the world.  This dissertation attempts to reconcile 
Schwarz’s seemingly contradictory statements about exile as both a productive process and one 
through which the refugee is robbed of his individual agency in the unfolding of his own life.  To 
this end, Schwarz’s experiences in Niemandsland are discussed within an analytical framework 
that seeks to determine the implications of exile for both Schwarz’s sense of personal agency in 
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processes of identification as well as for his corresponding notions of belonging and place in the 
world.   
 Chapter Three focuses on the legal dimension of Niemandsland, specifically how 
statelessness affects the individual’s sense of belonging to the national community from which he 
has been legally expunged.  Entitled “The Interplay between Legally Sanctioned Space and 
Notions of Place in the World as Manifest in Select Works of German Exile Literature, 1933-
1945,” Chapter Three explores the incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural 
and historical ties that endure between the stateless individual and his national community of 
origin as manifest in select works.  The chosen works are representative of the diversity of 
German writers’ responses to the experience of statelessness in exile from the NS-regime across 
several genres.  The argumentation of the chapter is supported by the analysis of excepts from 
these works of varying genres: non-fiction political writings and speeches by Thomas Mann, 
including “Schrifsteller im Exil” and Deutsche Hörer!, the novels Kind aller Länder by Irmgard 
Keun and Transit by Anna Seghers, the drama Jacobowsky und der Oberst by Franz Werfel, and 
the “dialogisierte Tagespolitik” Flüchtlingsgespräche by Bertolt Brecht (White 137).  The 
existing scholarship on these works is extensive, but the contribution of this dissertation lies in 
the fact that these works and their authors are being discussed within a unified analytical 
framework.  The discussion of excerpts of Thomas Mann’s political writings and speeches in this 
framework evidences that, in his presentation of the intellect and the assertion thereof as an 
inalienable right of the individual, Thomas Mann re-appropriates the designation of German and 
contests the NS-regime’s desire to control processes of identification.  Thomas Mann’s assertion 
of the inalienable right of the individual to a space – both intellectual and physical – in which to 
establish an identity resonates with a notion prevalent in the above-mentioned selected works of 
fiction, namely that the legal invisibility of the stateless refugee is incongruous with reality that, 
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as a living entity, he occupies a physical space in the world.  These works of fiction are 
connected thematically in that, through their depiction of refugees navigating the seemingly 
endless bureaucratic mazes in pursuit of identification and travel documentation and the 
corresponding legal right to exist, they deconstruct and call into question the validity of nation-
based identities.  Although some scholars have already dealt with the role of identification and 
travel documentation in these works, their analyses do not reference the space of the in-between 
in their discussion of the depiction of these legal documents.  Schreckenberger, in her analysis of 
the function of identification and travel documents in Kind aller Länder, asserts that it is upon 
consideration of these documents that the distinction between the traveler and the refugee 
becomes apparent.  As opposed to travel, Schreckenberger explains, exile is characterized by the 
impossibility of arrival, a notion that in turn resonates with Brigetta Abel’s argument that, in 
exile, the refugee experiences a destabilization of identities, especially those “related to location” 
(96).  Sabine Rohlf explains that the refugee’s loss of valid identification and travel documents 
represents the loss of the right to place in the world, the consequence of which is a destabilization 
of identity that Rohlf terms “radikale Ortlosigkeit” (150).  The emphasis on place in Rohlf’s 
formulation of Ortlosigkeit parallels Patrick B. Farges’ description of recurrent “Ent-Ortung” in 
Seghers’ exile writings (283).  Although these terms underscore the inherent incongruity between 
the refugee’s lack of legally-sanctioned space and the reality of human embodiment, they lack the 
analytical depth possible in the application of the concept of Niemandsland.  The application of 
Niemandsland in the same analytical context evidences, beyond the incongruous realities of legal 
invisibility and human embodiment, overlapping experiences of the in-between, the intersection 
of legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer.  
 In contrast to Chapters Two and Three, the analyses of which deal predominantly with the 
legal complications faced by the refugee of the NS-period and the implications of statelessness 
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for processes of identification, Chapter Four, in its discussion of Kaléko’s exile poetry, focuses 
primarily on the devastating and irretrievable loss of home that exile represented for Kaléko.  
Titled “Exile in Nirgendland: The Poetry and Exile Experience of Mascha Kaléko,” Chapter Four 
explores a leitmotif in Kaléko’s poetry that the refugee is perpetually trapped in a Niemandsland, 
an in-between space that she refers to as Nirgendland.  Previous scholarship has considered how 
Kaléko’s biography and experience of multiple emigrations over the course of a single lifetime 
affected the processes of identification manifest in her poetry, but predominantly in support of the 
argument that she “assumed the elective identity of a ‘typical’ Berliner” (Karina von Tippelskirch 
157).  Other scholars have considered Kaléko’s exile poetry in relation to how it coincides and 
where it departs from that of other German exile writers (Hans-Jürgen Schrader). The specific 
contribution of this chapter to existing scholarship, the product of an analysis of the term 
Nirgendland as central to an understanding of Kaléko’s exile poetry and the corresponding 
discussion of Kaléko’s depiction of time in exile, is insight into Kaléko’s attempts to negotiate a 





2  The Necessity of a Legally Documented and Sanctioned Existence: The Legal Status 
of German Refugees of the National Socialist Period 
 
 In Keine Zeit für Eichendorff: Chronik unfreiwilliger Wanderjahre, Egon Schwarz points 
out the significance of a legally documented and sanctioned existence for the refugee through his 
description of the visa: “Die Furcht war aber ganz konkret: Würde es gelingen, die Grenze zu 
überschreiten?!  Denn uns fehlte das Lebenselixier, von dem damals…Sein oder Nichtsein 
abhingen: ein Visum” (59-60).  The conception of “Sein oder Nichtsein” as dependent on the 
possession of a visa, on legal documentation that grants an individual permission to exist within a 
given space for a given period of time, is a notion that defined the exile experience of many 
refugees who fled the NS-regime.  The following chapter serves to outline the legal situation 
faced by the refugee of the NS-period (1933-1945) and the innumerable challenges that he faced 
in pursuit of the legal right to exist.  In the current analysis, the government entities with which 
the refugee dealt during his flight through exile are understood as organisations that compose the 
institutional order within Jenkins’ tripartite model of identification.  As organisations, these 
government entities were vehicles of classification and thus “authoritatively allocate[d] particular 
kinds of identities to individuals” (Jenkins 45).  Thus, the NS-regime as well as the governments 
of those national communities from whom the refugee sought legal permission to exist played for 
the refugee an integral role in his attempt to reestablish for himself a legally sanctioned space in 
the world, both physical and intellectual.  NS-ideologues were well aware of the power of law to 
legitimize and thus demonstrated great interest in manipulating processes of identification 
through legal classifications in their attempt to create a clear distinction between that which 
constituted a desirable citizen (designated by the term Reichsbürger in the Nürnberger Gesetze of 
1935), and that which did not.  For the refugee from the NS-regime, his precarious designation of 
malignant other under National Socialist legal code led to a process of legal erasure through 
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which he was rendered stateless.  Once outside of NS-territory, the stateless refugee encountered 
innumerable legal complications in his attempt to secure for himself the legal right to exist, 
whether temporarily or indefinitely, within the borders of given national territories.  The 
following chapter discusses the legal status of refugees from the NS-regime as a means to 
establish a historical foundation for the overarching question that informs this dissertation, 
specifically to what extent statelessness and the loss of a legally sanctioned existence impacted 
the refugee’s notions of identity, in particular his sense of belonging and space in the world. 
 
2.1  The Initial Impetus for Emigration: National Socialist Legislation 1935-1935 
 
A series of laws enacted by the NS-regime in 1933 ushered in an era of autocratic rule and 
demonstrated NS-ideologues’ desire to racially reconfigure German society.  Although Adolf 
Hitler came to power on 30 January 1933, legal protection of individual freedoms remained intact 
until the Reichstagsbrand of 27 February 1933; the consequent institution of a single-party 
government played a critical role in the NS-reconfiguration of German society.  Deeming the 
Reichstagsbrand indicative of an imminent communist uprising, the cabinet leaders instituted on 
28 February 1933 the emergency measures outlined in the Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten 
zum Schutz von Volk und Staat, commonly referred to as the Reichstagsbrandverordnung 
(Wachsmann 166).  The Reichstagsbrandverordnung instituted “the systematic repression of 
political opposition…and served as the basis for the police arrest and incarceration of political 
opponents without trial, the euphemistically named Schutzhaft” (166).  The preamble and first 
article of the decree outline the nullification of the civil liberties guaranteed in the Weimar 
constitution: 
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Auf Grund des Artikels 48 Abs. 2 der Reichsverfassung wird zur Abwehr 
kommunistischer staatsgefährdender Gewaltakte folgendes verordnet: 
§ 1. Die Artikel 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 und 153 der Verfassung des 
Deutschen Reichs werden bis auf weiteres außer Kraft gesetzt. Es sind 
daher Beschränkungen der persönlichen Freiheit, des Rechts der freien 
Meinungsäußerung, einschließlich der Pressefreiheit, des Vereins- und 
Versammlungsrechts, Eingriffe in das Brief-, Post-, Telegraphen- und 
Fernsprechgeheimnis, Anordnungen von Haussuchungen und von 
Beschlagnahmen sowie Beschränkungen des Eigentums auch außerhalb der 
sonst hierfür bestimmten gesetzlichen Grenzen zulässig. (“Verordnung des 
Reichspräsidenten”) 
The repercussions of the decree were immediately felt; the suspension of numerous human rights 
outlined in the constitution of the Weimar Republic, wide-scale arrests of political opponents, and 
the dissolution of parties and unions contributed to the political upheaval as a new autocratic 
order took hold.  The Reichstagsbrandverordnung served as impetus for the first wave of German 
emigration, as opponents to National Socialism took flight.  Intellectuals and political dissidents 
were the first to leave Germany, many of whom frequently traveled abroad and already possessed 
a passport (Dwork and van Pelt 11).  Legislation cancelling passports of political opponents was 
at this point not yet in place, and although many successfully crossed the border, they did so with 
the notion that they would soon return.  As Alfred Döblin explained, the perception was, “es war 
ja nur ein Ausflug; man läßt den Sturm vorübergehen; nur für drei bis vier Monate, dann sei man 
mit den ‘Nazis’ fertig” (Döblin 265).   
 The 1 April 1933 boycott of all Jewish professionals and Jewish-owned businesses, 
sponsored by the NS-state, made it clear that Jews were the specific target of, and of particular 
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significance for, National Socialist racial ideology (Dwork and van Pelt 13).  The boycott was a 
preemptive measure by the NS-government, who had heard that the American Jewish Congress, 
“contrary to the wishes of German Jews,” had planned a worldwide boycott of German goods: 
In the [NS-] party’s view, Jews had been reduced to resident foreigners who could 
be held hostage to ensure the behavior of the outside world toward Germany.  This 
was pure racism at work: people were held responsible not only for their own 
deeds but for those of the imagined race-community to which they belonged as 
well.  Just as the Germans belonged to a unified race-organism, so did the Jews.  
Thus, Jews living in Germany were responsible for the actions of Jews abroad. 
(13-14) 
Although the April 1933 boycott against Jewish businesses was not an economic success, it was a 
success as a maneuver of psychological manipulation, pushing the “Jewish Question” to the 
forefront of discussion (14-15).  The NS-regime called into question the right of Jews to be part 
of German society, and thereby “forced a national debate” on the subject (15).   
 The situation in Germany in the beginning of April 1933 proved a major setback for 
German Jews, who had experienced in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries political 
emancipation under Bismarck that continued through the Weimar Republic.  Although social 
discrimination had to an extent remained common practice up until the Weimar Republic (prior 
to which Jews were barred from government, civil service and diplomatic positions, as well as 
senior academic positions and commissions in the armed forces), the economy was open to the 
Jews, many of whom gained prominence in the financial and manufacturing sectors of the 
German Reich.  As Dwork and van Pelt assert, “patriots, monarchists, and very proud of the 
German culture which they believed to be theirs too, German Jewry formed the most prosperous 
Jewish community in the world” (4).  A testament to this prosperity is the fact that, initially, 
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relatively few German Jews chose to leave Germany for the New World.  In contrast, from 1899 
to 1914 more than 1 million Jews emigrated to the United States from the Russian Empire, as did 
240,000 Jews from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 60,000 Jews from Great Britain, whereas 
only 10,000 German Jews chose to do so (4-5).  Further, during the same time period, 60,000 
Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia settled in the German Reich, “which made Germany a 
country of Jewish immigration” (5).  Jews experienced further improvement of societal 
conditions during the Weimar Republic, during which time “the tension between formal equality 
and de facto second-class status in many spheres evaporated,” and many Jews advanced to 
positions in the government and societal institutions (5).  Although the climate of political 
instability after World War I saw a rise of extreme anti-Semitism on the far right, Jews were, by 
and large, well protected under the law.  For example, the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger 
jüdischen Glaubens was a well-organized entity that regularly brought civil suits against anti-
Semitic agitators, who were then often ultimately convicted within the Weimar court system (6).  
In consideration of both the de facto and de jure legal status of Jews during Weimar Republic, it 
is evident that, in terms of the theoretical framework for the current analysis, Jews experienced 
during this time period significant validation in the institutional order.  The government of the 
Weimar Republic not only legally acknowledged them as German citizens entitled to the rights 
associated therewith, but also in practice enforced these laws.  What the vast majority of 
Germany’s 500,000 Jews could not imagine when the NS-regime assumed power, however, was 
that the protection provided to them through the legal system of the Weimar Republic would be 
rendered void by the National Socialists, who immediately sought to institute a legal system 
informed by, and in promotion of, their ideological agenda.  
 The first anti-Jewish legislation of the NS-period was passed shortly after the 1 April 
boycott; on 7 April 1933 the government passed the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des 
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Berufsbeamtentums, the third paragraph of which ordered the immediate removal of all “Beamte, 
die nicht arischer Abstammung sind,” from their positions in the civil service (“Gesetz zur 
Wiederhestellung”).  As Dwork and van Pelt describe, “this affected thousands of Jews, as all 
teachers, professors, physicians employed in state hospitals, as well as government employees 
counted as civil servants” (as Beamte) (16).  Another law, passed on 7 April 1933, the “Gesetz 
über die Zulassung zur Rechtsanwaltschaft,” removed Jews from the judiciary (“Gesetz über die 
Zulassung”).  Completing this initial attempt to purge Jews from the public sphere of German 
society through legislation, the NS-regime passed on 25 April 1933 the “Gesetz gegen die 
Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen,” which set a quota of 1.5% of the total number 
of Jewish students admitted to German high schools and universities and a maximum of 5% for 
any individual school (“Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung”).  Removed from occupations and barred 
from educational opportunities, many German Jews sought to move abroad in 1933, and they 
were initially welcomed by neighboring European countries.  France, for example, waived its 
visa requirements, and 30,000 German Jews fled there in 1933.  The Netherlands and 
Czechoslovakia also loosened documentation restrictions and admitted 6,000 and 5,000 refugees, 
respectively (Dwork and van Pelt 18).  Dwork and van Pelt suggest that this sympathy is 
indicative of the fact that these host countries believed the refugee situation to be a temporary 
emergency (18).  Further, the book burnings that began on 10 May 1933 “horrified many abroad” 
(18).  Relief organizations in host countries raised temporary funds for refugees, many of whom 
had left the majority of their possessions behind due to various obstacles, including the 
Reichsfluchtsteuer (to be discussed later).  This hospitality was limited, however, in that refugees 
were most often unable to find employment in the host countries, with the exception of 
agricultural work (22).  In France, for example, German-Jewish refugees joined thousands of 
other refugees from various nations, including but not limited to Syrians, Turks, Bulgarians, 
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Hungarians, Russians, Armenians, Italians and Spaniards, which exacerbated the unemployment 
situation (22).  Palmier summarizes the experience of German refugees in the 1930s: 
Far from improving, their situation continued to deteriorate, despite international 
discussion of the refugee problem and the establishment of support committees.  
Each new wave of émigrés made the survival of the preceding wave more difficult.  
As the 1930s advanced, the conditions of reception became more draconian, and 
the reactions of public opinion to the refugees grew more hostile. (230) 
The situation in Germany continued to deteriorate in the 1930s as the NS-regime tightened its 
grip on German society.  Directly following the anti-Jewish legislation passed in 1933, however, 
the waves of emigration slowed in 1934, with 23,000 Jews leaving Germany that year as opposed 
to the 50,000 that had done so in 1933.  Dwork and van Pelt explain that “planned emigration 
overtook panicked flight” as Jews sought to coordinate an escape abroad that allowed them to 
salvage some of their possessions and financial assets (92).   
This period of calm after the initial storm was short-lived however, and it became evident 
with the Nürnberger Gesetze of 15 September 1935 that NS-ideologues sought to 
comprehensively eradicate Jews from German society.  The Nürnberger Gesetze consisted of 
three laws, the Reichsflaggengesetz, the Reichsbürgergesetz and the Gesetz zum Schutze des 
deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre.  The Reichsbürgergesetz effectively stripped German 
Jews of their German citizenship.  In article 1, paragraph 2 of the law it stated, “Reichsbürger ist 
nur der Staatsangehörige deutschen oder artverwandten Blutes, der durch sein Verhalten beweist, 
daß er gewillt ist, in Treue dem Deutschen Volk und Reich zu dienen” (“Reichsbürgergesetz”).  
Here a manipulation of processes of identification in the institutional order is apparent.  In this 
excerpt, there is a hierarchy evident in terms of qualifications that must be met in order to earn 
the designation of German citizen (Reichsbürger).  The aspect of race is of greatest significance 
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here; as the law is structured, Germanic-ethnicity is the irremissible prerequisite for German 
citizenship.  Secondary to Germanic-ethnicity is the demonstration of adherence to and support of 
NS-ideology in promotion of advancing the German state.  This legal manipulation within the 
institutional order is indicative of the NS-regime’s desire to appropriate the term ‘German’ to 
serve its own ideological agenda.  From its naissance, the NS-regime demonstrated an awareness 
of the association that is often made between law and the quality of legitimacy.  Through the 
legal codification of that which constitutes ‘German,’ the NS-regime not only implemented a 
system of legal designations defining the identity-status of individuals within German territory, it 
also attempted to shape how the outside world would understand and answer the question of what 
it meant to be ‘German.’  
Through the Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre (also from 
15 September 1935) it became evident that the National Socialists sought to control the private 
sphere of German society as well.  This law prohibited marriages and sexual relationships 
between Jews and so-called ethnic-German citizens or those of kindred blood.  The preamble and 
article 1 of paragraph 1 stated:  
Durchdrungen von der Erkenntnis, daß die Reinheit des deutschen Blutes die 
Voraussetzung für den Fortbestand des Deutschen Volkes ist, und beseelt von dem 
unbeugsamen Willen, die Deutsche Nation für alle Zukunft zu sichern, hat der 
Reichstag einstimmig das folgende Gesetz beschlossen, das hiermit verkündet 
wird:  
§ 1 
(1) Eheschließungen zwischen Juden und Staatsangehörigen deutschen oder 
artverwandten Blutes sind verboten. Trotzdem geschlossene Ehen sind nichtig, 
 25 
auch wenn sie zur Umgehung dieses Gesetzes im Ausland geschlossen sind. 
(“Gesetz zum Schutze”) 
In the Nürnberger Gesetze a clear demarcation is evident between that which constituted a 
desirable, ‘German’ citizen and that which constituted the malignant ‘other.’  In consideration of 
the overarching NS-agenda to engender the transcendence of the ‘German’ people and the nation 
that they were intended to constitute, it is evident that the NS-regime’s legal delineation of 
‘German’ identity was ultimately motivated by its eugenics-based ideology.  In an 
interministerial discussion from 29 September 1936 regarding German policy toward the Jews, 
State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart of the interior ministry is quoted, “The fundamental principle 
of all measures is to foster the emigration of the Jews” (Eckert 210).  The legal manipulation of 
identity terms (‘German,’ ‘citizen,’ ‘German citizen’) by the NS-regime is thus indicative of NS-
ideologues’ desire to promote, through racial homogeneity, a unified and coherent notion of that 
which constituted ‘German’-ness.  Stripped of German citizenship, barred from the economy and 
societal institutions, and now legally restricted in their relations with ethnic-Germanic Germans, 
many German Jews saw emigration abroad as their only choice.  They joined the thousands of 
antifascist refugees who had emigrated abroad since 1933 and became similarly entangled in a 
bureaucratic web of legal documentation that deeply affected their emigration experience. 
 
2.2  Logistics of Emigration: Navigating the Bureaucratic Maze in an Attempt to Secure 
the Legal Right to Exist 
 
“Der Pass ist der edelste Teil von einem Menschen. Er kommt auch nicht auf so 
eine einfache Weise zustande wie ein Mensch. Ein Mensch kann überall zustande 
kommen, auf die leichtsinnigste Art und ohne gescheiten Grund, aber ein Pass 
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niemals. Dafür wird er auch anerkannt, wenn er gut ist, während ein Mensch noch 
so gut sein kann und doch nicht anerkannt wird.”   
Bertolt Brecht, Flüchtlingsgespräche (203) 
Brecht’s famous description of the passport points to the intersection of the refugee’s 
critical need for a legally sanctioned existence with the reality that, during the NS-period, 
government entities tightly controlled the conferring of documents that granted such permission, 
thereby ultimately limiting the legal rights and protections that such documentation could afford 
to the refugee.   The exhausting and seemingly incessant pursuit of identification and travel 
documents is an experience frequently depicted in German exile literature of the NS-period.  
There was an inherent contradiction in the refugee’s experience in attempting to secure these 
documents, particularly in consideration of Jenkins’ assertion that embodiment is a prerequisite to 
any identity.  The stateless refugee of the NS-regime experienced, as a stateless person without 
the official right to exist within any given territory, the legal denial of a physical space within 
which to exist.  The question thus follows: if an individual is legally erased, how does one 
reconcile this erasure with the reality that the individual still exists and occupies a physical 
space?  The fact is that the refugee did occupy space, a space that was physical, but also 
intellectual.  This situation begs the question of to what extent, through legal manipulations, 
could government entities reduce the refugee to the status of niemand.  Further, what is the extent 
and quality of the agency that the refugee had in defining for himself a space in the human world, 
a sphere, both physical and intellectucal, in which he could experience the dynamic processes of 
identification that intersect to form his notion of identity?   
The history of the European passport system dates back to 15th century France, where it 
was instituted along with a system of royal couriers.  In the following centuries the system 
remained almost continuously in place as a means through which to track and control 
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populations, although there was no international standard for the regulation of what constituted a 
passport and what rights and obligations were attached to it.  Dwork and van Pelt explain that, 
“the liberalization of national economies and the advent of mass travel by train and steamship in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century led to the elimination of passport obligations.  As laws 
requiring passports could not be enforced, they were canceled or, as in the case with France, lay 
dormant” (56).  World War I marked a turning point in the European passport system.  When 
borders closed in 1914, passport laws and regulations were reactivated, and “passport and visa 
requirements became standard throughout Europe” (56).  Identification documentation became 
more complicated, as now a photograph and full physical description of the bearer were required 
for passports.  When the war ended in 1918 these regulations were not dropped, however, but 
rather tightened as the passport became proof of citizenship and the corresponding entitlement to 
the rights thereof.  In the economic crisis following World War I, a passport and the citizenship it 
represented corresponded to the right for employment, and thus passports were a means to protect 
labor markets from foreign workers.  Further, in the context of the welfare state, proof of 
citizenship corresponded to rights for education, unemployment, health and retirement benefits 
(57).   
Following World War I and the reconfiguration of European national boundaries, nine to 
ten million people sought asylum in Europe (57).  Many of these refugees composed minority 
groups who fled to the countries where they were “nationally attached” and were ultimately “well 
absorbed” (57).  There existed, however, a second type of refugee, namely those who did not 
have a national homeland to which to return.  The Armenian genocide in Turkey prompted the 
flight of 200,000 Armenians into France and Syria.  The Russian Revolution led 700,000 
Russians to flee to countries throughout Europe, including, but not limited to, Germany, Poland, 
France, and Romania (57).  These refugees did not possess valid passports, and they were legally 
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denationalized by the countries from which they had fled through a series of legislation in the 
1920s (58).  Stateless, these refugees lacked the protections afforded by citizenship to a given 
state, and thus hundreds of thousands of people existed precariously in Europe without any 
political or economic rights.  The League of Nations recognized the direness of the situation and 
appointed the widely respected Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen to serve as High 
Commissioner on behalf of the League of Nations to deal with the refugee crisis.  With the help 
of Philip Baker, Nansen sought a means through which to provide political and legal protection to 
these refugees (59).  An identity document was thus conceived; officially named the Certificat 
d’Identité, Baker referred to it as the “Nansen passport,” a term that stuck (59).  By the end of 
1922, the Nansen passport was recognized by twenty-four nations as a valid international identity 
document, and within the years that immediately followed, that number reached fifty (59).  As 
Dwork and van Pelt explain, “the Nansen passport did not grant the privilege of residence 
citizens enjoyed or the right to seek employment.  But it looked like a passport, was called a 
passport, was associated with the most noble name of its day, and it worked” (59).  Throughout 
the 1920s Nansen passport holders gained additional rights and benefits, including access to 
quasi-consular services, the right of return to the country that originally issued the document, 
limited diplomatic protection, and eased labor restrictions (59-60).  Further, numerous nations 
agreed that Nansen passport holders were eligible for visas, similar to individuals in possession of 
a national passport (60).  The response of the League of Nations in the 1920s to this refugee crisis 
is quite interesting when considered in juxtaposition to the comprehensive failure in the following 
decade of governmental entities within the international community to find a solution to the 
refugee crisis instigated by the rise of National Socialism.  The creation and implementation of 
the Nansen Passport represents the acknowledgement of an organisation (the League of Nations) 
that the stateless individual is a human being entitled to a legally recognized and sanctioned 
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existence.  On the level of the institutional order, this runs counter to the later failure of the 
League of Nations to either deal with the source of the issue in Germany or grant rights and 
protections to legally vulnerable and stateless refugees.  There were many factors that contributed 
to the League of Nation’s sense of obligation to resolve the European refugee crisis of the early 
1920s.  Of these factors, the one that is of particular relevance to the current discussion is the 
acknowledgement by the League of Nations that the individual, as a member of the human 
community, is entitled to a space, both physical and legal, within the infrastructure of that 
community.  Inherent in their action of establishing a system of identification documentation that 
legally acknowledged and sanctioned the existence of these refugees, was the implication that the 
League of Nations deemed those refugees worthy of the official designation of members of the 
human community and the rights associated therewith.  The American activist and journalist 
Dorothy Thompson touches on this notion in her 1938 statement regarding the Nansen passport:  
It is a fantastic commentary on the inhumanity of our times, that for thousands and 
thousands of people a piece of paper with a stamp on it is the difference between 
life and death, and that scores of people have blown their brains out because they 
could not get it.  But there is no doubt that by and large, the Nansen certificate is 
the greatest thing that has happened for the individual.  It returned to him his lost 
identity. (28) 
It is evident that the correlation between identity and the passport that Thompson touches on 
resonates with the refugee experience and suggests the necessity of a legally documented 
existence for survival.  This begs the comparison of the essentially successful handling of the 
European refugee crisis of the 1920s with the utter failure of the League of Nations to address, let 
alone solve, the dire situation of the thousands of refugees from the NS-regime.  Much 
scholarship has addressed this question, but existing analyses tend to focus on economic factors, 
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such as the role of the Great Depression, as well as the interplay of those economic factors with 
the political situation of Europe during the NS-period, in particular the seemingly incessant 
shifting of political power.  For the purposes of this dissertation, a comparison of the two 
different approaches implemented in the handling of these refugee crises, as well as the 
subsequent results of these approaches, compels a consideration of identification processes within 
the institutional order.  The approach of the League of Nations in their successful attempt to 
resolve the 1920s refugee crisis quite clearly evidences the notion that, within the institutional 
order, refugees of this period in Europe experienced the official recognition of an organisation; 
their existence was both legally acknowledged and sanctioned.  In the following decade, 
however, vast numbers of refugees of the NS-regime existed in a realm of overlapping 
Niemandsländer; in their situation, statelessness represented a legal erasure, and this status of 
being legally niemand created for them innumerable challenges in their attempt to reconcile this 
legal invisibility with the fact that physically, they still existed.   
Although it would thus seem that the Nansen passport could provide a solution also for 
German refugees in need of an international identity document, there was much debate on this 
topic.  Beginning in 1933, various parties voiced hesitancies, stating that the political situation 
surrounding the Russian refugee crisis was much different than that surrounding the German 
refugee crisis.  The Russian refugees could not obtain passports, whereas the many German 
refugees were technically still German nationals and possessed German passports.  This situation 
is complicated however by the fact that on 14 July 1933 the NS-regime passed the Gesetz über 
den Widerruf von Einbürgerungen und die Aberkennung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit 
(“Gesetz über den Widerruf”).  The law served two purposes: it targeted both antifascist Germans 
abroad as well as eastern European Jews who had fled to Germany after World War I (Dwork and 
van Pelt 62).  However, this law confronted all German refugees with the risk of becoming 
 31 
stateless (62).  A further difference between the Russian and German refugee situations was the 
fact that the USSR was not an important member of the League of Nations, as Germany had 
become by 1933, and other member nations hesitated to provoke Hitler.  Other concerns 
regarding the extension of the Nansen passport to German refugees included the fear that doing 
so would only encourage the NS-regime to force further emigration of persons it deemed 
undesirable.  This situation is an interesting example of the interplay between different 
organisations – here, member nations – within the framework of the overarching organisation, the 
League of Nations.  The politics of power among the member nations, along with the 
unwillingness of member nations to risk conflict with Germany, contributed greatly to the League 
of Nation’s ultimate failure to protect refugees from National Socialism.  Such practices of 
appeasement laid the foundation for the NS-regime to push refugees into legal Niemansländer, a 
major step in the process of legal erasure.  This international hesitancy in regard to the German 
refugees was exacerbated by the fact that member nations also feared that it would be difficult to 
economically absorb German refugees; whereas the Russian refugees could be easily placed in 
agriculture and labor positions, many of the German refugees were accustomed to white-collared 
work (63).   
Despite these apprehensions and widespread avoidance of the issue by main member 
powers of the League of Nations, the German refugee crisis was brought up by the Netherlands 
during the League of Nations Assembly in September 1933.  The Netherlands, which believed 
itself to have “shouldered more than its share of the refugee burden,” called for the establishment 
of a new high commissioner to deal with the issue (64).  What was not addressed, however, was 
the root of the issue, namely the reason why refugees were fleeing Germany.  None of the 
member countries wanted to provoke Germany, and thus the refugee crisis was dealt with as if it 
were the natural byproduct of politics (64).  The negotiations and debate surrounding the 
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establishment of the commission considerably weakened the proposal for the creation of a new 
high commission to deal with the refugee crisis.  Ultimately, the International High Commission 
for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany was created, and James McDonald, an 
American professor and diplomat, was appointed as high commissioner (65).  It was a weak 
entity, however, in that it received no funding from the League of Nations, and it did not report to 
the League Council (65).  As Dwork and van Pelt describe, “treated like a cast-off child of the 
League and starved for resources, McDonald’s high commission consisted of two small rooms 
and a staff of six people located in Lausanne, physically and symbolically removed from the 
Geneva headquarters” (66).  The tangible facts of this commission – the limitation of its 
resources and its physical distance from the League of Nations – are representative of its 
influence within the organisation of the League of Nations itself.  Two years of effort yielded the 
creation of a new identity document, Certificat d’Identité des Réfugiés Provenant d’Allemagne.  
It provided crucial rights, including the right to return to the country of issue, as well as the right 
to apply for visas.  It did not carry the influence or prestige of the Nansen passport, however, nor 
did it come with the quasi-consular services of the Nansen passport.  For German refugees with 
expired passports, however, “it was better than no paper at all” (66).   
 McDonald’s efforts were, however, short-lived.  As Palmier explains, McDonald 
attempted to open discussion with NS-officials upon taking up the position of high commissioner, 
but his success was limited to the coordination of relief projects with Jewish organizations (270).  
Further, his plan to evacuate 100,000 German Jews over the course of five years, which he 
submitted to the British Foreign Office, was met with defeat (270).  Beyond frustration, 
McDonald realized with the NS-institution of the Nürnberger Gesetze that his efforts were futile 
if he were not able to attack the problem from its source.  The League of Nations was not willing 
to criticize the NS-regime, and “try as he might to protect refugees from Germany, the Nazi 
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regime insolently created ever more.  The heart of the matter lay in Berlin, not Paris, London or 
The Hague” (Dwork and van Pelt 68).  On 27 December 1935, McDonald released a letter of 
resignation to publications around the globe in which he concluded that “the problem must be 
tackled at its source if disaster is to be avoided” (101).  McDonald’s plea drew attention to the 
German refugee issue, although ultimately nothing was done, neither by the League of Nations 
nor its member nations.  As Dwork and van Pelt conclude, “McDonald’s dramatic resignation 
and bold plea for direct intervention captured attention in many quarters.  But the moment passed, 
the papers thrown away.  And the sole attempt by a responsible official to change the paradigm 
from dealing with German refugees to dealing with the German regime became yesterday’s 
news” (68).  The failure of the international community to act on behalf of German refugees in 
the mid-1930s further exacerbated the precariousness of the refugees’ existence, pushing them 
deeper into the Niemandsland of legal invisibility.   
Throughout the remainder of the 1930s, leading up to World War II, the “International 
High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany” remained a weak entity.  Its affiliation 
with the League of Nations remained loose, and the only funding it received was for its 
administrative costs.  It could not financially assist refugees, and it had little success in 
compelling the member nations to act on behalf of the refugees.  Further, the deteriorating 
political situation in Germany and the NS-regime’s agenda of territorial expansion led to an ever-
increasing number of refugees.  Hans-Albert Walter summarizes the conditions under which the 
High Commission operated in the late 1930s: 
Hatte sich der Hohe Kommissar schon in den Vorjahren nicht gegen die restriktive 
Asylpolitik der Völkerbundsmitglieder durchsetzen können, so stand seine 
Tätigkeit in der mit der Annexion Österreichs beginnenden Phase der 
Vorkriegszeit unter einem noch schlechteren Vorzeichen.  Die nunmehr sprunghaft 
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ansteigenden Flüchtlingszahlen und vor allem eine ebenfalls ständig wachsende 
Zahl von potentiellen Flüchtlingen, die vorläufig noch in den Herkunftsländern 
lebten, erweiterten nämlich seine zuvor relativ begrenzten Aufgaben ins nahezu 
Unüberschaubare. [...] Schießlich war er wegen seiner politischen Ohnmacht und 
organisatorischen Schwäche auch auf keine der neuen Notsituationen vorbereitet, 
so deutlich und lange sich diese auch vorher angekündigt hatten. (59) 
Walter continues to cite the fact that, despite mass waves of emigration out of Austria following 
the Anschluss of 11 March 1938, the High Commission was not granted jurisdiction over these 
refugees by the Völkerbundsrat until nearly two months later, on 9 May 1938.  Ultimately, the 
member nations of the League of Nations were concerned with their individual political interests 
and sought to avoid an inundation of refugees into their respective territories: “…die Haltung des 
Völkerbundes [spiegelt…] nichts anderes wieder als die Politik seiner Mitgliedsstaaten […]. Die 
Staaten [waren] nur daran interessiert […], Exilierte und Emigranten jeweils dem Nachbarn 
zuzuschreiben, ihr eigenes Territorium aber soweit als irgend möglich ‘flüchtlingsrein’ zu halten” 
(62).  The depression of the 1930s heightened the fear of member nations that they would not be 
able to economically absorb refugees, a fear that superseded any notion of humanitarian 
obligation.  
 The politics of economics were an integral experience of refugees from the NS-regime.  
Beyond identity documents, financial constraints proved to be a primary obstacle to emigration.  
Permission to immigrate to a given country often depended on the financial means of a refugee.  
The economic depression of the 1930s left many nations with a critical unemployment issue, 
which led to strict regulation of the labor market.  Refugees were often only admitted to a given 
country under the condition that they did not seek employment there.  For “certain types of 
skilled labourers, technicians and agricultural workers,” there was a limited demand in various 
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foreign economies, but “the overwhelming proportion of emigrants from Germany, particularly 
the Jews, belonged to the professional or business classes” (Sherman 23-24).  Even those 
refugees willing to learn a new profession faced seemingly insurmountable circumstances.  
Sherman explains: 
Those emigrants willing and able to learn new skills nevertheless faced grave 
financial difficulties; in the world-wide economic depression, no country was 
willing to risk the importation of potential or actual paupers, and practically every 
European and non-European country demanded of the would-be migrant some 
convincing demonstration of means sufficient to ensure his not becoming a public 
charge. (24)    
The crux of the issue regarding the financial status of refugees lay in NS-policy, which sought to 
strip refugees of practically all financial means for the profit of the NS-state.  Through the 
“aryanization” process, for example, businesses owned by Jews and non-Aryans were often sold 
at a fraction of the cost.  Other property also needed to be liquidated, and often only a small 
percentage of an item’s true value was obtained.  Further exacerbating the financial status of 
refugees was the Reichsfluchtssteuer, which was introduced in 1931 as a means to conserve 
Germany’s foreign exchange reserves (24).  The NS-regime maintained this tax regulation, which 
it levied on any intending emigrant in possession of more than RM 50,000 or who had in any one 
year since 1931 earned more than RM 20,000 (24).  The Reichsfluchtssteuer stipulated that the 
intending emigrant forfeit 25% of the last assessed value of all his property to the NS-regime, 
with the remainder of his capital placed in a blocked mark account, “which could only be realised 
abroad, at a rate which fluctuated but which tended steadily downward as the uses to which 
blocked marks could be applied were progressively limited” (24).  Sherman cites the estimation 
that the material losses of refugees averaged 30-50% of a refugee’s entire capital for the years 
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1933-1936, and that percentage increased to 60-100% from 1937 to the outbreak of World War II 
(25).   
 
2.3 The Question of Minority Status for Jews in Europe  
  
Following World War I, the Allied Powers met in Paris in 1919 to redraw the national 
boundaries within Europe.  Nationalist principles guided this redistribution of territory; state 
borders were to encompass a national majority (Dwork and van Pelt 69).  The issue that arose 
from this policy, however, was that in the reshaping of the European map, numerous minority 
groups found themselves within the new boundaries of a national majority.  The division of the 
former Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian Empires, for example, aimed to redistribute 
territory to reflect the national majorities resident there, but this inevitably left minority groups 
within these new national boundaries.  These minority groups “now found themselves in a much 
more awkward position than in the multination empires.  The basic assumption that structured the 
new nation states gave rise to implacable hostility against these minorities.  They did not belong” 
(70).  Jewish communities existed in numerous European nations as minority groups, but unlike 
for other minority groups, there did not exist for the Jews a greater national majority to appeal to 
for protection.  For example, after World War I, a significant German minority population lived 
within Polish territory, and Germany itself took an interest in the protection of these Germans 
living in Poland (71).  The Jews, however, did not form a majority nation anywhere, and thus 
Jewish organizations from the United States and Europe sought a means of legal protection for 
the numerous Jewish populations residing across Europe.  These organizations managed to merge 
into the Committee of Jewish Delegations (CJD), which proposed a document outlining minority 
rights to be submitted for consideration at the 1919 peace conference in Paris (71).  The proposal 
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called for the right of minorities to citizenship, as well as political, civil, religious and national 
rights equivalent to those of citizens belonging to the national majority.  The Committee on New 
States and the Protection of Minorities was founded by the Allied Powers at the peace 
conference, and its first task was to compose the Polish Minorities Treaty (71).  The document 
formulated by the CJD served as a template for this treaty, and the treaty itself was ultimately 
accepted by Poland.  With the subsequent formulation of the League of Nations, treaties 
protecting minority rights became a prerequisite for admission to the League, and thus numerous 
nations joined Poland in the early 1920s with the adoption of a minorities treaty.  By the time 
Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926, however, “no one bothered to impose a 
minorities treaty.  For many reasons, the League was eager for Germany to join and, as there had 
been no complaints against the new member to bring the issue to the fore, the opportunity just 
slipped away” (72).   
 The NS-regime was in an interesting situation politically, because, although its ideological 
agenda against the Jewish minority benefitted from the fact that Germany never signed a 
minorities treaty prior to entering the League of Nations, the minorities treaties signed by other 
member nations afforded legal protection to German populations living as minority groups across 
central and eastern Europe.  The worry arose that the NS-regime’s legally enforced 
discrimination against the Jews would create bad publicity for the regime abroad, and possibly 
exacerbate the situation for ethnic German populations living outside of NS-territory (74).  
Ultimately, however, anti-Jewish measures were central to NS-ideology and thus a reformulation 
of the situation was sought.  The German foreign office enlisted the help of Max Hildebert 
Boehm, a scholar and activist for German minorities in Europe, to assist in this reformulation.  
He produced an article entitled “Minderheiten, Judenfrage und das neue Deutschland,” which 
was sent to German embassies and consulates (75).  In the article he argued that the fundamental 
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purpose of minorities protections was to prevent the assimilation of minorities groups into the 
national majority, to protect the groups’ ethnic character.  Since the Jewish policy of the NS-
regime served to dissimilate and not to assimilate Jews, it did not conflict with this notion.  
Further, Boehm argued, “if minorities as defined in a League treaty sought to be protected from 
pressure by the majority population to assimilate, German Jews sought a degree of assimilation 
that the majority population resisted and resented” (75).  The German foreign office adopted 
Boehm’s reformulation of the question of the minority status for Jews and their official stance on 
the matter to serve the dual purpose of protecting German minorities outside of NS-territory, 
while simultaneously defending their ideological agenda against the Jews.  Through this 
argumentation, the NS-regime expanded its reach as an organisation within the institutional order 
of the League of Nations.  
Despite this argument, however, anti-Jewish NS-policy conflicted with Germany’s legal 
obligations in Upper Silesia, the only region for which Germany after WWI had signed a 
minorities treaty (74).  In 1922, when the League of Nations partitioned the region of Upper 
Silesia between Poland and Germany, a fifteen-year treaty was imposed on both governments 
that included the protection of minorities’ rights (75).  The anti-Jewish NS-legislation of April 
and May 1933 applied to German Upper Silesia and thus violated the 1922 German-Polish 
convention (75).  The CJD saw the German-Polish convention and the legal obligations that it 
stipulated as a means with which to attack National-Socialist anti-Jewish policies.  The CJD 
chose the case of Franz Bernheim to appeal to the League of Nations against NS-policies.  
Bernheim, a thirty-four year old shop clerk from Upper Silesia, was born in Salzburg and later 
obtained citizenship in Württemberg and thereby German nationality (76).  He moved to Upper 
Silesia for employment, but on 30 April 1933 he was dismissed from his position on the sole 
grounds that he was a Jew.  A petition was submitted to the League of Nations that May by the 
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CJD on behalf of Bernheim, and it came before the Council on 26 May 1933 (76).  The German 
delegation interpreted the petition as a possible attack on NS-policy in general, and attempts were 
made to have the petition dismissed (76).  These attempts failed, however, and the Council 
announced its decision regarding the petition on 6 June 1933.  This decision preoccupied Jews 
across Germany, who viewed it as determining the relationship between Jews and the NS-regime.  
As evident in an article by Alfred Wiener, “Zwischen Himmel und Erde,” published on 1 June 
1933 in the newspaper of the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, German 
Jews, who had been well integrated into German society, sought to be classified as German 
citizens with the rights belonging thereto, and not as a minority group (78).  The Council ruled, 
however, that Bernheim should be classified as a minority and was therefore entitled to minority 
rights as secured in the German-Polish convention.  The German delegation did not protest, but 
rather openly claimed its acquiescence to the Council’s decision and that anti-Jewish laws would 
not be in effect in Upper Silesia (78).  As Dwork and van Pelt explain, it was “a great public 
relations coup,” as Germany “publicized its acquiescence widely, to ensure that all the world 
knew how eagerly Nazi Germany fulfilled its legal obligations” (78).  The Jews in Upper Silesia 
gained a few years of protection, and many felt that the Jews had won the battle against National 
Socialism (78).   
The NS-regime was still focused on promoting its anti-Jewish agenda, however, and 
sought initially to do so within the framework of its international legal obligations.  On 3 October 
1933, Friedrich von Keller, the German representative to the League of Nations, made a speech 
before the Sixth Committee of the League of Nations, which dealt with political questions (81).  
In this speech, von Keller attempted to present Boehm’s reformulation of the question of Jews as 
a minority, but this attempt opened a discussion on NS-law itself, which von Keller had sought to 
avoid.  Members present at the Sixth Committee meeting rejected von Keller’s formulation of 
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national homogeneity and insisted on the equal rights of all citizens regardless of religion or 
ethnicity (82).  Further, the French representative Henri Bérenger proposed a resolution on the 
subject of minorities.  The first paragraph stated that even nations who had not signed a 
minorities treaty were obligated in their policies and treatment of minorities to adhere to the 
standards set forth in minorities treaties already passed by the League of Nations (82).  The 
second paragraph was a direct attack on the German attempt to redefine minority status, and it 
stated that groups were not to be excluded from minority status simply to serve the political 
agenda of a ruling government (82).  Unfortunately, however, the resolution required a 
unanimous vote to pass, and von Keller voted against it due to the second paragraph.  The League 
removed the second paragraph from the resolution, and Germany agreed to it.  This represented 
the failure of the League of Nations and the international community to protect Jews under the 
legal designation of a minority:   
A pivotal moment [was] lost.  In autumn 1933 the League had power but chose not 
to use it.  Too many of the key states had a version of minorities problems of their 
own.  Britain and France, both colonial powers, well knew that while they could 
speak about equal rights at home, no such rights [existed for] the native peoples of 
their empires […]. In any case, Berlin got the message.  The League posed no 
threat.  The German delegation would walk out later that month.  The immediate 
issue was disarmament.  But the minorities question had opened the exit door. (83)   
The League of Nations proved itself to be a weak entity and set the precedence for the NS-regime 
to disregard its authority without fear of repercussion, strengthening thereby the NS-regime’s 
power to assert its agenda on the level of the institutional order.  
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2.4    The Legal Status of German Refugees in Various Countries and International 
Policies Governing Immigration 
 
This section deals with the legal situation encountered by refugees of the NS-regime in 
specific countries and world regions.  The subsections that elucidate the details of how individual 
nations dealt with the German refugee crisis provide interesting insight into the many factors – 
political, economic, socio-cultural – that contributed to the comprehensive failure of the 
international community to come to the rescue of the refugees of National Socialism.  On the 
difficulties that refugees faced in this experience of being uprooted, Patrik von zur Mühlen 
asserts: “diese politische, soziale, kulturelle und mentale Entwurzelung hatte Folgen, an denen 
sich das Ausmaß der Entfremdung von der Welt der eigenen Herkunft und der übergroßen 
Distanz zur neuen Umgebung abmessen lässt” (74).  Legal barriers preventing immigration of 
these refugees popped up across the world, making immigration in some cases complicated, and 
in many others impossible.  Nations’ legal rejection of the refugee, their refusal to provide him 
with the travel and identification documentation necessary to travel through or even remain 
within their given territories, represents the exclusion of the refugee from the institutional order 
of the internal-external dialectic of identification.  Inherent in statelessness is a rupture in this 
dialectic of identification, and the exclusion of the individual from the institutional order of the 
international community raises the question of the impact of legal erasure and invisibility on the 
identity of the stateless refugee. 
 
2.4.1  Initial Waves of Emigration: Central and Western Europe 
  
When Hitler came to power in 1933, the predominant notion was that the NS-regime, just 
like the governments that had preceded it, would not last very long.  The initial waves of refugees 
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from Germany were mainly composed of political opponents of the NS-regime: writers, 
intellectuals and political thinkers who had challenged National Socialism and were threatened 
by imminent imprisonment because of opinions and values that were central to their identity.  
Many of these individuals had contacts abroad and regularly traveled outside of Germany.  They 
left Germany during the initial phases of the NS-regime with the notion that they would soon 
return, once things had settled and tensions had dissipated.  They fled to the countries where they 
had contacts, but especially to those in close proximity to Germany with lax or nonexistent visa 
requirements.  German-speaking countries were attractive in that they offered familiarity as well 
as the possibility for writers of publishing in the mother-tongue.  Although some fled to Austria, 
the growth of Nazism there deterred many, and with the Anschluss of March 1938, new waves of 
refugees flooded out of Austria.  Switzerland was often used as a transit station, a country 
through which one would travel en route to his ultimate destination, but overall it was adverse to 
admitting refugees for any period of extended stay.  It worried about Überfremdung and had 
established in the 1920s a policing system of foreigners that sought to control, and even reduce, 
the number of foreigners in Swiss territory (Wichers 375-380). 
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, and especially German-speaking Prague, initially 
offered German refugees some of the most favorable conditions in Europe.  German refugees 
were not required to have a visa or special permit to enter the country, nor did they need a valid 
passport to remain there (Palmier 136).  As of 1933, Czechoslovakia had 700,000 unemployed, 
and German refugees were thus allowed to stay within Czech territory as long as they did not 
seek work there.  In 1933 the Czechoslovak National Committee for Refugees from Germany 
was founded, which brought together a number of relief organizations (136).  The Committee 
issued to German refugees Evidenzbögen, paperwork that documented a refugee’s flight from 
National Socialism and provided legal protections.  The welcoming attitude of the Czech 
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government and people toward German refugees is explained “by the liberal tradition of the 
Czech government, the existence of a German-language Czech literature, and above all by the 
close ties between Prague writers and those of Germany” (137).  This “benign attitude” of the 
Czech government toward German refugees, however, incited the hostility of the NS-regime 
(136).  With Hitler’s eventual takeover of Czechoslovakia, German refugees were forced to seek 
asylum elsewhere abroad, but up until the late 1930s, the nation served as a refuge to many, 
especially German writers and intellectuals who could contribute to literary life in Prague.    
France had a long tradition of hospitality, and many German refugees emigrated there 
during the 1930s in hopes of escaping Nazism.  As the 1930s progressed, however, many found 
themselves trapped in France, unable to obtain the documentation necessary to emigrate further 
to a different location abroad.  France had a mounting refugee crisis.  In 1919, France had 
absorbed numerous White Russians.  Beyond the German refugee crisis of the 1930s, the collapse 
of Republican Spain in 1939 sent hundreds of thousands of Spanish refugees into France (Dwork 
and van Pelt 230).  In 1939 alone, 465,000 Spanish refugees fled to France, compared with the 
475,000 refugees who had fled Germany, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia from 1933-1941 (230).  
France responded to the crisis by erecting large internment camps.  “Intended to be temporary, 
they soon became fixed, miserable institutions.  These centers secured government control and 
offered little to the refugees.  Not even the legal protections afforded prison inmates applied to 
camp inmates.  They did not get food, clothing, or shelter as specified by penal code, and they 
lost their civil liberties” (230).  Once the Spanish refugees began to return to Spain at the end of 
1939, and with the outbreak of World War II, the French government used the camps to 
incarcerate enemy aliens, stateless persons, and people under suspicion (231).  More people 
flooded into France as the NS-regime attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.  
Conditions at the camps deteriorated, as they were filthy, overcrowded and completely unable to 
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provide for the basic needs of the inhabitants.  When France fell to Hitler, it agreed to turn over 
all German refugees, defying its promise of asylum.  As Dwork and van Pelt sarcastically 
explain, “it was sheer luck for refugee Jews in France that the Germans did not want them.  The 
Nazi government had gleefully bid them farewell in the 1930s, and they continued to do so in 
1940.  Now unoccupied France would serve as a fine dumping ground” (232).  Within days of the 
NS-takeover of France, thousands of Jews were pushed over the demarcation line and into the 
unoccupied zone, where they were ultimately put into camps.  With the implementation of the 
Holocaust and Final Solution, by 1942 the French internment camps served as holding cells for 
Jews who were to be shipped east for extermination.  The government of Vichy France even 
granted Germany permission to deport foreign Jews from the unoccupied zone, and thus France 
and the French internments camps ultimately proved to be an “anteroom to Auschwitz” (240).  
The question of international complicity in the Holocaust is a complicated topic over which there 
continues to be debate.  The political situation of France in the late 1930s and through World War 
II is one of numerous examples of how political volatility within a given country affected 
international politics and consequently the fate of thousands of refugees of the NS-regime.       
 
2.4.2  German Jews as Refugee Misfits: Great Britain and Palestine 
 
The British government demonstrated much hesitation in its handling of the German 
refugee question, a hesitancy characterized by the fact that refugee German Jews did not ‘fit in,’ 
socio-economically, with the greater needs of Great Britain.  England itself had a looming 
unemployment issue, and the majority of German Jewish refugees were white collared workers, 
professionals and business owners, for which there was little demand in England.  Further, the 
British territory of Palestine was in need of agricultural workers and tradesmen to help promote 
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its fledgling economy, positions for which many German Jews were ill suited.  Although the 
initial waves of emigrants fell primarily upon nations of mainland Europe, Great Britain 
recognized early on the potential for a refugee crisis and sought to establish a political position on 
the issue that was as favorable as possible for its own interests.  Especially considering its 
international jurisdiction over Palestine, which had become integral to Zionist ambitions, Great 
Britain perceived how it might inevitably have to take some sort of action regarding the German 
refugee issue.  As early as 1933 private organizations concerned with the welfare of German 
refugees pressed the British government to act in favor of the refugees.  As Sherman explains: 
Those private organisations and individuals who interested themselves shortly 
after Hitler’s accession to power in the fate of German refugees recognized that the 
problem with which they were concerned raised issues of Government policy 
which went far beyond the immediate emergency and its concomitant relief effort.  
It was conceded by refugee groups that the economic situation in Great Britain, 
and the overwhelmingly middle-class character of the German emigration, made a 
large-scale absorption of refuges in Great Britain impracticable.  Nevertheless, the 
partisans of more liberal immigration policies urged from the outset greater 
generosity on the part of the British Government, both at home and in the overseas 
territories for which Britain was responsible. (27) 
Representatives of the Jewish community in Great Britain were especially vocal on the German 
refugee issue, and they pressed the British Government to exhibit leniency in its application of 
emigration policy.  The Jewish community went so far as to propose to the Home Office in 1933 
that all German Jewish refugees seeking refuge in Great Britain be admitted, and that all German 
Jews already resident in Great Britain be allowed to prolong their stay indefinitely (30).  Integral 
to this proposal of the Jewish community, however, was their assurance that “all expense, 
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whether in respect to temporary or permanent accommodation or maintenance will be borne by 
the Jewish community without ultimate charge to the State” (quoted in Sherman 30).  Further, 
German Jewish residence in Great Britain was to be seen as temporary, and the further migration 
of refugees to ultimate destinations outside of Great Britain was part of the Jewish community’s 
initiative.  The Cabinet assigned a Committee to review the proposal of the Jewish community 
and form a recommendation as to how the British government should proceed in regards to the 
German refugee situation.  The Committee concluded that the policy in Palestine should remain 
that emigration to that territory be conditioned by what the economy there was able to absorb.  
Further, the number of refugees admitted to the British Colonies in general should be “treated as 
negligible” (quoted in Sherman 31).  As far as migration to England itself was concerned, the 
Committee concluded that policy governing admission and exclusion of German Jews should 
remain the same, with the additional stipulation that refugees register with the police upon 
reaching their British destination (31).   
 As emigration from Germany increased throughout 1933, debate in the British 
government turned toward the question of whether or not Great Britain should raise the issue of 
German refugees at the League of Nations.  This proved to be a highly controversial matter, as: 
Discussions within the Foreign Office revealed that the chief objection to taking 
any initiative with the League was the conviction that the British Government by 
so doing would inevitably assume the onerous responsibility for suggesting an 
overall solution to the problem.  While the delicate state of Anglo-German 
relations preoccupied the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office was concerned lest a 
British Government lead at Geneva imply a willingness to take some special action 
on the refugees’ behalf, such as their admission in considerable numbers to 
Palestine. (37) 
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The British Foreign Office refused to raise the question of German refugees with the League of 
Nations, citing the fact that, in comparison with other countries, such as those of mainland 
Europe, Great Britain had absorbed relatively few German refugees.  An internal memorandum 
outlined the British government’s apprehensions: 
The number of such refugees in the United Kingdom is still comparatively 
small…(according to the Home Office, round about 1,000), but the competent 
authorities have no desire to see it increased…the Home Office, Colonial Office, 
Dominions Office and Ministry of Labour are especially anxious to avoid being 
placed in the position of having either to turn down, or to act upon any 
immigration or settlement recommendations coming from such a source [the 
League]; and they therefore do not want the matter referred to the League at all if 
that can be avoided…they are a fortiori averse from any suggestion that HM 
Government should…take the initiative….It may be noted en passant that placing 
the matter on the agenda involves (1) giving notice three weeks in advance; (2) 
giving reasons before the Assembly for placing the matter on the agenda; and (3) 
proposing a definite course of action.  Both (2) and (3) would be highly 
embarrassing to HMG. (Cited in Sherman 37-38)  
Although the British government eventually conceded to the fact that the issue of German 
refugees would inevitably need to be dealt with by the League of Nations, it maintained its stance 
that it should not take the lead in resolving this issue.  The government of the Netherlands 
ultimately brought the German refugee issue before the League of Nations, which it called upon 
to formulate an international solution to the crisis.  The British Foreign Office carefully instructed 
the British delegation at the League of Nations on how to proceed in regard to any suggested 
resolutions to the German refugee problem.  The delegation was warned that the British 
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government was not in any position to offer financial support in the resolution of the issue.  Also, 
the policy regarding Palestine was to remain that immigration there was strictly limited to the 
economic absorptive capacity of the territory.  Further, criticism of Germany and German policy 
was to be avoided as to not exacerbate Anglo-German relations.  And finally, the British labor 
market would be the “paramount consideration” in regard to immigration policy (40).   
 The hesitancy of the British government to act on behalf of the refugees in fear of 
compromising its own interests characterized its stance on the German refugee issue throughout 
the 1930s.  In terms of Palestine, Great Britain maintained the policy that emigration to that 
territory be conditioned by its economic absorptive capacity.  The British government decided 
how many Jews could enter Palestine, but it was the Jewish Agency, a Zionist organization 
established to give the Jews voice in the governing of Palestine, who decided which refugees 
were granted permission to immigrate.  This is where things became more complicated for 
German Jews.  As previously discussed, up until 1933, German Jews were socio-economically 
well integrated in Germany.  Due to this integration in German society, Zionism had not 
resonated with German Jews as it had with many Eastern European Jews.  In 1933, only a small 
percentage of German Jews were registered members of Zionist organizations.  With the NS-
assumption of power and consequent impetus to emigrate, however, German Jews suddenly took 
an interest in Palestine.  As Dwork and van Pelt point out, however: 
It was those who had shown little interest in the project of Palestine before – the 
German Jews – who needed asylum now.  They had few friends among the Zionist 
leaders who wrestled with the conflict between their established long-range vision 
and abandoning those plans in light of the crisis in Germany. (34) 
The issue was further complicated by the fact that the majority of German Jews were white-
collared workers, professionals and business owners, whereas the developing economy of 
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Palestine was largely agriculture based, and thus there existed a demand for manual laborers and 
tradesmen.  There was a movement in Germany and later in Austria to re-train those wishing to 
emigrate in trades for which there was a demand abroad.  Many organizations offered 
Umschulungskurse to support this effort (126).  
 In promoting Jewish emigration out of Germany, the NS-regime made a financial 
agreement with Zionists, termed the ha’avara agreement, to transfer Jewish assets to Palestine.  
Zionists and NS-ideologues agreed on a singular point, namely that Jews did not have a place in 
the diaspora, and both saw Palestine as the solution (35).  To facilitate Jewish emigration to 
Palestine, the German government agreed to allow German Jews the sum of money required by 
Great Britain for entry into Palestine.  The transfer of capital in the form of German products or 
commodities was also permitted.  Jews sold their possessions in Germany, and then deposited the 
money gained into a German bank account.  A trust company then spent the money on German 
goods, such as cars, pharmaceuticals, building supplies, etc., which were shipped to Palestine, 
sold for Palestinian pounds and given to the settlers (35).  Although German Zionists abhorred 
having to make a deal with the NS-regime, the ha’avara agreement stimulated significant 
economic growth in Palestine, which in turn allowed for further emigration to the territory (36).   
There was particular concern in Germany and Austria about the future of Jewish youth.  
Barred from institutions of higher education and ultimately the economy, many Jewish youth and 
their parents looked toward the youth aliyah movement to secure a safe future for Jewish 
children.  The aliyah movement recruited Jewish youth and trained them for agricultural work so 
that they could emigrate to Palestine and live on the kibbutz agricultural collectives.  Beyond 
agricultural training, however, participants were educated in Jewish culture and history, so as to 
foster a deep sense of community and belonging among the youth groups.  Although settlement 
in Palestine through the aliyah movement provided an opportunity for survival, it meant for 
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German-Jewish youth the adoption of a radically different identity in a social and economic 
context foreign from what they had known in Germany and Austria.   
 
2.4.3  The USSR: A Harsh Haven 
 
The USSR became a haven to two types of refugees from the NS-regime: political 
refugees whose communist leanings put them in ideological conflict with the NS-regime, and 
non-communist Jews who became trapped in the political chaos of the ever-shifting national 
boundaries in Europe from the late-1930s through the end of World War II.  The constitution of 
1918 outlined how the USSR was to deal with refugees, and this tradition continued in Article 
129 of the 1936 USSR constitution, which guaranteed the right to asylum to foreign refugees, 
“die wegen Verfechtung der Interessen der Werktätigen oder wegen wissenschaftlicher 
Betätigung oder wegen ihrer Teilnahme am nationalen Befreiungskampf verfolgt werden” 
(Schafranek 384).  Despite this de jure legal tendency, however, the USSR was relatively 
restrictive in admitting political refugees.  For example, it is estimated that, in the beginning of 
1936, 4,600 political refugees from the NS-regime had been granted asylum in the USSR, 
whereas the immigration of non-communist refugees from the NS-regime was almost entirely 
restricted (384).  Many of the communist political refugees from NS-Germany formed an 
intellectual community in Moscow, representative of which are such communist literary figures 
as Johannes R. Becher, Willi Bredel, Hans Günther, Alfred Kurella, Ernst Ottwalt, Karl 
Schmückle, Erich Weinert, and Friedrich Wolf (385).  Communist German literary figures found 
further audience via organizations such as the Verlagsgenossenschaft ausländischer Arbeiter in 
der UdSSR (VEGAAR), which in 1937 consisted of over 300 members (386).  The VEGAAR 
was founded in March of 1931 with the purpose of publishing “Broschüren, Hand- und 
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Nachschlagebücher über die Sowjetunion, politische und wissenschaftliche Literatur sowie 
Romane, Novellen und Reiseberichte, […] die geeignet sind, den Ausländer näher mit der 
Sowjetunion bekannt zu machen” (386).  With the rise of National Socialism in Germany, the 
VEGAAR published after 1933 numerous works of anti-fascist literature.  The authors of these 
works included the communist German writers listed directly above, in addition to other 
communist and anti-fascist writers, among them Bertolt Brecht, Fritz Erpenbeck, Lion 
Feuchtwanger, Oskar Maria Graf, Egon Erwin Kisch, Wolfgang Langhoff, Hans Marchwitza, 
Theodor Plievier, Ludwig Renn, Adam Scharrer, Anna Seghers, Bodo Uhse, Franz Carl 
Weiskopf, and Hedda Zinner (386).  The VEGAAR also published four German-language 
newspapers before its dissolution in 1938 (387).  After World War II, many of these communist 
German intellectuals returned to either the USSR occupied zone in Germany or to Austria, “um 
dort im Rahmen der SED [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands] bzw. der KPÖ 
[Kommunistische Partei Österreichs] im Bereich von Verwaltung, Politik und Kultur die 
Interessen ihres früheren Asyllandes zu vertreten” (394).  
Few non-communist German refugees sought asylum in the USSR before the outbreak of 
World War II (Dwork and van Pelt 218).  The USSR did not cooperate with the League of 
Nations in its establishment of the High Commission for refugees, as it still resented the League 
of Nations for protecting White Russians with the Nansen passport system, and essentially 
admitted only those officially invited by the government (218).  Things changed, however, with 
Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 and the subsequent Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which 
divided Poland between Germany and the USSR.  Once Poland was divided, Jews in the German-
occupied zone, having heard of the atrocities committed by the Germans against Jews elsewhere, 
fled east across the border into the Soviet-occupied territory.  In total 300,000 Polish Jews fled 
across the border into Soviet territory, joining the 1.2 million Jews already resident in Soviet-
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occupied Poland (218).  Further exacerbating the situation was the involvement of German and 
Soviet forces in the exodus.  When German forces began to push Jews over the demarcation line 
into Soviet territory, Soviet forces, overwhelmed by Jewish refugees, fought back by refusing 
Jews entry into their territoy.  What resulted in the fall of 1939 was thus a “no-man’s-land,” as 
Jews were “caught between German gun barrels and Soviet threats” (219).   
 Interestingly, where many countries were adverse to admit refugees, the USSR dealt with 
its refugee crisis by offering Jewish refugees citizenship.  The Soviets wanted to put the refugees 
to work, and they adopted a policy of mass naturalization: “the Soviets simply did not want 
stateless people on their hands or people with Polish citizenship, which had no value since 
partition” (223-224).  Although some were hesitant to accept the offer of citizenship – many 
Polish Jews hoped for the eventual fall of the NS-regime and reunification with German-occupied 
Poland – others saw naturalization and the opportunity to work in the USSR as an escape from 
the ever-encroaching NS-regime.  In need of the refugees’ labor, the USSR, in June 1940, 
transported 200,000 Jewish refugees east to Soviet territory in a matter of a few days (225).  The 
refugees were not sent to Birobidzhan, an autonomous Jewish region in Siberia, but rather to the 
Arctic region, Siberia and the Soviet republics of central Asia.  The Soviet government used the 
refugees as labor for logging sites, mines, and the construction of infrastructure in these regions. 
The refugees met harsh conditions in the Soviet internment camps – with limited food and much 
disease, many died.  At the same time, however, refugees did not face physical abuse at the 
Soviet camps, and the deportation out of Poland into remote regions of the USSR is ultimately 




2.4.4  “Paper Walls:” The United States 
 
David S. Wyman, in his study of the United States and the German refugee crisis of the 
NS-period, aptly refers to the situation in the title of the work: Paper Walls: America and the 
Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941.  The “paper walls” put in place by the US government prevented 
many German refugees from emigrating to America.  The German refugee crisis coincided with a 
period in US history in which there existed a great aversion to immigration.  Roger Daniels cites 
the fact that about half of all people who ever immigrated to the US did so during the period of 
1880-1924 (63).  He explains further: 
In addition to sheer numbers, the negative attitude toward immigration was 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the closing of the frontier and the psychic strains of 
increasing industrialization and urbanization.  These factors helped produce a kind 
of American Kulturkampf (cultural struggled) between an old-stock, Protestant, 
rural-oriented America and an immigrant, non-Protestant, urban-oriented America.  
Immigration policy was but one of the battlegrounds of that struggle, a struggle 
that was heightened by the strains and stresses arising out of the nationalism and 
antiforeign reactions set off by World War I.  (64) 
These factors contributed to a drastic change in American immigration policy in the 1920s, which 
transformed from one that admitted immigrants with certain limited exceptions, to one that 
admitted only a strictly limited number of persons from particular places.  The Immigration Act 
of 1924 set a limit on the number of immigrants who could enter the US in a given year, and then 
subdivided that number into quotas for individual countries.  As Adam Cohen outlines in 
Imbeciles: The Supreme Court, American Eugenics, and the Sterilization of  
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Carrie Buck, the Immigration Act of 1924 was the product of the eugenics movement in the 
United States, which sought specifically to prevent the immigration of Italians and Eastern-
European Jews.  In his analysis, Cohen asserts that the 1924 act and related 1927 Supreme Court 
decision in the case Buck vs. Bell, which allowed for the forced sterilization of a woman deemed 
“feeble-minded,” brought momentum to the eugenics movement not only in the US, but abroad 
as well (10).  In the German context, Cohen cites the fact that Hitler praises in the 1925 
publication of Mein Kampf the Immigration Act of 1924 and that the NS-regime “used America 
as a model for its own eugenic sterilization program” (135, 10).  Further, after WWII, the NS-
party members “who had carried out 375,000 forced eugenic sterilizations cited Buck vs. Bell in 
their defense” (11).  In an interview conducted with Terry Gross, broadcasted by National Public 
Radio on 7 March 2016, Cohen asserts that the eugenics-informed immigration quotas of the 
1924 Immigration Act undoubtedly affected the survival of Jews fleeing the NS-regime: 
It [Immigration Act of 1924] absolutely did prevent many Jews from coming to 
America at the time.  Under the old immigration laws, where it was pretty much, 
you know, show up, they would've been able to immigrate, but suddenly they were 
[…] trapped by very unfavorable national quotas so this really was a reason that so 
many Jews were turned away.  And one very poignant aspect of it that I thought 
about as I was working on the book is, in the late '90s, some correspondence 
appeared - was uncovered - in which Otto Frank was writing repeatedly to the 
State Department begging for visas for himself and his wife and his two daughters, 
Margot and Anne, and was turned down and that was because there were now 
these quotas in place1. And if they had not been, it seems clear that he would've 
																																																						
1 There is a discrepancy between Cohen’s reference of “the late 90s” and his citation of this 
reference in his book.  On p. 135, Cohen references Otto Frank’s correspondence with a US 
government official, in which he pleads for visas for his family.  For this reference he cites the 
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been able to get a visa for his whole family, including his daughter, Anne Frank. 
So when we think about the fact that Anne Frank died in a concentration camp, 
we're often told that it was because the Nazis believed that Jews were genetically 
inferior, that they were lesser than Aryans. That's true, but to some extent, Anne 
Frank died in a concentration camp because the U.S. Congress believed that as 
well. 
Through the example of the Frank family, Cohen suggests the complicity of the US government 
in the Holocaust, in its support of the eugenics movement and the consequences thereof for its 
immigration policy toward refugees of the NS-regime. 
 Although Franklin D. Roosevelt, a liberal democrat, acknowledged from the beginning of 
his presidency what was happening in Germany and “deplored it,” he did little to effect a change 
in the situation nor to help German refugees (Daniels 66-67).  As Daniels explains, “irrefutable 
evidence exists in a number of places to demonstrate that […] the U.S. Department of State 
consistently made it difficult for most refugees to enter this country” (67).  The quota system was 
maintained, but on top of that, a German refugee intending to emigrate to the US needed to 
provide ample documentation that he would not become a public charge.  This required that a 
refugee obtain an affidavit, written by someone residing in the US on his behalf, ensuring that the 
refugee would have a place and means to exist once in the US, and would under no condition 
become a public charge.  The person who wrote the affidavit would often be investigated, and if 
																																																						
New York Times article “In Old Files, Fading Hopes of Anne Frank’s Family” (Patricia Cohen, 15 
February 2007).  This article specifically mentions, however, that Otto Frank’s correspondence 
had been discovered in 2005: “It wasn’t until 2005 that YIVO received a grant to organize and 
index the 350 file cabinets worth of material it had warehoused in an off-site storage center. In 
the summer of that year, Estelle Guzik, a part-time volunteer, was sorting through files when she 
saw that a file jacket was missing the subject’s date of birth, said Carl J. Rheins, YIVO’s 
executive director. He said that she opened it and saw that the children’s names were Anne and 
Margot Frank, and said, ‘Oh my God, this is the Anne Frank file.’”  
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he had pledged financial support of the refugee, he would have to supply evidence of his own 
financial means.  The process was complicated and time-consuming.  Further, time was of the 
essence to the refugee, whose ever-present worries included the expiration of identification and 
travel documentation, as well as the advance of the NS-regime.  A testament to the difficulty of 
emigration to the US is the fact that, from 1933-1940, over 200,000 refugees from Germany 
would have been eligible to immigrate to the US based on the quota system, but during that time 
only approximately 100,000 managed to do so (66).   
 
2.4.5  Latin and South America 
 
Many German refugees sought refuge in South America, several countries of which had a 
tradition of admitting German-speaking immigrants.  Argentina, for example, had long ties to 
Germany, having absorbed a considerable German-speaking population since the turn of the 20th 
century, when South America experienced waves of European migration.  In general, 
immigration policies of countries such as Argentina remained lax during the 1930s, which 
encouraged German immigration.  The Argentinian economy proved able to absorb the influx of 
refugees from the NS-regime, and Walter cites the fact that, on average, it took only two months 
for a German immigrant to find work once he had arrived in Buenos Aires.   
 In the mid-1930s, however, immigration policy in South America changed.  In 1936, 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed a pact, in which they agreed to significantly increase 
controls over immigration, legislation that was not specifically intended to prevent emigration of 
refugees of NS-Germany, but rather that of refugees of the Spanish Civil War.  Newly intensified 
visa restrictions affected German refugees, however, so much so that in 1938, the United States 
State Department sought to intervene on behalf of the refugees.  The US intervention only 
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exacerbated matters, however, and the three South American countries increased immigration 
restrictions.  
 Bolivia became an important country of emigration for refugees only at the end of the 
1930s, when other nations had significantly tightened their immigration controls in response to 
the flood of refugees from the NS-regime (von zur Mühlen 74).  Bolivia represented to refugees, 
along with Shanghai, a last chance for survival (74).  In the period of 1938-1940, Bolivian 
consulates in Europe granted approximately 12,000 entrance visas to refugees seeking to 
emigrate abroad, of which 10,000 were used, primarily by German-speaking Jews, as a means of 
establishing indefinite residency in Bolivia (75).  Bolivia was, however, a harsh contrast to the 
Europe that had been the refugees’ socio-economic and –cultural context.  Bolivia was, in 
comparison to Western and Central European, North American and many other South American 
countries, strikingly underdeveloped in terms of its economy and infrastructure and could thus in 
no way offer the predominantly white-collared refugees employment in the professional fields 
that Europe had once offered.  Further, the political situation in Bolivia was unstable and plagued 
by rampant corruption.  These conditions, combined with the fact that the natural environment 
represented, with its high altitude and consequent thin air, yet another difficulty for adjustment, 
led to the widespread emigration of German-speaking refugees out of Bolivia after WWII ended, 
predominantly to the more economically developed countries in the Americas or to Israel (84).  
As von zur Mühlen summarizes, “Natürlich bildeten die wirtschaftliche Armut und politische 
Instabilität wichtige Motive zur Abwanderung, aber ebenso auch die Fremdartigkeit des Landes, 
das nicht in der Lage war, den deutschsprachigen Flüchtlingen auf Dauer eine materiell 
gesicherte, aber eben auch mental ansprechende Heimat zu bieten” (84).   
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2.5  Chapter Summary   
 
The refugee of the NS-period faced innumerable challenges in his pursuit of the legal 
right to exist.  The analysis of this chapter evidences that the situation of the German refugee was 
complicated by several political and socio-economic factors of the period 1933-1945.  By putting 
German Jews in the precarious position of existence within a legal Niemandsland, the NS-regime 
economically and socially isolated German Jews in an attempt to eradicate them from German 
society.  Prior to Hitler’s rise to power, however, German Jews were well integrated into German 
society and enjoyed financial and social success.  Many German Jews belonged to the educated 
middle-class and were professionals and business owners.  When it became apparent through NS-
legislation that the Jews were a target for eradication, however, they joined the thousands of 
German political refugees who had fled abroad.  Few realized that the NS-regime would remain 
in power as long as it did, however, and many Jews initially remained in Germany.  The extreme 
legal restrictions surrounding German Jews’ ability to transfer capital abroad created further 
complications in their attempt to emigrate.  As the 1930s developed, however, it became evident 
that the situation in NS-Germany was deteriorating as Hitler amassed power, and as refugees 
tried to flee with what little resources they had, few nations were willing or able to provide the 
asylum that these refugees needed.  As is evident in the proceedings of the League of Nations and 
the failed High Commission for refugees, no single nation took the lead in solving the refugee 
crisis.  Nations were primarily concerned with their own interests, and the unemployment of the 
world-wide economic depression of the 1930s was a domestic issue that affected many nations, 
who felt unable to economically absorb the predominantly middle-class German refugees.  
Further, in the 1930s many nations did not want to provoke Germany, and thus the source of the 
refugee crisis was never dealt with.  The ever-expanding legal jurisdiction and international 
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influence of the NS-regime from 1933-1939, when compared to the weak and grossly insufficient 
international response to the refugee crisis resulting therefrom, represents a rupture in the 
institutional order that proved to be profound for the refugee of the NS-period.  Nevertheless, 
refugees of the NS-regime flooded consulates as thousands sought a legally recognized and 
sanctioned existence through the procurement of valid identification and travel documents.  With 
the help of numerous private organizations who worked on behalf of the refugees, some managed 
to escape abroad to various destinations.  They often left everything behind in doing so – family, 
friends, possessions, Heimat – but they ultimately survived.  Others, however, became lost in 
bureaucratic mazes of applications for travel and residency rights that never came to fruition, 
forever lost to the Niemandsland of statelessness.  
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3 The Implications of Legal Otherness for the Refugee’s Notion of Identity: A Case 
Study of Egon Schwarz’s Keine Zeit für Eichendorff  
 
Egon Schwarz, renowned Germanist and professor emeritus of German literature at 
Washington University in St. Louis, provides through his autobiography, Keine Zeit für 
Eichendorff, a compelling account of exile as he experienced as a refugee of the NS-regime, a 
memoir that touches on the indelible impact of exile on the individual’s notions of identity and 
belonging in the world.  An analysis of Schwarz’s autobiography serves a dual purpose in the 
context of this dissertation.  In terms of the theoretical framework for the current analysis, 
Schwarz’s experience as a refugee of the NS-regime was distinctly defined by the interplay 
between the institutional and individual orders in Jenkins’ dialectic of identification.  His flight 
through exile is thus a first hand account of how the institutional order encountered by the 
refugee of the NS-period, as outlined in Chapter One, impacted his sense of place and belonging 
in the world as an individual subject to the overarching socio-historical and -political powers of 
that institutional order.  Further, Keine Zeit für Eichendorff is representative of the genre of 
autobiography, which is considered integral to the canon of German exile literature of the NS-
period.  As Wulf Koepke argues in “Die Selbstdarstellung des Exils und die Exilforschung: Ein 
Rückblick,” many refugees of the NS-regime turned to the process of autobiographical 
composition as a means to process the experience of a sudden and traumatic “Bruch” endemic to 
the flight into exile (13).  Of this process Koepke explains: 
Das kulturelle Exil […] alle diese Menschen waren des Wortes mächtig, alle 
hatten eine einzigartige Geschichte zu erzählen, alle hatten 1933 oder 1938 einen 
traumatischen Bruch in ihrem Leben erlitten, alle fühlten sich aus der Bahn 
geworfen und mussten in einem unwillkommenen fremden Land eine neue 
Existenz gründen, als anonyme Anfänger, auch wenn sie vorher berühmt, 
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wohlhabend und in bedeutenden Positionen tätig waren.  Entsprechend groß ist die 
Zahl der Autobiografien aller möglichen Art […].  Solch Rückblick konnte der 
eigenen Existenz Sinn und Abrundung geben; die Erfahrungen vermittelten eine 
politische, philosophische, religiöse Botschaft an die ‘Nachgeborenen’: einen 
Selbstdarstellung konnte inneren Frieden des Schreibenden bedeuten, einen 
Abschluss vieler Konflikte mit sich und dem Herkunftsland. (13) 
Koepke’s description of the autobiographical process touches on the notion of the individual 
negotiating an element of agency in terms of self-understanding within the individual order 
through autobiographical composition.  Schwarz’s autobiography serves as a case study of the 
impact of exile on identity, and questions of identity therein within the theoretical framework of 
Jenkins’ tripartite model of identification.  The analysis will evidence that Schwarz’s account of 
exile serves as an example of how exile, in which the refugee experiences a rupturing of temporal 
and spatial continuity, affects the refugee’s notions of self and how he understands his experience 
and place in the world.  Further, the question of individual agency in determination of self 
relative to overarching socio-political and -historical forces, a question of great significance to 
Schwarz, will be discussed in terms of the implications thereof for identity formation.  As 
Schwarz explains in the introduction to his autobiography: 
Gerade weil ich von Anfang an eine Art Spielball geschichtlicher Mächte war, 
weil so ganz und gar nichts Spontanes, Selbststätiges an meinem Lebenslauf zu 
sein scheint, stellt sich mir das Problem der Willensfreiheit mit ungewöhnlicher 
Intensität.  Nachdenkend über meinen Werdegang – dieses Wort scheint mir das 
Dilemma geradezu zu verkörpern, denn sein erster Teil deutet mehr auf die 
äußeren Zwänge, der zweite auf die persönliche Initiative – hoffe ich, zwischen 
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dem mir durch die Umstände Vorgegebenen und dem Beitrag, den ich zu meinem 
eigenen Leben geleistet habe, genauer unterscheiden zu lernen. (2) 
With this Schwarz sets the tone of his memoir, and alludes to the fact that through its 
composition he seeks to determine more definitively for himself the extent to which he has 
exercised agency in the unfolding of his own life. 
 
3.1 Legal Otherness and Exile:  A Loss of Continuity? 
 
The indelible connection between identification and notions of time and space that 
Jenkins posits begs the question of the implications of the exile experience for identity, given the 
fragmented nature of time as experienced in exile.  Whereas legal otherness constitutes a rupture, 
exile represents a further dimension of estrangement.  In “Vitae, nicht vita,” Günther Anders 
explains that, in exile, the refugee perceives numerous ruptures in his experience of time and 
space as he is forced to move from one location to the next.  Characteristic of exile from the NS-
regime, he explains, is the collapse of a unified life into what appears to be numerous separate 
and disjointed lives.  Anders asserts that the predominant tendency of refugees of the NS-regime 
was not a return to the lives they left behind in exile, but rather the process of an ever-growing 
sense of estrangement from their former, singular Leben: 
Aber die Rückkehrfälle sind nicht die wichtigsten, mindestens (da ja die Zahl 
derer, die wie ich remigriert sind, verschwindend gering ist) nicht für uns 
Emigranten.  Kennzeichnend für uns ist nicht, daß unser Leben durch ein 
(unerinnerbares) Intermezzo eine Unterbrechung erfahren hat, sondern daß die 
Zerfällung unseres Lebens in mehrere Leben endgültig geworden ist; und das 
heißt, daß das zweite Leben im Winkel vom ersten absteht, und das dritte wieder 
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vom zweiten, daß jedesmal eine ‘Wegbiegung’ stattgefunden hat, eine Knickung, 
die den Rückblick – beinahe hätte ich geschrieben: physisch – unmöglich macht.  
(67-68) 
Anders’ description of the exile experience touches on the question of the significance of spatial 
and temporal continuity for identity formation.  The experience of repeatedly changing location 
results for the refugee in a perceptual loss of continuity; although the continuity of time is 
inherently present, the refugee no longer perceives it, and thus arises the notion of multiple 
disjointed lives experienced through a singular body.  Schwarz’s memoir deals with, both directly 
and indirectly, the seemingly warped experience of time and space in exile, and an element of 
lost continuity is at the pith of this experience.  Schwarz’s experiences in Niemandsland are 
discussed in this chapter within an analytical framework that seeks to determine the implications 
of exile for both Schwarz’s sense of personal agency in processes of identification as well as for 
his corresponding notions of belonging and place in the world.  
 
3.2 The Complexity of Identity Formation as Experienced by Schwarz prior to the 
Anschluss 
 
There is seemingly an inherent quality of continuity to the genre of autobiography, a 
‘story’ of a given life composed of a series of events that often have a causal relationship.  As 
implied in Anders’ assertion, quoted above, there is the notion that in an autobiography, one can 
look back on one’s life and see the path that one has followed, the past from whence one has 
come, and perhaps also down that path into the future.  In a life interrupted by exile, however, the 
path is often not continuous, but rather fragmented, begging the questions of woher? and often 
more pertinent, wohin?.  In Keine Zeit für Eichendorff, Schwarz deals with the question of 
fragmentation and its implications for identity through his account of his life, which was 
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tumultuously and suddenly cast off on a series of tenuously connected detours.  Born 1922 in 
Vienna as the only child of lower middle class Jewish parents, Schwarz came into the world at a 
time of great socio-historical and -political upheaval, particularly for Jews.  From the very 
beginning of the autobiography, Schwarz alludes to a quality of socio-historical estrangement that 
he experienced prior to exile and that defined his early life in Vienna.  Schwarz’s parents 
followed a pattern of assimilation, of a movement out of the traditionally isolated Eastern 
European Jewish community and into urban and mainstream Austrian society.  It was a pattern 
that led not only to a loss of community, but to a socio-economic position in-between two 
cultures as well: that of the old Jewish ghetto and that of the Germanic, Viennese middle class.  
Schwarz explains: 
Der typische Entwicklungsgang wiederholte sich so oft, daß er fast zum 
unausweichlichen Paradigma wird.  Bloß muß man dabei nicht vergessen, daß der 
Einzelne, je nach seinem Talent und seinem Glück, auf jeder dieser Stufen stecken 
bleiben konnte: Auszug aus dem östlichen Städtel oder Ghetto, Einstieg in einen 
Zweig des Handels, Gewerbes oder der Industrie, Aufstieg zur Wohlhabenheit, 
Übersiedelung nach Wien, manchmal mit Zwischenstationen in Böhmen, Mähren, 
der Slowakei oder Ungarn, Heirat mit der Tochter einer schon früher 
emanzipierten Familie, die, feiner gebildet als ihr Ehegatte, den Kindern eine 
fantastische Liebe zur deutschen Kultur einflößte.  Herangewachsen widmen sich 
die Sprößlinge dieser Verbindungen dem Aufbau des väterlichen Geschäfts, aber 
ebenso häufig einem freien Beruf oder der Kunst oder der Literatur.  Natürlich ist 
dieser Prozeß von einer geistigen Entwicklung begleitet: Verlust der Orthodoxie, 
ja fast des ganzen jüdischen Kulturerbes, Aufgabe der jiddischen Umgangssprache 
und der hebräischen Sakralsprache, Verfeinerung der Sitten, Anpassung an die 
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westliche Welt.  Man steht vor einem gewaltigen Säkulisierungsprozeß, der zwei, 
drei, manchmal vier Generationen in Anspruch nimmt.  So kam es, daß in Wien 
Juden auf den verschiedenen Ebenen der Assimilation zusammenlebten, von den 
eben Angekommenen, die in allem, sogar was Kleidung und Haartracht betrifft, 
noch ganz in ihren Traditionen lebten, bis zu den seit Generationen Ansässigen, oft 
längst Getauften, bei denen das Judentum nur noch eine vage, gern verleugnete 
Familienerinnerung war. (17) 
The loss of a traditional Jewish identity through the process of assimilation that Schwarz 
describes meant not only the loss of community, but the loss of a socio-historical identity as well.  
Jews in various stages of assimilation into Viennese society left behind to varying degrees the 
traditional Jewish community’s culture, languages and shared history.  This begs the question of 
what there was to gain for them in their new place in Viennese society, and further, if it were 
even possible for them to fill such a socio-historical void.  The great influx of Eastern Jews into a 
Viennese society, which Schwarz describes as having been still a traditionally Christian one, led 
to a rise of virulent anti-Semitism that combined traditional and economic prejudices “mit 
sozialdarwinistischen, biologistischen Elementen” (17).  Although Schwarz was raised and 
educated in Vienna and in a home with minimal maintenance and practice of Jewish heritage, his 
assimilation into mainstream, Christian Viennese society was superficial.  In the discussion of his 
childhood in Vienna, he reflects on the psychological impact of this pseudo-assimilation on the 
young Jew: 
Der junge Jude, der in einem solchen Klima aufwächst [...] spürt nur sehr früh, daß 
er ‚anders’ ist, daß er nicht ‚dazugehört’.  Als Mitglied einer verachteten und 
verfolgten Minderheit ist er gezwungen, mit dieser existentiellen Grundtatsache 
seiner Abstammung und seiner Sonderstellung fertig zu werden.  Vom Selbsthaß 
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bis zum Gruppenstolz steht ihm eine ganze Skala von möglichen Reaktionen zur 
Verfügung, Assimilation und Taufe, trotziges Bestehen auf seinem religiösen und 
nationalen Judentum, Selbstmord aus Ekel oder Verzweiflung an der eigenen 
ausweglosen Existenz oder militantes Auftrumpfen, Zionismus und 
Auswanderung.  Nur darf man sich diese Entscheidungen nicht als bewußte und 
rationale Alternativen vorstellen.  Viele Möglichkeiten liegen in der Luft, sie 
existieren nebeneinander, der Heranwachsende nimmt sie gleichzeitig, wenn auch 
mehr oder minder intensiv in sich auf, psychologisch durchläuft er sie alle, von 
allen bleibt etwas in ihm haften, und erst allmählich, im Zusammenhang mit 
seinem ganzen Charakter, entwickelt er eine seiner Individualität entsprechende, 
mit seiner übrigen Weltanschauung im Einklang stehende Haltung seinem 
Judentum gegenüber.  (17-18) 
This excerpt provides insight into the immense complexity of Jewish identity as experienced by 
Schwarz in the Vienna of the interwar period.  The multiplicity of identities that Schwarz 
describes as possibilities for young Jews, all pulling them in different directions in the process of 
identity formation, alludes to a sense of disorientation and confusion in terms of a notion of self.  
The simultaneous possibilities that ranged from suicide to Zionist pride in the Jewish heritage 
indicate that there existed a quality of vacillation to the processes of identification, a fact that 
suggests great disorientation in the young Jew’s determination of self.  Here the question of 
continuity comes into play in that through assimilation, a socio-historical disjuncture occurred as 
Jews chose to move out of the isolated Eastern European Jewish communities and into 
mainstream Austrian society.  This break with the Jewish community, the traditional source of 
identification, had great implications for Jewish identity in that Jews found themselves in a socio-
cultural Niemandsland, outside of the Jewish community and yet not fully integrated into 
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mainsteam Austrian society.  In his notion that he was “anders,” Schwarz indicates this double-
sided estrangement experienced by Jews of the intewar period in various stages of assimilation.     
 Finding themselves in a socio-cultural Niemandsland added another dimension of 
complexity to the situation of Jewish identity of the interwar period.  The fact that in the process 
of assimilation many Jews lost the connection with the traditional Eastern European Jewish 
communities from which they originated, and yet at the same time never completely integrated 
into mainstream Austrian society, meant a significant rupture in processes of identity formation.  
Through assimilation, Jews lost much more than the Jewish religion, but the historical culture of 
the Jewish people as well, a loss of the connection to a common history with linguistic, religious, 
cultural, national and economic dimensions.  Schwarz asserts that Jewish identity at this time was 
much more complex than a purely religious identity: 
Der Assimilation wirkte unter den Juden zu dem Zeitpunkt, von dem hier Bericht 
erstattet wird, noch eine Kraft entgegen, ohne die ein Verständnis der jüdischen 
Situation nicht vollständig sein kann: die Religion.  Der Komplex, den die Juden 
Religion nennen, enthält neben den rein religiösen Aspekten viel Brauchtum, 
Volksaberglauben und historisch-nationale Reminiszenzen, ist also von der 
Gruppenidentität keineswegs so leicht so lösen wie die Religion anderer nationaler 
Einheiten. Wenn ein Schwede zum Katholizismus oder ein Mexikaner zu einer 
protestantischen Sekte übertritt, dann ändert sich nichts in seinem Verhältnis zu 
seiner Nationalität.  Bei einem Juden bedeutete ein ähnlicher Schritt im Wien der 
Vorkriegszeit eine radikale Veränderung seiner existentiellen Lage. (19) 
Jewish identity was thus an amalgam of numerous identifications that extended far beyond that of 
just religion.  Even though Viennese Jews did not live in a traditionally isolated Jewish ghetto but 
rather amongst Christian Austrians, the interaction between Jews and Christians was superficial 
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and never breached more intimate spheres of human interaction: Jewish and Christian neighbors 
said hello in the stairwell of apartments, Jews shopped at Christian-owned stores, but a distinct 
separation and sense of otherness from both sides dominated the relationships (21).  Although 
Jews and Christians attended the same schools, friendships and social circles were delineated 
along the Christian-Jewish boundary, a fact indicative of a strong notion, even on a primary level 
felt by children, of a Jewish otherness.  This perception resonates with Jenkins’ theory of an 
internal-external dialectic of identification, based on the notion that the world, “as constructed 
and experienced by humans,” is composed of three distinct yet inextricably intertwined orders 
that “are simultaneous and occupy the same space, intersubjectively and physically” (Jenkins 40).  
Here the interaction order comes into play, in that the implication is that Jews, through the 
process of assimilation and gradual rejection and loss of the Jewish cultural heritage, sought to be 
recognized by mainstream Austrian society as Austrians, as members of that society.  To a certain 
extent Austrian society acknowledged Jews as “Austrian” – the law did not distinguish them from 
Christian Austrians, and they were entitled to the same rights as other Austrian citizens.  Jewish 
assimilation into Austrian society was not complete, however, in that socio-culturally an 
estrangement existed between Christian and Jewish Austrians, leaving Jews in an in-between 
space outside of mainsteam Austrian society.  In terms of Jenkins’ tripartite model of identity 
formation, the experience of Austrian Jews who followed the pattern of assimilation described by 
Schwarz was defined by contradictions.  In the institutional order, the Austrian government, in 
not making a legal distinction between Christians and Jews, acknowledged Austrian Jews as 
citizens entitled to equal rights as other Austrians.  In the interaction order, in which Christians 
and Jews engaged one another, there was however a notion of otherness that separated the two 
groups.  Schwarz asserts that the resulting alienation was especially pronounced “bei Juden einer 
gewissen sozialen Schicht, die der einen Gruppe nur mehr lose, der anderen noch gar nicht 
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angehörten” (Schwarz 21).  Schwarz further alludes here to the fact that through the process of 
assimilation, it was Jews of a certain class – the lower middle-class and midde-class – who 
experienced a particularly apparent sense of societal alienation.  Schwarz’ allusion to the Jews’ 
existence in between two traditional identities, that of the Jewish ghetto and Christian Viennese 
society, introduces into his work the concept of Niemandsland, a leitmotif throughout his 
autobiography and an integral aspect of the development of his understanding of his place in the 
world. 
   Interesting is that Schwarz, during his Viennese childhood, at a certain point 
demonstrated a distinct desire to belong to a community, to be acknowledged in the process of 
the internal-external dialectic of identification as a completely integrated member of a social 
group.  Schwarz’ maternal grandparents lived in the Jewish ghetto in the city of Preßburg 
(Bratislava), the capital of Slovakia.  On certain occasions his family would travel to Preßburg, 
often on high holy days, and spend time with his large extended family.  The community of 
Preßburg Jews made an indelible impression on the young Schwarz, who was touched by the 
harmonious and homogenious nature of their community, the continuity of its history and the 
interconnectedness of the lives of individuals who belonged to it.  He describes how he 
experienced this community as an anachronism: 
Bei weitem den nachhaltigsten Eindruck, den ich erst viele Jahre später zu 
benennen lernte, hinterließ mir jedoch das ungebrochene Stammesdasein der 
Preßburger Juden, ihr miserables Ghetto, das aber einen unschätzbaren Wert 
besaß, denn es war trotz seines Schmutzes und Elends nichts weniger als die 
vielgerühmte und –beschworene ‚Gemeinschaft’, das verlorene Traumparadies der 
Industriegesellschaft. (22) 
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Schwarz describes his experiences in Preßburg as magical.  The anachronistic nature of the 
traditional Jewish ghetto that fascinated Schwarz suggests that the Jewish ghetto can be seen as a 
socio-historical place of origin, the past from which he had come, a past that had preserved its 
pre-industrial identity.  Through leaving this traditional community, Jews created a rupture in the 
socio-historical continuity of their Jewish identity, the first step in the destabilization of identity 
that Schwarz describes. 
Indicative perhaps of an inherent human desire to belong, the desire for an identity that 
one conceives of for oneself and that is simultaneously acknowledged and confirmed by others, 
Schwarz, at the age of fourteen, decided to become a pious Jew, and sought to resurrect Jewish 
cultural and religious traditions in the home of his Viennese parents.  He explains: 
Verglichen mit ihr [Preßburg Jewish community] schien mein Wiener Milieu leer 
zu sein.  Unter dem Einfluß der Preßburger Lebensfülle, in der ich als Gymnasiast 
und Lateinschüler nicht in einem äußerlichen, sondern in jedem, besonders im 
geistigen Sinne nur ein vorübergehender Gast war, versuchte ich es als 
Vierzehnjähriger, auf der Suche nach Selbstfindung und Lebenssinn, eine Zeitlang 
mit der Frömmigkeit, nicht ahnend, daß es schwerlich gelingen kann, einen 
isolierten Zug, und sei er noch so wichtig oder gar zentral, aus einer Kultur in eine 
andere hinüberzunehmen, ohne seine Wirksamkeit zu verändern oder seine 
Funktion zu verzerren. (25)   
This passage indicates Schwarz’s desire to remove himself from a socio-cultural Niemandsland 
and integrate fully into a traditional identity.  His description of the Preßburg ghetto as an 
example of a true “Gemeinschaft,” a paradise lost with industrialization, is indicative of 
Schwarz’s awareness that his life in Vienna lacks a sense of belonging derived from a 
homogeneous and harmonious community.  Schwarz’s inability to reconstruct his Preßburg 
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experience in his Viennese home, however, suggests the significance of time and space for 
identity formation.  Schwarz, living in Vienna, was not only physically removed from the 
Preßburg ghetto, but temporally as well, finding himself in an advanced stage of assimilation 
toward mainstream Austrian society.  Although Schwarz failed to reconstruct the sense of 
community that he experienced in Preßburg, his affinity to that community is a profound 
indication of the intrinsic human desire to belong to a group with a shared and validated identity.   
 
3.3  Ruptures 
 
With the Anschluss of 1938 and his consequent flight into exile, the perceived continuity 
of Schwarz’s life was lost.  The continuous changing of place that defined Schwarz’s exile 
experience represented for him innumerable ruptures in the dialectic of identification on the level 
of the instituiontal order   This series of ruptures was preceded by an identity imposed upon him 
as a Jew in Viennese society, and the imposition of identity continued into his exile experience, 
where he became the undesireable refugee.  In terms of Jenkins’ theory of identity formation, it is 
evident that socio-political and -historical forces project identities onto populations and onto 
individuals.  Jenkins argues that, “the classification of individuals is at the heart of modern, 
bureaucratically rational strategies of government and control” and that “identities exist and are 
acquired, claimed and allocated within power relations” (45).  For Schwarz and his family, this 
meant their classification by the NS-regime as the malignant other, and once in exile, by other 
nations as the undesireable refugee.  The following section explores the various ruptures 
experienced by Schwarz in exile, both those of identity and that of the time-space continuum.  
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3.3.1 Rupture of Statelessness and the Loss of a Legal Identity 
 
Not yet quite sixteen years old, Schwarz witnessed the NS-regime march into Vienna in 
March of 1938, an event that immediately and comprehensively interrupted his life and that of his 
family.  As Schwarz points out, by the time of the Anschluss in 1938, the structure of the NS-
regime was well established in Germany, especially legally.  Whereas Jews in Germany had felt a 
more gradual shift in societal forces between the time Hitler came to power in 1933 and 1938, 
Austrian Jews felt the effects of NS ideology immediately.  Overnight it became apparent that 
Jews were to be eradicated from Austrian society, and a sense of panic set in amongst Austrian 
Jews: 
[…] die Machtübernahme durch die Nazis in Österreich [hatte] natürlich einen 
ganz anderen Charakter […] als fünf Jahre vorher in Deutschland.  Es war ein 
gefestigtes, von politischen und ökonomischen Erfolgen jeder Art selbstsicher 
gemachtes Regime, welches seine Oberhoheit auf die kleine Nachbarrepublik 
ausdehnte.  Alle in den Jahren der Erstarkung gemachten Erfahrungen, alle bis 
dahin verabschiedeten Gesetze, einschließlich der [1935] in Nürnberg erlassenen 
und später erheblich vermehrten Judengesetze, wurden, nicht allmählich wie im 
Reich, sondern mit einem Mal und mit großer Härte auf das neue Gebiet 
übertragen und sein ganzes staatliches und soziales Leben sozusagen über Nacht 
umgekrempelt.  (33-34) 
The NS-regime, in terms of Jenkins’ tripartite model, functioned as an organization and vehicle 
of classification, and with their takeover of Austria they legally classified Jews as an undesirable 
population and a target for eradication.  The ideological and societal structure of the NS-regime 
left no room for Austrian Jews, who became essentially stateless, which Schwarz associates with 
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the strange feeling, “plötzlich vogelfrei zu sein” (37).  Helga Schreckenberger analyzes 
Schwarz’s experience in NS-Austria prior to his emigration as an exile in and of itself: “schon 
vor dem Verlassen der Heimat erfuhr Schwarz eine Art von Exil durch den Verlust der 
elementarsten bürgerlichen Rechte auf Schutz und körperliche Sicherheit” (199).  The result of 
statelessness, of having no legal protection was thus “tiefste Verunsicherungen und 
Desorientierung” (199).  The loss of citizenship and the rights associated with it meant for 
Austrian Jews a disjuncture in the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of 
indentification in that they were not recognized by any given state as a citizen, but rather now 
instead were labeled a malignant ‘other.’  To lose legal validation of a state-based identity had 
profound consequences for Schwarz’s sense of place in the world, particularly as he was forced 
into exile to survive, entering the world as a stateless refugee and therefore also officially as one 
in between identities.   
As the 1930s developed and the NS-regime tightened its ideological grip on German and 
Austrian society, it became more and more logistically difficult for individuals seeking to 
emigrate to do so.  By 1938, emigration options were extremely limited, especially if one were 
not of significant financial means and did not have contacts abroad, a fact that incredibly 
complicated the situation of Austrian Jews.  Schwarz notes, “der kleine Mann, der weder Geld 
noch Geschäftsfreunde in fremden Ländern hatte, mußte sich auf lauter launische und 
unzuverlässige Dinge stützen: sein Glück, das Mitleid und die Hilfsbereitschaft der Welt, seine 
eigene Tatkraft, Ausdauer und Schlauheit” (41).  Schwarz’ reference to der kleine Mann is a 
poignant allusion to his experience of being an individual among the masses, subjected to 
historical forces beyond his control.  Here Schwarz calls into question the agency of the 
individual and casts over it the shadow of doubt.  For Schwarz and his parents however, fate and 
luck were with them, in that they managed to get their affairs in order and successfully reach 
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Preßburg, close to Slovakia’s western border with Austria, utilizing the little room they had for 
personal agency.  Schwarz’ mother had already gone to Preßburg on a visit during the Anschluss, 
and so it was Schwarz and his father who needed to coordinate their departure from NS-Austria 
and join her in safety in Preßburg.  After numerous frightening complications, they managed to 
put their affairs in impeccable order, pay the flight tax, and attempt a border crossing into 
Slovakia.  They lacked one key element, however: a visa.  Schwarz, in his description of the 
critical nature of the visa and its implications for survival, provocatively underscores the paradox 
of the exile experience: “die Furcht war aber ganz konkret: Würde es gelingen, die Grenze zu 
überschreiten?!  Denn uns fehlte das Lebenselixier, von dem damals – in einem den meisten 
heutigen Menschen unvorstellbaren Maß – Sein oder Nichtsein abhingen: ein Visum” (43).   The 
conception of “Sein oder Nichtsein” as dependent on the possession of a visa, on legal 
documentation that grants an individual permission to exist within a given space for a given 
period of time, is a notion that defined the exile experience of those who fled the NS-regime.  
The legality of existence as dictated by the NS-regime is a notion that touches on the role of the 
institutional order in the processes of the internal-external dialectic of identification.  As 
discussed, in the context of Jenkins’ model, governments can be interpreted as organisations and 
thus “vehicle[s] of classification” (45).  A government’s denial of a visa to an individual is an 
official form of rejection, and in the historical context of the late 1930s a rejection of the 
permission to exist within a given territory.  Luck and fate combined so that Schwarz and his 
father successfully crossed into Slovakia through the help of their Preßburg family and a bribe, 
but Schwarz never loses sight of the fact that it was precisely this fortuity that contributed to his 
ultimate survival. 
  Although a reprieve, Preßburg was a temporary haven and turned out to be one of many 
stops in the family’s journey through exile, representing thus another rupture in the continuity of 
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space that the family experienced.  Through the Münchner Abkommen (29. – 30. September 
1938), Hungary, to the south and southwest of Slovakia, occupied border areas of Slovakia, 
which was consequently partitioned.  Soon Schwarz’s family found themselves surrounded, as 
the NS-flag was visible in Preßburg across the Danube.  Hitler facilitated the establishment of a 
fascist state in Slovakia, and thus the hope of a refuge there quickly dissolved.  Through his 
description of the events that directly followed, Schwarz illuminates the inhumanity of this 
renewed rupture and its implications for identity and exposes an inherent paradox latent therein.  
Schwarz and his family, who did not have the proper visa nor residency rights, were forced to 
leave Preßburg, escorted by the Slovakian military on a journey toward the Hungarian border.  
After several days and under trying conditions, Schwarz’s family and several hundred other 
Jewish refugees were dumped in between the Hungarian and Slovakian border, a Niemandsland 
inhabited by people whom no one wanted.  Finding himself in a literal human dump, Schwarz 
experienced perhaps the most paradoxical situation of his life: 
Ein Paar hundert Meter vor uns sahen wir slowakische Grenzposten, hinter uns, 
die Rückkehr verwehrend, hatte sich eine Kette ungarischer Grenzwächter 
gebildet.  Dazwischen war ein breiter Streifen Demarkationslinie, wie der 
technische Ausdruck für die von einer internationalen Grenzverschiebung 
betroffene Zone lautet.  Wir waren Niemande im »Niemandsland«.  Es begann nun 
eine der absurdesten, ganz aus dem Rahmen der Herkömmlichkeiten fallende 
Episode meines Lebens.  Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit, Streik und Protest, selbst 
Krieg und Revolution, Inhumanes von Menschen über andere Menschen 
Verhängtes gehörten vergleichsweise zu den ‚normalen’ Erscheinungen, machten 
den Vorrat des Erfahrenen oder wenigstens des Vorstellbaren aus.  Aber die 
Existenz von Ausgebürgerten und Geächteten, sozusagen ausgestrichen aus den 
 76 
Listen der standesamtlich Zugelassenen und Lebensberechtigen, war damals vor 
dem Krieg in Mitteleuropa, zwischen zwei Staaten, deren Machthaber ständig 
salbungsvolle Worte von Abendland und Gesittung im Munde führten, noch eine 
Neuheit, etwas Unverständliches, in keiner Rubrik Unterzubringendes.  (51-52) 
Schwarz’s use of the term “Niemande” suggests a complete break in the internal-external 
dialectic of identification, in that through being pushed out of all societies and dumped in a 
Niemandsland, the refugees were no longer recognized by others as belonging to the human 
community.  His description of being “ausgestrichen aus den Listen der standesamtlich 
Zugelassenen und Lebensberechtigen” attributes an ephemeral and insignificant quality to the 
existence of the individual who is deemed undesireable by a given state.  Schwarz describes this 
experience as one that it is almost impossible to wrap one’s mind around – the bizarre position of 
having been legally deleted from society and yet still alive, of occupying a space outside of the 
human community.  
 Luck and fate interceded yet again on behalf of Schwarz and his parents, as a family 
member was successfully able to rescue them from the Niemandsland and facilitate their arrival 
in Prague, in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Czechoslovakia, and especially German-speaking Prague, initially offered refugees from the NS-
regime some of the most favorable conditions in Europe.  The refugees were not required to have 
a visa or special permit to enter the country, nor did they need a valid passport to remain there 
(Palmier 136).  In Prague, Schwarz and his family were still in late 1938 able to obtain residency 
permits, although the NS-regime was ever tightening its grasp on this refugee haven.  Schwarz 
notes the generosity of the Czech government and how invaluable it was to again have a legal 
existence: “Darin zeigten sich die Tschechen ungemein großmütig.  Irgendwo sein zu dürfen, 
legal mit Schein und Stempel, war für unseresgleichen im damaligen Europa kein verächtliches 
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Privileg” (57).  Emigration options were extremely limited by late 1938, however, with 
opportunities for emigration restricted predominantly to Bolivia and Shanghai for the refugee of 
average means and connections.  Through fortuity and the assistance of a Jewish aid 
organization, HICEM, Schwarz and his parents secured the necessary identification documents, a 
Bolivian tourist visa, and passage on a ship leaving France destined for the Chilean coast.  This 
course of events raises the question of human agency relative to greater historical forces in 
Schwarz’s acknowledgement that if it had not been for the good will and help of individuals, he 
and his parents would not have survived.  Human agency under these circumstances requires 
differentiation as indicated by Schwarz’s point of view: 
Und da ich in diesen Erinnerungen auch der Frage nachgehe, welchen Anteil der 
einzelne Mensch an seinem Schicksal hat, was er zu seiner Gestaltung nach 
eigener Einsicht beizutragen vermag, wird sich niemand wundern, wenn ich an 
dieser Stelle nicht dazu neige, der Freiheit des Willens und der Selbstbestimmung 
eine übertriebene Bedeutung beizumessen.  Und doch: ein Wille, eine individuelle 
Initiative hat bei unserer Rettung mitgeholfen.  Vielleicht war es nicht eine einzige 
Tat, sondern das Werk setzte sich wie ein Mosaik aus vielen kleinen Teilen 
zusammen, vielleicht war es nicht immer unser eigenes Streben, das uns aus den 
Verstrickungen löste, sondern die Fürsorge anderer; aber selbst in diesen wilden, 
scheinbar von Zufall und Willkür regierten Zeiten, lassen sich die intendierten 
Akte der Beihilfe und Förderung von den chaotischen Mächten blinder 
Unterjochung unterscheiden. (63) 
In this passage, Schwarz addresses the question of human agency in a much more positive light 
than in other sections of his autobiography.  Although Schwarz interprets much of his life 
experience as evidence for an ultimate lack of power that individual agency has relative to the 
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greater historical forces at play, here he acknowledges that in his case, and assumedly that of 
other refugees who survived, the acts of individuals, merged into a mosaic of acts of humanity 
and good will, affected the outcome of the situation at hand in a positive way.  In this instance the 
processes of the interaction order of the internal-external dialectic of identification are apparent in 
that the refugee and his worth are acknowledged by other individuals, and he is thereby again 
engaged by and readmitted into the community of humankind.    
 Schwarz’s departure from Europe and journey into exile in South America was, however, 
characterized by a quality of disorientation and alienation that further interrupted processes of 
identification and thereby complicated his development of notions of belonging and place in the 
world.  The ship that brought Schwarz and his parents across the Atlantic to Bolivia via a Chilean 
port was cramped with refugees traveling as third class passengers.  Here again on the journey to 
South America the notion of existence in a Niemandsland manifests itself in Schwarz’s 
experience on the ship: 
Man befand sich, unverkennbar, auf einem Emigrantenschiff, das aus einem 
Frachter der plötzlichen Konjunktur zuliebe notdürftig zur Beförderung von 
großen Menschenmengen hergerichtet worden war. [...] Der Kapitän soll gesagt 
haben, er bedaure die Länder, in die sich der Inhalt seines Schiffes entladen würde.  
Offenbar empfanden die Regierungen, deren Häfen man anlief, ebenso, denn in 
den meisten wurden nur die Passagiere der ersten und zweiten Klasse vom Schiff 
gelassen, während wir, Auswanderergesindel, an Bord bleiben mußten. (61) 
Yet again Schwarz experiences the official rejection of government entities, which through their 
actions acknowledge the legal otherness of the refugees and fear the possibility that he as a 
refugee, and others like him, might somehow manage to stay within their territory.  In terms of 
Jenkins’ tripartite model, the refugees experience a rupturing of the internal-external dialectic of 
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identification in that governments refuse to acknowledge the refugees as fellow human beings 
with an inherent worth.  The ship itself is a travelling Niemandsland in Schwarz’s autobiography, 
another manifestation of the existence in the space of the in-between, both physically and legally 
outside of human delineated national boundaries.  
 
3.3.2 Rupture of European Identity 
 
Schwarz acknowledges Bolivia as an opportunity to survive, but explains that it did not 
offer the European refugee any semblance of a second home.  Bolivia at the time of Schwarz’s 
residence there was removed from Europe in all dimensions: spatially, culturally, and even, as 
Schwarz suggests, temporally.  Hans-Albert Walter offers insight into the situation that the 
refugee faced in Bolivia.  He notes that in comparison with the industrialized and urban 
Argentina, Bolivia was seemingly a place from a different era and “stellte dagegen beinahe den 
Prototyp einer in sich geschlossenen Gesellschaft dar, die mit ihrer Rückständigkeit eher dem 19. 
als dem 20. Jahrhundert anzugehören schien” (305).  He cites the fact that while in the mid-20th 
century over 70% of Bolivians were illiterate and two-thirds of them lived in rural regions, in 
Argentina only 10% of the population was illiterate and only 37.5% lived in rural areas (305).  
Further, life expectancy in Bolivia at the time was less than 50 years of age, whereas in Argentina 
it was 65 years of age, similar to statistics in Europe at the time (306).  Walter characterizes the 
refugee situation in Bolivia and the country’s motivation for accepting refugees: 
Das von Sozialhistorikern als ein Land mit archaischer Gesellschaftsstruktur 
klassifizierte Bolivien besaß also so gut wie keine Voraussetzungen, um eine 
größere Einwanderung von Angehörigen der städtischen Mittelschichten 
aufnehmen und absorbieren oder auch nur einigermaßen sinnvoll beschäftigen zu 
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können.  Wenn es dennoch zu einer solchen Einwanderung gekommen ist, so 
resultiert das vor allem aus der Geldgier und Bereicherungssucht einer korrupten 
Bürokratie.  Man kann ohne Übertreibung sagen, daß fast die gesamte 
Einwanderung aus Deutschland, Österreich und ČSR auf dem Wege der 
Korruption zustandegekommen ist. (306) 
Schwarz’s description of the situation faced by the refugee in Bolivia is almost exactly that of 
Walter’s explanation and analysis.  Schwarz describes Bolivia as an almost pre-modern society, 
politically corrupt and unstable, that offered the refugees a safe haven but absolutely no 
semblance of a society or culture to which they as Mitteleuropäer could relate.  Although, as 
discussed, Schwarz had experienced to a certain extent as a Jew in Vienna of the interwar period 
a sense of alienation, Vienna – a large, industrialized, Western and urban city – was his place of 
origin, providing a sense of home if he were to ever have had one.  Consequently, his sense of 
alienation from Bolivian society was profound: 
Nicht nur daran muß man sich gewöhnen, fast nichts ist, wie man es kennt, weder 
in der Gesellschaft noch in der Natur.  Wer mitteleuropäische Maßstäbe an das 
Gesehene, Erlebte anlegt, wird es nie verstehen.  Und dennoch bleibt einem nichts 
anderes übrig, als sich eines in Europa ausgebildeten Wahrnehmungs- und 
Erkenntnisapparates zu bedienen, Erwartungen und Vorstellungen einer völlig 
anderen Kultur auf das neu auf einen Zutretende anzuwenden.  Darin besteht das 
Dilemma.  Es wird Jahre dauern, ehe sich aus dem Mitgebrachten und dem 
Vorgefundenen ein übergreifendes, weitere Bereiche der menschlichen Erfahrung 
erfassendes Bewußtsein herausgebildet hat. (65-66) 
An adolescent raised in a middle-European context, Schwarz did not have the worldly experience 
to understand what he encountered in Bolivia; that which he witnessed was simply not 
 81 
interpretable through a lens shaped by a Western, European identity.  Schwarz was not alone in 
his alienation which affected the refugee’s identity in this utterly foreign environment of exile: 
Ist es nötig, zu beteuern, daß wir Immigranten in diese Welt paßten – um ein 
populäres Wort zu gebrauchen – wie die Faust aufs Auge?  Zwischen Indianern 
und Europäern klaffte ein unüberbrückbarer Abgrund von Kulturäonen, der eben 
nicht nur linguistisch bedingt war und jede Gemeinsamkeit außer der 
oberflächlichsten ausschloß.  […] Es gibt einen sozialwissenschaftlichen Begriff, 
der ihre Desorientierung suggestiv beschreibt, den heute allenthalben erwähnten 
„Kultur-Schock“.  Der Ausdruck war damals noch nicht gebräuchlich, aber die 
Erscheinung wohl.  Sie tritt immer dann ein, wenn jemand aus seiner vertrauten 
Umgebung in eine fremde gerät, wo alles anders ist als gewohnt, die Gesichter, die 
Kleider, die Sitten, wozu womöglich noch die fremde Sprache kommt, die man 
niemals völlig beherrscht und die einen zwingt, ständig unter seinem geistigen 
Niveau zu leben, die fremde Psychologie und Lebensauffassung.  
(71-72) 
In this comprehensive alienation from Bolivian culture as encoutered by the Jewish refugees, 
there is inherently a break in the processes of the internal-external dialectic of identification in all 
three orders, but particularly in that of the interaction order as experienced between the Jewish 
refugees and native Bolivians.  They each were people from completely different socio-economic 
and -historical contexts, and neither group had the proper lens through which to interpret and 
understand the other.  Thus an interruption is evident in the interaction order, in which during the 
presentation of self the Jewish refugee was not acknowledged or validated by his Bolivian 
counterpart, who could simply not understand him.  Further, the fact that the refugee lived and 
operated in a foreign linguistic context created additional difficulties in self-expression within the 
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interaction order.  To express oneself in a language in which one is minimally proficient is not 
only frustrating but devaluing as well, in that one cannot readily and comprehensively explain 
ones thoughts.  Alienation from Bolivian society was thus exacerbated by the linguistic divide 
and the limitations it placed on the refugee’s demonstration of self to the Bolivian population.    
 Schwarz employs the motif of the picaro in his description of how he survived his time in 
South America.  The picaro is the antihero of the German Schelmenroman, the origins of which 
lie in Spanish literature of the sixteenth century.  The genre of the Schelmenroman resonated with 
German society as it transitioned from a feudal system to early capitalism, a time in which 
individual agency in determination of place in the world became a question of great interest 
(Schreckenberger 202).  The picaro is a figure of the lower-class who navigates socio-economic 
and –political forces through cleverness to ultimately secure his own survival (Frenzel 619).  He 
is not traditionally a malicious figure, but he is also not particularly honorable; his main priority 
is survival and securing, however temporarily, a comfortable existence for himself (619).  
Schwarz employs the figure of the picaro in retrospect to make sense of his disjointed 
experiences in South America.  During his time in Bolivia, Schwarz took on a series of jobs with 
which he had varying success, from a traveling salesman to a middle-range employee of a mining 
company, navigating the entire time the corruption that riddled the Bolivian government and 
economy.  Like the other Jewish refugees, Schwarz and his parents arrived in Bolivia on visas 
sold to Jewish aid organizations by corrupt Bolivian bureaucrats looking to make a profit off of 
the desperate situation of individuals whose survival depended on emigration.  These aid 
organizations were sold tourist and agricultural visas, yet another paradox in the exile journey in 
that the recipients of these visas were neither tourists nor by any means qualified to enter the 
agricultural industry.  And thus it was in this tumultuous political and social climate that Schwarz 
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sought to survive, in ways that he later perceived as picaresque, and during which time he 
transitioned into adulthood: 
Die Geschichte meiner ‚Berufe’ und Anstellungen, der Wechsel meiner Rollen, 
Arbeiten und Tätigkeiten liest sich, das charakteristische Emigrantenmilieu wie in 
einem Prisma zeigend, ohne daß ich allzuviel dazu getan hätte, ebenfalls wie das 
Leben eines Pikaro, wie ein Schelmenroman, in dem sich eigene Initiative und 
äußere Determiniertheit durchdringen.  (90) 
 Schwarz’s continuous switching of jobs indicates an element of fragmentation that defined his 
time in South America.  Schwarz titled this chapter of his biography “Der Emigrant als Picaro,” 
and as Maeding asserts, “es handelt sich folglich beim ‘Emigranten als Picaro’ um ein auf den 
literaturgeschichtlichen Motiv- und Figurenfundus zurückgreifendes Konstrukt, das der 
Erzählbarkeit eines zerklüfteten Lebens halber die Literarisierung des autobiographischen 
Gedächtnisses betreibt” (497).  Beyond the negotiation of greater societal forces, the 
Schelmenroman also depicted a life divided into seemingly disconnected episodes, as the picaro 
moved from one opportunity to the next in securing his own survival.  This aspect of the picaro 
existence further resonated with Schwarz, who explains: “Zusammengehalten waren die nur lose 
miteinander verbundenen Episoden dadurch, daß sich aus ihrer Summe letzten Endes doch ein 
Gesamtbild ergibt: das einer durch und durch schlechten, dummen, boshaften Gesellschaft” (91). 
Through the application of the figure of the picaro in interpreting his exile experience in South 
America, Schwarz demonstrates how notions of continuity, of the causal and connected 
relationship between events in a given life, are an inextricable aspect to how the individual 
conceives of his current place in the world.  Schwarz thus perceives the Schelmenroman as a 
possible framework through which to unify his seemingly disconnected experiences in South 
America.   
 84 
 Despite the volatile instability that he experienced in exile, Schwarz asserts that exile 
represented to a certain extent a productive process that indelibly affected his sense of self:  
Anders als andere Emigranten, die der Heimat nachtrauern, heiße ich daher die 
Emigration gut und bekenne mich zu ihr, nicht weil sie mir just passierte und man 
für gewöhnlich sein Leben billigt, sondern beinahe als Prinzip, als einen Prozeß, 
dem ich meine Befreiung und, so sonderbar das anmuten mag, die Gewinnung 
meines Gleichgewichts zu verdanken glaube. (121) 
Schwarz’s assertion that exile was for him a process through which he developed his notion of 
equilibrium and liberation seems to contradict one of the dominant themes of his autobiography, 
namely that he has been “eine Art Spielball geschichtlicher Mächte,” subject to the greater 
historical forces at play.  The one constant that Schwarz experienced prior to and during exile 
was the sense of existing in an in-between space.  This placement in in-between spaces required 
Schwarz to reconceptualize the notion of belonging.  One can reconcile these seeming 
inconsistencies if one considers the relationship between identity formation and the rupture of 
continuities: 
Wäre ich nur ein wenig jünger gewesen – ein einziges Jahr hätte da den Ausschlag 
geben können –, dann hätte ich, wenn schon nicht Bolivianer, [...] so doch 
vielleicht Lateinamerikaner in einem weiteren Sinn werden können.  Und als ein 
wenig Älterer mit bereits gestalteter Identität und Individualität, mit einem bereits 
gefestigten Europäertum, hätte ich diese Lebensepoche als Zwischenspiel, als 
vorübergehendes Abenteuer angesehen [...] und mir das mir Gemäße bzw. 
Erreichbare daraus geholt.  So aber war ich weder das eine noch das andere [...] 
und bin bis zur Stunde jemand geblieben, der im Grunde nirgends und in einem 
anderen Sinn wieder überall zu Hause ist. (117) 
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Again, and almost summarily, Schwarz touches on a perpetual existence in a Niemandsland, one 
that he has learned to temper with the ability to be “überall zu Hause.”  His age at the time of his 
family’s departure into exile played a critical role in his sense that he is neither entirely European 
nor Bolivian, but rather places himself in an in-between space existing between his societal 
experiences.  It is significant that Schwarz does not use the term Heimat, but rather conveys a 
sense of belonging through the phrase zu Hause, thereby distancing himself from the concept of 
Heimat and calling into question whether or not it is a term that is even applicable to his 
experience in the world.  Rather, by reconciling his simultaneous feelings of being nowhere and 
everywhere zu Hause, Schwarz alludes to a sense of belonging in the space of the in-between.  
 Schwarz ultimately survived exile in South America and traveled on to the United States, 
where Bernhard Blume, a Germanist also in exile, secured for him a fellowship to study at Ohio 
State University and support himself as a teacher of German at Otterbein College.  Although 
“Blume ist und bleibt für Schwarz der Retter, dem er das Entkommen aus dem Picarodasein 
verdankt,” Schwarz’s autobiography begs a reconsidertation of his personal agency in his own 
survival, and beyond that, his determination of self and place in the world (Maeding 497).  As 
argued, Schwarz’s exile experience evidences numerous examples of disruptions in processes of 
identification and ultimately depicts numerous instances of fragmentation.  His autobiography, in 
which he establishines a sense of belonging for himself in the space of the in-between, the socio-
historical Niemandsland that he shares with other European Jews of the NS-period from whom 





3.4 Individual Agency Relative to Greater Socio-Historical Forces 
 
Reflecting back on his life, Schwarz explains how he has come to perceive his Jewish 
heritage in the context of its impact on his life and notion of self.  In view of the multitude of 
options that existed for him in terms of Jewish identity, ranging from a complete rejection thereof 
to pride and religious piety, his notion of a Jewish identity is not religious, cultural or social, but 
rather historical: 
Läßt sich dieser ganz im Zeichen bestimmter geschichtlicher Konstellationen 
stattgehabten Entwicklung die Gewißheit abgewinnen, daß der Mensch einen 
freien Willen besitzt?  Es ist schwer zu sagen. […] Ich habe mein Judentum nicht 
verleugnet, sondern es immer als gestaltende Kraft meiner Existenz anerkannt, 
allerdings in einem historischen, nicht in einem religiösen, kulturellen, nationalen 
oder gar biologischen Sinn.  (29-30) 
This restrospective conclusion in the first chapter of the autobiography foreshadows one of the 
notions with which Schwarz closes the work: that he ultimately found a sphere of belonging 
among European Jews of the interwar period who were subject to the same historical context and 
one of the most complicated and horrific occurrences of human history.  Here the question of 
individual agency comes into play, as Schwarz attempts to reconcile his personal agency relative 
to the greater historical forces to which he was subject.  While agency is difficult to ascertain, it 
can be said that it is evident in Schwarz’s consistent assertion of his free will in the unfolding of 
his own life relative to the impact of these overarching forces.  As a Jew born in a certain place at 
a certain time – central Europe during the interwar period – he was subject to socio-political and -
historical forces that irrevocably impacted the course of his life.  
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3.5  Conclusion 
 
Schwarz’s exile experience was defined by innumerable ruptures in the internal-external 
dialectic of identification that resulted from processes of legal erasure.  His experience in the 
space of the in-between, the space in which physical, legal and socio-cultural Niemandsländer 
overlap and coalesce, indelibly affected his notions of belonging and place in the world.  Decades 
later, when composing his autobiography, he expresses the permanent effect of exile as manifest 
in his unrelenting notion that everything that he has in the world is merely borrowed.  The 
process of legal erasure that Schwarz experienced is among the most inhumane which human 
societies over the course of history have ever devised, and in a legally designated, geographical 
as well as intellectual Niemandsland Schwarz experienced one of its manifestations.  From that 
time on, Schwarz’ sense of belonging in the world has remained tenuous, underscored by the 
notion that at any given moment, his world can be irreconcilably altered by uncontrollable 
historical forces that have a broad impact on processes of identification.  He concludes, “seither 
ist mir selbst in den besten Zeiten, als stünde ich nicht auf festem Boden, als spürte ich die 
Bewegung der Erdkugel und als sei mir alles, was ich habe und benutze nur geliehen” (54-55).  
Schwarz’s experience in Niemandsland left him with the unshakable notion that any sense of 
belonging is fundamentally tenuous, and all rights, possessions and identities associated with the 
belonging to a given place at a given time can suddenly be taken away by the greater historical 
forces to which one is subject.  The constant of the Niemandsland that dominates Schwarz’s 
experience in the world is thus ironically the continuity of his identity, and ultimately where his 
sense of belonging in the world lies. 
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4 The Interplay between Legally Sanctioned Space and Notions of Place in the World 
as Manifest in Select Works of German Exile Literature, 1933-1945 
  
 Identification documents were of particular significance in Europe of the NS-period, as 
they acknowledged an individual as a member of a given nation who, as a result, was entitled to 
specific rights and protections.  Many German and Austrian refugees of the NS-period were 
stateless, however; their passports were nonexistent or expired, and no nation claimed them as a 
citizen.  Stateless refugees existed in a legal Niemandsland, and their exile experience was 
defined by an incessant pursuit of the legally sanctioned right to exist.  As discussed in the first 
chapter of this dissertation, most nations sought to avoid an influx of refugees by establishing 
legal barriers that tightly controlled emigration into their respective territories.  The struggle to 
find a legally sanctioned space in which to exist is a dominant theme in German exile literature of 
the NS-period, and it is depicted in numerous works as an experience with profound implications 
for the refugee’s notions of place and belonging in the world.  This raises the question of how the 
depiction of identification and travel documents in German exile literature serves as a 
commentary on identity formation in exile.  Further, the legal jurisdiction over time and space in 
exile, as presented in select works, will be interpreted as a human construct incongruous with the 
fundamental human need for sanctioned space.  In this analysis, statelessness is considered a 
legal reality, the result of a process in the interaction order through which the individual is legally 
stripped of a national identity.  The following analysis pursues the question, on the level of the 
individual order, of the extent to which statelessness affects the individual’s sense of belonging to 
the national community from which he has been legally expunged.  It begins by exploring the 
incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural and historical ties that endure 
between the stateless individual and his national community of origin in the case of Thomas 
Mann.  Further, the incongruity of the refugee’s legal invisibility with the fact that he still 
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occupies space – both physical and intellectual – in the world, is discussed in the context of how 
this experience is depicted in select works of German exile literature of the period, exploring the 
question of whether the refugee can reconcile these dissonant realities.  
 
4.1 Thomas Mann’s Defiance of the NS-Regime’s Appropriation and Legal Codification 
of “German”  
 
Thomas Mann, who fled Germany in 1933 and was stripped of his German citizenship in 
1936, famously declared, “wo ich bin ist die deutsche Kultur,” a statement that served as a retort 
to the NS-regime’s legal appropriation of “German” as well as to assert the indelibility of his 
belonging to the German national community (Vaget 11).  The question of sanctioned space in 
which to exist and, as a writer, to create, was of great significance to Thomas Mann, whose work 
and person the NS-regime sought to erase from the German national consciousness.  In a letter to 
Karl Kerényi in 1935, Thomas Mann expresses his inability to dissociate himself from the world 
history that is unfolding around him: “was geht mich die ‚Weltgeschichte‘ an, sollte ich wohl 
denken, solange sie mich leben und arbeiten läßt? Aber ich kann nicht so denken” (quoted in 
Bitterli 15).  This quote is indicative of the complex interplay between Thomas Mann’s affinity 
for pure Künstlertum and yet simultaneous sense of responsibility as a German writer towards a 
societal and political engagement, a subject that scholars of Thomas Mann have already pursued.  
As Bitterli asserts, “beides tritt uns so in Thomas Manns Gestalt entgegen: das Bewußtsein einer 
gesellschaftlichen, mithin politischen Verantwortlichkeit des Schriftstellers und zugleich das 
Wissen um eine gewisse Eigenständigkeit des künstlerischen Bereichs…” (21).  Although this 
issue is not the primary focus of the current analysis, it is of significance in so far as it relates to 
Thomas Mann’s notion of his purpose and place in the world as an exiled writer who was, for 
many Germans, an icon of intellectual leadership.  As Bitterli further explains, “in jeder geistigen 
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Haltung…sah Thomas Mann eine politische latent vorhanden und vorgebildet, und diese 
Überzeugung ließ ihn auch den Schriftsteller in den Kreis des staatlichen und politischen Lebens 
stellen” (19).  Thomas Mann’s conception of the writer, and thus himself, as a political figure is a 
notion manifest in the numerous essays and speeches that he composed in exile during the NS-
period.  In the letter to Kerényi quoted above, it is apparent that Thomas Mann is affected by the 
dynamic socio-political and -historical situation in which he finds himself; he cannot write and 
create in a vacuum of pure Künstlertum.  Bitterli interprets Thomas Mann’s political engagement 
in the context of the volatile interwar period: 
Ausschlaggebend für Thomas Manns politische Aktion wurde erst eigentlich ein  
zeitgeschichtlicher Impuls – der durch den Ersten Weltkrieg, die Krisis der 
Republik und das Heraufkommen des Nationalsozialismus herbeigeführte 
Ausnahmezustand – , der den Schriftsteller zwang, sich mit politischen Mitteln zur 
Wahrung seiner persönlichen Rechte einzusetzen…die Ordnung des Rechtstaates 
erschien Thomas Mann als Vorbedingung jeder künstlerischen Tätigkeit; war diese 
Ordnung in Gefahr, so mußte es Sache des Schriftstellers sein, zu deren Sicherung 
politische Anstrengungen zu unternehmen. (21-22) 
In this passage the individual’s necessity for a legally sanctioned societal space is evident.  In the 
context of the figure of the writer, space – both intellectual and physical – within which to create, 
is a prerequisite of all artistic pursuits.  Like Thomas Mann, many writers were legally 
dispossessed of their German citizenship under National Socialism and denied intellectual space 
within the German national community through censorship and the threat of imprisonment.  In 
consideration of the “centrality of time and space to identification,” as outlined by Jenkins in 
Social Identity, the repercussions of a lack of space for the writer’s notions of identity, of place 
and purpose in the world, are profound (48).  Thomas Mann, in his writings and speeches, 
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employed his intellect as a means to go on the offensive against the NS-regime by calling into 
question its legitimacy as an institution of power and authority.  Through his works Thomas 
Mann reclaimed the inalienable right to assert his intellect, which the NS-regime sought to mute 
through censorship and the legal erasure of his person.  Underscoring his belief in the agency and 
subversive capacity of the human intellect is his statement in 1939 to German writers in exile: 
Und eben dies ist der entscheidende Faktor.  Denn der Geist ist entscheidend.  Wir, 
die wir hier versammelt sind, sind nur Arbeiter im Reich des Geistes, ohne 
unmittelbaren Einfluß auf die Geschehnisse der Welt.  Aber darum sollte man 
unsere Worte und Ermahnungen nicht unterschätzen.  Der Geist, der keine 
materielle Macht besitzt, hat eine stille und doch unwiderstehliche, vernichtende 
wie formende Wirkung auf Erden, und seine Entscheidungen haben Gewicht. 
(849) 
Here Thomas Mann juxtaposes the physical (“materielle Macht”) with the intangible nature of the 
Geist, a comparison that parallels the question of physical and intellectual space.  Although the 
NS-regime was successful in legally erasing German writers in exile within the jurisdiction of 
their institution, these writers maintained an intellectual space in the world through which they 
could assert their inalienable right of intellectual agency.     
Thomas Mann recognized the power of language, both written and spoken, in processes of 
identification, and he promoted in his writings and speeches the use of language as a means with 
which to fight National Socialism.  In a speech first given in Beverly Hills, California on 5 April 
19392 in front of the American Committee for Christian German Refugees, Thomas Mann drew 
connections between the writer, the power of language, and universal laws (gesittete Welt 915):   
																																																						
2 Although later given the German title “Feind der Menschheit,” the speech was conducted in 
English. 
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During this period of active vileness and passive weakness what is the mission of 
the individual who thinks and feels as a free human being, to halt the disaster and 
to serve the idea in which he believes and in whose future victory he trusts?  Many 
avenues are open to him by word of mouth and action.  We should be faint-hearted 
were we to underestimate even in times of apparent absolute violence, the effect of 
the intellect, of the judging, admonishing and summoning word.  Language is the 
possession of mankind that unites not only man with man, but man with intellect. 
(303) 
His assertion that “language is the possession of mankind,” specifically his use of “possession,” 
suggests that language is an inalienable right of the individual, a medium through which he 
establishes an intellectual space for himself in the world, a space in which to assert his identity 
and thereby engage in the internal-external dialectic of identification.  In terms of Jenkins’ theory 
of the internal-external dialectic of identification, language is a primary means of communication 
and therefore a means of interaction among the three orders as well.  When language is restricted, 
controlled and manipulated by the institutions of a regime to serve a given political agenda, 
processes of identification are invariably and intentionally affected.  The legal restrictions on 
language instituted by National Socialist ideologues posed a direct threat to the writer’s existence 
in that these restrictions sought to deny intellectual and physical space, a prerequisite to the free 
and voluntary formation of identity, to any writer whose work was incongruous with the newly 
‘purified’ German Geist.  In this speech, Thomas Mann called on the audience to reclaim the 
right of the individual to this space: 
[…] it must not come to pass that this creature [Hitler, G.F.] shall be the sole 
spokesman, to the end that he may dishonor the spoken word, distort it, drag it 
through the mire and thrust into despair a mankind that hears nothing else but this 
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creature’s abhorrent dialect […].  The spoken word, still linked to honor, meaning 
and humaneness, must not be renounced, muted and banned from the world during 
its grotesque march through an age of brainless declines.  Where this word is still 
free, has not been trampled under foot, where it has not been thrust back into a 
frightened spirit by physical threats, it must raise its voice –, not for a discussion 
with the enemy – there is no regulated language in which discussion with him 
could be possible – but rather its voice must be raised with inalienable authority, 
granted by God and reason, to protect the human spirit against the onslaught of 
devilish lies and confusion which it suffers.  Its voice must be raised […] to save 
this spirit from a despair that endangers its very life. (304) 
In the act of giving this speech, Thomas Mann embodied the message therein, namely that to 
preserve the basic human right to intellectual space, one must assert that right and speak against 
any power that seeks to revoke it.  Here and later in this speech Thomas Mann expounded on the 
perversion of political purpose inherent in National Socialism and its jurisdiction over intellectual 
space.  He explained that although there may exist in a given free state a gamut of political 
affinities, ranging from “conservatives” to “revolutionaries,” that this diversity is possible in a 
free state because the various parties are united by a common concern for “the human being, his 
welfare, his dignity, his happiness, his divine calling” (306).  This fundamental common ground 
was, however, lacking in National Socialism, which Thomas Mann deemed the “enemy of 
mankind” (306).  To combat this common enemy, the individual must employ language and 
assert thereby his inalienable right to intellectual space: “the intellect, devoid of material power, 
has a quiet, yet irresistible efficacy on earth, an efficacy that is both annihilating and constructive 
and its decisions are of importance” (310; vgl. “Schriftsteller im Exil”).  Thomas Mann leaves his 
audience with the imperative to assert and employ their intellect, an imperative that he himself 
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embraced, as is evident in his various speeches and written works from 1933-1945.  Further, this 
speech serves as an attack on the National Socialist attempt to assert legal jurisdiction over 
national identity and the intellect of the individual through censorship of written and spoken 
language.  In his presentation of the intellect and the assertion thereof as an inalienable right of 
the individual, Thomas Mann contests the NS-regime’s desire to control processes of 
identification and thereby alludes to the right of the individual for a space – intellectual and 
physical – in which to establish an identity.  
 In the autumn of 1940 Thomas Mann was given the opportunity to embody this message 
of resistance that he fervently promoted when the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) 
approached him with the request that he compose short messages to be broadcasted from London 
with the intent of them reaching Germany and the Occupied Territories via long wave radio 
(gesittete Welt 923).  With the exception of the first four broadcasts, which were written by 
Thomas Mann and read by a German-speaking employee of the BBC, the broadcasts were 
composed and read by Thomas Mann himself and recorded in the United States, finally to be sent 
to and then broadcasted from London.  Entitled Deutsche Hörer!, these talks were five to eight 
minutes in length and were broadcasted by the BBC approximately once a month from October 
1940 to May 1945, with a final broadcast in November of 1945 (923).  As Thomas Mann himself 
asserts in the foreword to the first edition of the texts of the talks (1942, Bermann-Fischer 
Verlag), these broadcasts provided him with the “Gelegenheit, hinter dem Rücken der Nazi-
Regierung, die, sobald ihr die Macht dazu gegeben war, mich jeder geistigen 
Wirkungsmöglichkeit in Deutschland beraubt hatte, Kontakt zu nehmen […] mit deutschen 
Menschen und auch mit Bewohnern der unterjochten Gebiete” (473).  Through Deutsche Hörer! 
Thomas Mann, in his use of the German language to engage the German national community to 
which he belonged, re-appropriates the German language to defy his legal statelessness and assert 
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inexorability of his German-ness.  His mention of a “geistige Wirkungsmöglichkeit” is an 
allusion to his sense of societal place and self-conception as a German writer, whose role it is to 
engage his public in intellectual exchange.  The NS-regime’s legal restriction of his 
“Wirkungsmöglichkeit” was perceived by Thomas Mann as a restriction on his intellectual space 
within German society, a restriction that he discusses, and ultimately sought to defy, in such 
works at Deutsche Hörer!. 
 In the first broadcast of Deutsche Hörer! in October of 1940, Thomas Mann introduces 
himself to his audience as a German writer whose person and work the National Socialist Regime 
outlawed: 
Ein deutscher Schriftsteller spricht zu euch, dessen Werk und Person von euren 
Machthabern verfemt sind und dessen Bücher, selbst wenn sie vom Deutschesten 
handeln, von Goethe zum Beispiel, nur noch zu fremden, freien Völkern in ihrer 
Sprache reden können, während sie euch stumm und unbekannt bleiben müssen. 
Mein Werk wird eines Tages zu euch zurückkehren, das weiß ich, wenn auch ich 
selbst es nicht mehr kann. Solange ich lebe aber, und selbst als Bürger der Neuen 
Welt, werde ich ein Deutscher sein und leide unter dem Schicksal Deutschlands 
und all dem, was es nach dem Willen verbrecherischer Gewaltmenschen seit 
sieben Jahren, moralisch und physisch, zugefügt hat. (476) 
In this excerpt Thomas Mann addresses the NS-regime’s attempt to assert jurisdiction over the 
national identity of the individual through the legal codification of that what it meant to be 
“German.”  He clearly states that he is a German writer, despite the fact that his work and person 
have been legally rendered incongruous with ‘German-ness’ as defined by NS-ideology.  In terms 
of Jenkins’ claim that “identities exist and are acquired, claimed and allocated within power 
relations,” this passage can be interpreted as Thomas Mann’s assertion of the power and 
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inalienable right of the individual for self-determination through his rejection of the identity 
projected onto him by the NS-regime.  The NS-manipulation of the interplay between law and 
processes of identification is further alluded to in his reference to himself as both “ein Deutscher” 
and “Bürger der Neuen Welt;” citizenship is a legal classification, but he does not conflate it with 
the identity of being German.  Here Thomas Mann, by defining “citizen” and “German” in his 
own terms through drawing a distinction between legal and cultural identity, defies the NS-
regime’s appropriation and legal codification of these terms to serve its ideological agenda. 
 
4.2  The Intersection of Nation and Identity 
 
The necessity of valid identification and travel documentation for survival as a stateless 
refugee in Europe during the NS-period is a prevalent theme in numerous works of German exile 
literature, a theme that calls into question the intersection of the term nation with identity.  In her 
novel Transit, Anna Seghers depicts the infinite complications faced by stateless refugees of the 
NS-regime whom no nation would claim or protect.  The notion of the stateless refugee’s 
precarious existence in a legal Niemandsland is evident from the opening passage of the novel, in 
which the narrator comments on a ship, rumored to be lost at sea, that was filled with refugees 
seeking to sail out of Europe to safety: 
Die ‚Montreal’ soll untergegangen sein zwischen Dakar und Martinique.  Auf eine 
Mine gelaufen.  Die Schiffahrtsgesellschaft gibt keine Auskunft.  Vielleicht ist 
auch alles nur ein Gerücht.  Verglichen mit den Schicksalen anderer Schiffe, die 
mit ihrer Last von Flüchtlingen durch alle Meere gejagt wurden und nie von Häfen 
aufgenommen, die man eher auf hoher See verbrennen ließ, als die Anker werfen 
zu lassen, nur weil die Papiere der Passagiere ein paar Tage vorher abliefen, mit 
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solchen Schiffsschicksalen verglichen ist doch der Untergang dieser ‚Montreal’ in 
Kriegszeiten für ein Schiff ein natürlicher Tod. (5) 
This passage sets the tone for the novel, in which the expiration of identification documents is a 
perpetual threat to refugees.  Identification documents represented more than just a logistical 
issue for refugees seeking to emigrate to safety.  Symbolically, to deny an individual the 
permission to exist within a specific space – a space delineated along national boundaries – is an 
official and legal rejection of that person by a given national community on the level of the 
institutional order.  Refugees of the NS-period faced rejection from most nations, and this 
rejection is often depicted in exile literature as the exclusion and rejection of the individual by the 
greater institution of humankind.  In this passage from Transit, the narrator’s description of ships 
carrying refugees whom no nation wants is suggestive of a Niemandsland, both physical and 
intellectual.  The ship is travelling outside of national boundaries and thus is physically located in 
an in-between space.  Further, the comprehensive rejection by national communities places the 
refugees socially in an in-between space, removed from the human community.  Here, a 
disruption in the institutional order is apparent.  As previously stated, in accordance with Jenkins’ 
tripartite model of identification, individual identity is inconceivable independent of the human 
world.  Through the legal rejection of the refugee and refusal to admit him within their borders, 
nations exclude that individual simultaneously from the institutional order of the internal-external 
dialectic of identification as well from the interaction order, rupturing the refugee’s physical and 
intellectual connection with the people within that national territory.  Inherent in statelessness is 
thus ruptures in the dialectic of identification, and the exclusion of the individual from the 
institutional and interaction orders calls into question the possibility of identity formation and 
identity continuity for a stateless refugee, given that individual identity is inconceivable 
independent of the human world.  Through the depiction of the ship of refugees, pushed outside 
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of all national boundaries, Seghers suggests that the refugees themselves exist outside of the 
collective human society, and thereby begs the question of the possibility of self existing 
independent of society.  In “Zwischen den Welten: Zur Poetik des Transitorischen in Anna 
Seghers’ Roman Transit und ihrer Novelle Überfahrt,” Caroline Delfau discusses the leitmotif of 
the space of the in-between that materializes throughout Transit in Seghers’ depictions of 
locations occupied by refugees:   
Indem Marseille entgegen der historischen Tatsachen zum letzten Hafen Europas 
stilisiert wird, steht es metaphorisch für Schnittpunkt und Schleuse zwischen Land 
und Meer, zwischen Heimat und Fremde, Vergangenheit und Zukunft – und damit 
für Grenz-und Übergangsräume im Allgemeinen.  Durch den Hafen ist also nicht 
nur die Abfahrt, sondern auch das Zwei-Welten-Motiv omnipräsent.  Auch die 
weiteren Handlungsorte – Hotels, Konsulate und ein Reisebüro – bieten nur 
kurzweiligen Aufenthalt oder verweisen auf die baldige Abreise.  Selbst die Cafés 
sind spezielle Cafés für »Transitäre«, also diejenigen, die auf ihre Abfahrtspapiere 
warten. (41-42)        
The places occupied by the refugee are places marked with an element of temporariness – hotels, 
consulates and travel agencies are associated with notions of impermanence; one must occupy 
these spaces as a means to arrive at a future destination.  In exile, however, the experience of time 
is different from that of travel – the refugee does not have an ultimate destination, and thus these 
temporary locations become places of indefinite waiting.  Whereas the traveler has the agency to 
leave these temporary spaces and arrive to a destination, the refugee does not.  These in-between 
spaces become for the refugee a physical and temporal Niemandsland from which he cannot 
escape.     
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In Jacobowksy und der Oberst, Franz Werfel calls into question nation-based identities 
and the ability of a nation to strip an individual of his national identity.  At the very beginning of 
the drama, Jacobowsky appears to casually explain to fellow hotel guests during an air raid in 
Paris how he had to switch national identities during his flight through Europe:    
JACOBOWSKY: […] in Deutschland wuchs ich auf, von der festen Überzeugung 
gewiegt, ein kleiner strammer Deutscher zu sein.  Dieser begreifliche Irrtum wurde 
leider viel zu spät aufgeklärt, und zwar durch Hitlers ‚Braune Millionen’.  Ich floh 
nach Wien, mit leichtem Gepäck, glücklich, daß es ohne Konzentrationslager 
abgegangen war...Wien!  Hören Sie nur: ‚Mein Leben ist Lieb und Lust’...Er 
summt zwei Takte der Musik mit  Kaum hatte ich begonnen, ein waschechter 
Wiener zu sein und für neuen Wein und alte Walzer zu schwärmen, da holte mich 
das Schicksal wieder ein.  Ich floh nach Prag, und dieses Mal ohne Gepäck...Prag!  
Kennen Sie Prag? ... Er lächelt träumerisch  Prag ist eine wunderschöne Stadt.  Es 
tat mir aufrichtig leid, aus Prag fliehen zu müssen, und zwar zu Fuß, über die 
verschneite Grenze und ohne Winterrock...Paris aber ist die Stadt aller Städte.  Ich 
habe eine große Eignung zum französischen Patrioten, Madame.  Frankreich ist 
Gottes Land, dachte ich, und Franzose wirst du bleiben bis an dein Lebensende.  
Und nun... (19-20)  
Jacobowsky’s seemingly lighthearted presentation of his flight from the ever-encroaching NS-
regime is juxtaposed with the serious content of the description as well as with the scene itself, in 
which war planes and bombs are audible, prior to the German invasion of Paris.  The casualness 
of his demeanor while describing a traumatic experience creates a heightened sense of cognitive 
dissonance that extends beyond Jacobowsky’s positivity and adapaptability in the face of grave 
danger to the exile situation itself.  Through Jacobowsky’s adapaptability to national identities, 
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Werfel calls into question nation- and place-based identities as well as whether or not the 
individual can be stripped of such an identity.  In this same scene, Jacobowsky expresses that 
“[...] Frankreich ist mein fünftes und bestes Vaterland.  Ich kann Frankreich nicht so schnell 
verloren geben,” and thereby completes the effect of calling into question the concept of a 
homeland with associated notions of identity (30).  The use of Vaterland creates a further effect 
of perceptual disorientation in that Vaterland is a term traditionally associated with Germany, but 
here Werfel transposes it on France.  As in one can only have one Vater, it is often assumed that 
one can only have one Vaterland.  Thus through the figure of Jacobowsky, Werfel plays with 
common assumptions about identities associated with place in order to illuminate how the flight 
through exile and the consequent forced and constant change of place renders impossible the 
traditional model of place-based identity.  
An element of skepticism is apparent in Werfel’s portrayal of nation-based identities and 
loyalties, particularly through the exile experience of Jacobowsky.  In discussion with the Oberst 
Stjerbinsky, a Polish military officer whose figure, somewhat one-dimensional, represents blind 
and unquestioned national pride, Jacobowsky criticizes the actions of the Polish government and 
the international community as a whole for their lack of a timely and consolidated response to 
National Socialist aggression: 
JACOBOWSKY:  [...] Sie sind Pole und auch ich bin Pole, wiewohl ihr mich als 
dreijähriges Kind aus meiner Heimat vertrieben habt...Und als dann in 
Deutschland im Jahre dreiunddreißig diese Pest und dieses Leid über mich kam, da 
habt ihr Polen euch die Hände gerieben und gesagt: ‚Recht geschieht dem 
Jacobowsky!’  Und als später dann in Österreich diese Pest und dieses Leid über 
mich kam, da habt ihr die Achseln gezuckt und gesagt: ‚was gehts uns an?’  Und 
nicht nur ihr habt gesagt, ‚Was gehts uns an?’, sondern alle andern habens auch 
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gesagt.  Engländer und Amerikaner und Franzosen und Russen!  Und als dann in 
Prag diese Pest und dieses Leid ausbrach, da habt ihr noch immer geglaubt, es 
gehe euch nichts an und habt sogar die Gelegenheit benutzt, dem armen Tschechen 
in den Rücken zu fallen.  Als es aber über euch selbst kam, dieses Leid und diese 
Pest, da waret ihr sehr unschuldig erstaunt und gar nicht vorbereitet und in 
siebzehn Tagen erledigt.  (67) 
In this passage Werfel criticizes nation-based loyalties and calls for an international 
responsibility towards human rights.  As a Jew, Jacobowsky was forced to flee Poland with his 
family earlier in the century, essentially entering exile as a small child, and later as the NS-
regime came to power, he was forced out of Germany on an exodus through Europe.  In Europe 
of the NS-period, human society was organized and divided along national boundaries.  Since no 
European nation claimed the Jews or was willing to defend them, Jews were thus rendered 
powerless within the construct of the European nation system, especially given that the League of 
Nations did not grant Jews the designation of a minority group and thus left the Jews legally 
vulnerable.  Werfel reformulates the situation of European Jews through his rejection of the 
hierarchy of institutions, placing the institution of the community of humankind above that of the 
institutions of individual nations:  
JACOBOWSKY:  Hättet ihr aber, ihr und alle andern, am Anfang nicht gesagt:  
‚Recht geschieht dem Jacobowsky!’ oder bestenfalls: ‚Was gehts uns an?’, 
sondern: ‚Der Jacobowsky ist ein Mensch, und wir können nicht dulden, daß ein 
Mensch so behandelt wird’, dann wäret ihr alle ein paar Jahre später nicht so 
elend, läppisch und schmählich zugrunde gegangen, und binnen sechs Wochen 
wäre die Pest ausgerottet worden und Hitler wäre geblieben was er ist, ein 
Stammtischnarr in einem stinkigen Münchner Bierhaus.  Somit seid ihr selbst, ihr 
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allein und alle andern, die Größe Hitlers, seine Genialität, sein Blitzkrieg, sein 
Sieg und seine Weltherrschaft... (67-68) 
Addressing the responsibility of the international community towards the rights of all individuals, 
given the primary significance of the institution of humankind, Jacobowsky rejects the idea that 
the situation of European Jews is a problem that is unique to them as a specific religious and 
ethnic group.  Rather, as fellow members of the community of mankind, all individuals should be 
concerned by and respond to situations in which the rights of other individuals are compromised.  
Through this reframing of the situation of European Jews, Werfel calls into question the status of 
the nation construct as the ultimate institution governing processes of identification and their link 
to a legally condoned existence.  Analyzed in consideration of Jenkins’ tripartite model, this 
passage suggests the community of humankind as an alternative institution superseding that of 
the nation, and thereby restructures the hierarchy of processes of identification, placing greatest 
emphasis on the individual’s identity as a human being.      
In Kind aller Länder Irmgard Keun similarly depicts the situation faced by refugees from 
the NS-regime and illuminates the role of the international community in exacerbating that 
situation.  Keun implements the simplistic view of a child to deconstruct the exile situation: 
“Aber wir sind Emigranten, und für Emigranten sind alle Länder gefährlich, viele Minister halten 
Reden gegen uns und niemand will uns haben, dabei tun wir gar nichts Böses und sind genau wie 
alle anderen Menschen” (136).  In a single thought, Keun summarizes the situation faced by 
refugees in exile and presents it as a straightforward situation.  Many German exile writers of the 
NS-period highlight the complications of life in exile, the endless paper work and myriad of laws 
that govern their everyday lives.  Here, Keun, however, deconstructs the exile situation and 
exposes it at its most basic level: no nation wants the refugees, even though they are fellow 
human beings who have not necessarily done anything wrong.  The international community’s 
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response to the flood of refugees from NS-Germany and -Austria is thus criticized, and similar to 
Werfel, Keun, through her criticism, makes a case for international responsibility toward the 
universal protection of human rights. 
 
4.3   The Paradoxical Complexity of Travel Documentation 
 
A recurring theme in German exile literature of the NS-period is the complicated nature of 
identification and travel documents, imposed by a system that refugees were forced to navigate in 
their attempt to flee the ever-encroaching NS-regime.  Indelibly tied to the depiction of these 
documents is the question of time.  A paradox emerges in the situation of refugees in the latent 
incongruity between the time-limited nature of these essential identification and travel 
documents, contrasted with the continuity of the human lifespan.  An integral aspect of travel and 
identification documents was the fact that they had expiration dates, and this fact, in combination 
with the military advance of the NS-regime, left many refugees seeking to emigrate with a 
permanent sense of Eile (haste).  This ever-present sense of Eile is apparent in the novel Transit, 
in which Seghers presents how notions of time were a defining element of the exile experience.  
Seghers creates this effect of pressing Eile from the very beginning of the work, as is apparent in 
a letter sent between a couple in exile that the protagonist recounts: 
Man brauche sicher noch sehr viel Zeit, um dieses verfluchte Land zu verlassen.  
Da könne das Visum auch ablaufen.  Man hätte zwar dieses Visum beschafft, man 
hätte zwar die Reise bezahlt.  Doch gibt es kein Schiff, das einen stracks zum Ziel 
bringt.  Man muß Zwischenländer durchfahren.  Die Zwischenländer verlangen 
Transitvisen von einem.  Die dauern lange, die sind sehr schwer zu erringen.  So 
könnte denn alles, wenn man es nicht sofort gemeinsam betreibe, von neuem 
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zugrunde gehen!  Nur das Visum sei sicher!  Und dieses auch nur auf Zeit!  Jetzt 
geht es um das Transit! (29) 
The short, abrupt nature of these sentences contributes to the sense of Eile in this passage.  
Contrasted with the sense of Eile, however, are references to the fact that it takes a long time to 
obtain the necessary documentation (“man brauche…viel Zeit;” “die dauerten lange”).  In this 
passage the effect of Eile is juxtaposed with the fact that in order to obtain the necessary 
documents, one must wait.  Through this juxtaposition, Seghers suggests a warped nature of time 
in exile.  Further, the explanation of the situation surrounding travel documentation and the 
logical flow of that explanation are suggestive of a Teufelskreis (a vicious circle), which itself has 
a perpetual nature.  A third element is thus added to Seghers’ commentary on the experience of 
time in exile, and the perpetual nature of the Teufelskreis situation of travel documentation is 
contrasted with the timed, limited nature of that documentation, thereby creating an element of 
cognitive dissonance. 
 Werfel similarly works with the concept of the Teufelskreis in his depiction of travel 
documentation in Jacobowsky und der Oberst.  Jacobowsky exposes an element of latent futility 
in the refugee’s search for the proper documentation: 
JACOBOWSKY:  Oh, ich hatte in Bayonne für mich und Kamnitzer zwei kostbare 
Pässe eines exotischen Ländchens erworben.  Einige Staaten aber liegen zwischen 
mir und meinem vermutlich reizenden neuen Vaterland.  Um sie zu durchqueren, 
bedürfen wir ihrer Visa, der Visa von Transitania Numero eins, Numero zwei, 
Numero drei...  
JACOBOWSKY: [...] Transitania eins gibt die Erlaubnis zur Durchreise nur dann, 
wenn Transitania drei und zwei sie vorher erteilt haben.  Ich schlug mich wie ein 
Löwe für mich und Kamnitzer.  Doch immer, wenn ich das Visum eines 
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Transitanias erkämpft hatte, wurden die andern für ungültig erklärt.  Ein Karussell 
der Vergeblichkeit!  [...] (128-129)  
The image of the Karussell underscores the Teufelskreis-like nature of the pursuit for valid travel 
documentation.  Here again a similar reference to notions of Eile is apparent as the inevitable 
expiration of a given travel document renders the other documents in the constellation invalid.  
Jacobowsky’s tireless efforts to obtain the necessary documents are rendered futile by the 
paradox of the continuity of the individual’s lifespan and his occupancy of a physical space 
during that timespan with the impermanence of the permission to exist within a given space.  The 
pursuit for sanctioned space through the necessary documentation is here again indicated as the 
pursuit of survival.    
 Similar to Werfel, Seghers introduces an element of paradox her depiction of 
identification documents and suggests thereby an incongruity in the nature of identification 
documents with the realities of the exile situation.  In Transit, the narrator comments on the 
dynamic between the endless flow of refugees and the officials who tried to document them:     
Eine unermüdliche Schar von Beamten war Tag und Nacht unterwegs wie 
Hundefänger, um verdächtige Menschen aus den durchziehenden Haufen 
herauszufangen, sie in Stadtgefängnisse einzusperren, woraus sie dann in ein 
Lager verschleppt wurden, sofern das Lösegeld nicht zur Stelle war oder ein 
fuchsschlauer Rechtsgelehrter, der bisweilen seinen unmäßigen Lohn für die 
Befreiung mit dem Hundefänger selbst teilte.  Daher gebärdeten sich die 
Menschen, zumal die ausländischen, um ihre Pässe und ihre Papiere wie um ihr 
Seelenheil.  Ich begann sehr zu staunen, wie diese Obrigkeiten, inmitten des 
vollkommenen Zusammenbruchs, immer langwierigere Prozeduren erfanden, um 
die Menschen, über deren Gefühle sie schlechterdings jede Macht verloren hatten, 
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einzuordnen, zu registrieren, zu stempeln.  Man hätte ebensogut bei der 
großenVölkerwanderung jeden Vandalen, jeden Goten, jeden Hunnen, jeden 
Langobarden registrieren können. (37-38) 
Here the narrator points directly to the paradoxical and corrupt nature of the system 
administrating travel identification in light of the seemingly endless influx of refugees.  The 
comparison of the masses of refugees to the Völkerwanderung (Migration Period) is a poignant 
reference to the inhumanity of mandating such a system, and serves to call into question the 
desire of officials to document and control each individual refugee in the flight through exile.  
Further contributing to the inhumanity is the fact that the refugees were fleeing to save their lives, 
and the grave danger of the encroaching NS-regime is juxtaposed with the unnecessarily 
complicated – and almost perfunctory – nature of the system of travel and identification 
documentation.  The equivocation of human life to identification documentation suggests a 
parallel equivocation of the human body to what essentially amounts to a piece of paper with a 
registration number.  The effect of overlapping paradoxes is thus complete in this depiction in 
which the warped nature of what constitutes significance is cast in a critical light. 
Bertolt Brecht’s Flüchtlingsgespräche similarly exposes the inhumanity latent in the 
system governing travel documentation through its satirical commentary in support of exposing 
this critical shift in values.  In the following passage, Brecht suggests that a codependent 
relationship exists between the individual and the passport:  
Und doch könnt man behaupten, daß der Mensch in gewisser Hinsicht für den Paß 
notwendig ist.  Der Paß ist die Hauptsach, Hut ab vor ihm, aber ohne 
dazugehörigen Menschen wär er nicht möglich oder mindestens nicht ganz voll.  
Es ist wie mit dem Chirurg, er braucht den Kranken, damit er operieren kann, 
insofern ist er unselbstständig , eine halbe Sach mit seiner ganzen Studiertheit, und 
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in einem modernen Staat ist es ebenso; die Hauptsache ist der Führer oder Duce, 
aber sie brauchen auch Leut zum Führen.  Sie sind groß, aber irgend jemand muß 
dafür aufkommen, sonst geht’s nicht. (8)  
This passage suggests a perversion in the relationship between the passport and the individual by 
questioning which entity necessitates the other.  Here the priority is placed on the passport, and 
the individual is secondary in the relationship between to the two.  This perversion is illuminated 
in the comparison of the Führer with the people; the Führer is primary, the people whom he rules 
necessary yet secondary.  This passage is essentially a perversion of symbiotic ‘chicken-and-
egg,’ comparison in that the symbiosis between the two entities is lost as greater value is placed 
on one over the other.  Rooted in the paradox that a change in values has taken place, Brecht 
equivocates the passport with the most noble part of the human body: 
Der Paß ist der edelste Teil von einem Menschen.  Er kommt auch nicht auf so 
einfache Weise zustand wie ein Mensch.  Ein Mensch kann überall 
zustandkommen, auf die leichtsinnigste Art und ohne gescheiten Grund, aber ein 
Paß niemals.  Dafür wird er auch anerkannt, wenn er gut ist, während ein Mensch 
noch so gut sein kann und doch nicht anerkannt wird. (203) 
Here again the primacy of the passport relative to the individual is apparent.  Brecht casts this 
hierarchy in a critical light by exposing the disproportionate value placed on documentation over 
that of a human life: a human life is easily created, but a passport sanctioning and acknowledging 
that life is much more difficult to procure.  A premise of Jenkins’ model of identity formation is 
that identity is embodied; the body is a prerequisite for an identity.  Brecht’s commentary on the 
primacy of legal documentation relative to the body is the opposite of Jenkins’ model; it suggests 
an incongruity between the inherent human need for a space in which to exist and the difficulty in 
ascertaining that legally sanctioned space through a complicated system of legal documentation.    
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The arbitrariness of the bureaucratic maze described by Brecht in Flüchtlingsgespräche 
finds resonance in Jacobowsky und der Oberst, in which Werfel illuminates the inconsistencies 
between the reality of the refugees’ situation and the construct of the system governing travel and 
identification documentation.  Jacobowsky, in his flight through France, encounters a French 
official who demands that he produce his Carte d’Identité: 
JACOBOWSKY: überreicht seine Carte d’Identité, ein grünes Register, das so 
vielfach angestückelt und zusammengefaltet ist, daß es bis zur Erde herabhängt 
Carte d’Identité!! Sie beweist Ihnen, daß man trotz aller Anstrengungen dagegen 
stets mit sich selbst identisch bleibt, was nicht ungefährlich ist heute.  
BRIGADIER: Carte d’Identité! Sie beweist mir, daß Sie beständig Ihren 
Aufenthaltsort wechseln... 
JACOBOWSKY: Carte d’Identité!! Sie beweist Ihnen, daß ich ein nervöser 
Mensch bin, der sich unsagbar nach Ruhe sehnt und sie nicht finden kann. 
BRIGADIER: Ausländer natürlich! 
JACOBOWSKY: Gar so natürlich ist es nicht, keines Landes Inländer und aller 
Länder Ausländer zu sein... (77-78) 
 The Carte d’Identité was introduced in France in 1940 and made compulsory for all individuals 
over sixteen years of age.  By 1942 the Carte d’Identité indicated if an individual were Jewish, 
which ultimately facilitated the deportation of Jews to death camps during the Holocaust.  Werfel 
uses Jacobowsky’s Carte d’Identité to illuminate incongruities between notions of place-based 
identity and the reality of the refugee’s flight through exile.  An element of arbitrariness is latent 
in this exchange through the emphatic repetition of “Carte d’Identité!,” by which Jacobowsky 
mimics the French official and the gravity that he places on proper documentation.  Further, it is a 
scene in which Werfel’s commentary on the destabilization of identities in exile is indicated. 
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Jacobowsky’s multiple additions to his Carte d’Identité are indicative of his flight across Europe, 
but he says with pride that, despite the extensive additions to his identity card, he remained 
during this time identical to himself, something that he notes is “nicht ungefährlich […] heute.” 
His comment suggests not only the danger inherent in the fact that such legal documentation 
(permitting travel or residency) clearly indicated that he was a refugee and thus marked him as 
someone who was undesirable, but it further implies the perversion of processes of identification 
as experienced in exile as well.  Jacobowsky’s play on the Brigadier’s use of the word natürlich 
and his comment on the unnaturalness to be nowhere an Inländer underscore the significance of 
space and social context for identity and thus the inherent incongruity of the exile experience 
with the basic human need for space, itself a prerequisite to any identity.  This scene is 
representative of the unique stylistic approach of Werfel in Jacobowsky und der Oberst, 
specifically the paradoxical lightheartedness of Jacobowksy in his exchanges with the numerous 
people whom he encounters during his harrowing flight through exile.  Hans Wagener touches on 
the question of individual agency in his discussion of this seemingly paradoxical optimism: 
Jacobowsky and the Colonel is an extremely optimistic play.  It depicts the ability 
of the underdog to escape the overwhelming power of the seemingly almighty.  
His weapons are his intelligence, his wit, and particularly his ability to 
communicate.  Thus the comedy shows the triumph of the intellect, of the mind, 
and of the word over brutal force.  It offers the triumph of independent and free 
will over environmental or situational determinism. (65) 
Wagener suggests here that this paradoxical optimism heightens the effect of the figure of 
Jacobowsky, who, in his reliance on his intellect as a means of survival, represents the enduring 
hope and agency inherent in the individual as a microcosm of mankind.  
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4.4   Incongruities: Inherent Need for Sanctioned Space vs. Legal Niemandsland 
 
Throughout Kind aller Länder, Keun uses Kully’s perspective to describe the legal 
situation that the family faces in exile, specifically legal documentation related to sanctioned 
space. Kully explains: 
Vor allem muß ich lernen, was ein Visum ist. Wir haben einen deutschen Paß, den 
hat uns die Polizei in Frankfurt gegeben. Ein Paß ist ein kleines Heft mit Stempeln 
und der Beweis, daß man lebt. Wenn man den Paß verliert, ist man für die Welt 
gestorben. Man darf dann in kein Land mehr…über eine Grenze kommt man nicht, 
wenn man keinen Paß hat und kein Visum […] wenn man ein Visum hat, lassen 
die Beamten einen im Zug sitzen, man darf weiterfahren. Weil unser Paß in 
Frankfurt ausgestellt ist, bekommen wir eigentlich ein Visum nur in Frankfurt. 
Frankfurt liegt aber in Deutschland, und nach Deutschland können wir nicht 
zurück, weil uns dann die Regierung einsperrt, denn mein Vater hat in 
französischen und anderen Zeitungen und sogar in einem Buch geschrieben, daß er 
die Regierung nicht leiden kann. Ein Visum ist ein Stempel, der in den Paß 
gestempelt wird. Man muß jedes Land, in das man will, vorher bitten, daß es 
stempelt […] ein Visum ist auch etwas, das abläuft. Zuerst freuen wir uns immer 
schrecklich, wenn wir ein Visum bekommen haben und in ein anderes Land 
können. Aber dann fängt das Visum auch schon an, abzulaufen, jeden Tag läuft es 
ab – und auf einmal ist es ganz abgelaufen, und dann müssen wir aus dem Land 
wieder ‘raus.” (Keun 35-37) 
Through the simplistic narrative perspective of a child, Keun distills the legal situation in exile to 
reveal how it is essentially incongruous with the fundamental human need for a space within 
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which to exist.  As Jenkins outlines, individual identity and processes of identification are 
inconceivable independent of embodiment; space is thus a prerequisite for ‘being.’  As Kully 
describes in this excerpt, however, the experience of the refugee is defined by a perpetual 
struggle and search for legally sanctioned space, attempting to reconcile the impermanence of the 
permission to physically exist with the reality that the body physically remains even when it has 
been legally denied that space.  Even when the refugee finally secures for himself this legally 
sanctioned space, it is likely only a temporary solution due to the impermanent nature of 
documentation permits such as visas.  The transient nature of the visa is apparent to Kully, and 
her description of the visa as “etwas, das abläuft” and subsequent use of various forms of the verb 
ablaufen three times within a single sentence (“abzulaufen,” “läuft es ab,” “abgelaufen”) 
underscore the refugee’s heightened awareness of time and thereby indirectly ascribes an 
ephemeral quality to life as experienced in exile.  There is validity to Abel’s assertion that, 
“through Kully’s naïve voice, the logic of the passport is placed in question, for example, when 
she talks about the passport being the proof that one lives and that the loss of the passport means 
the loss of life – really what is at stake is an officially documented life, a life that is recognized by 
others (‘für die Welt’)” (110-11).  Missing from Abel’s analysis, however, is a discussion of the 
implications of a legally documented existence for processes of identification.  In consideration 
of Jenkins’ tripartite model, and specifically the institutional order, Kully’s understanding of the 
exile situation can be seen to underscore the internal-external dialectic between the refugee and 
governments which, in the terminology of Jenkins’ model, can be designated as “organisations” 
and thus “vehicles of classification.”  Legal classification is of critical importance to the refugee 
– in his search of sanctioned space, he seeks a given government’s classification in the form of 
legal documentation permitting residency or travel through its territory.  What complicates the 
situation, however, is that such legal documentation is often temporary, and thus the internal-
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external dialectic between the individual refugee and a given government is inevitably disrupted 
when, for example, the refugee’s visa (and thus his classification as a legal resident of that 
country) expires after a given period.  The refugee must therefore continuously engage with new 
and various governments, which suggests numerous ruptures in the dialectic of identification and 
thus a lack of continuity inherent in the exile experience (Abel 96).   
Helga Schreckenberger, through the compelling distinction that she draws between the 
refugee and the traveler, touches on the complicated issue of time and space in exile as manifest 
in Kind aller Länder: 
The difference between traveler and immigrant is clearly marked. For the traveler, 
the temporal limits on visa and residency are inconsequential since she is merely a 
visitor, planning on moving on or returning home. For the immigrant, such 
restrictions can be life-threatening […] Contrary to travel with its implied 
destination, exile is characterized by the impossibility of arriving. (316). 
The impossibility of arrival that Schreckenberger ascribes to the exile experience resonates with 
Abel’s assertion that, in exile, the refugee experiences a destabilization of identities, especially 
those “related to location” (Abel 96).  In her analysis of Kind aller Länder, Sabine Rohlf explains 
of the complications securing valid identification and travel documents: “Bei Verlust der 
identitätsstiftenden Papiere erlischt die Existenzberechtigung und das heißt: das Recht auf einen 
Ort in dieser Welt” (148).  The refugee’s loss of the right to place in the world results in a 
destabilization of identity that Rohlf terms a “radikale Ortlosigkeit,” a notion that serves as one of 
the “Grundmotive des Textes” (150).  The term Ortlosigkeit contains within itself the paradox of 
lack of sanctioned space with the reality of human embodiment; the individual still exists even if 
he has been legally erased.  A better term were perhaps Niemandsland, which is the intersection 
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of these incongruous realities, the physical and intellectual space occupied by the refugee outside 
of the legal bounds of the institutions that deny them sanctioned space.  
   In Kully’s description of life in exile as it is experienced by her family, “die rastlosen 
Reisen von Land zu Land, die alltäglichen Sorgen um Aufgenthaltserlaubnis, Geld und Paß,” she 
notes that at times it contradicts her basic understanding of the human world, which is informed 
by Western, Judeo-Christian philosophy (Kreis 75). She explains:   
Meine Mutter hat mir aus der Bibel vorgelesen. Da steht wohl drin, daß Gott die 
Welt schuf, aber Grenzen hat er nicht geschaffen.   
Über eine Grenze kommt man nicht, wenn man keinen Paß hat und kein Visum. 
Ich wollte immer mal eine Grenze richtig sehen, aber ich glaube, das kann man 
nicht...ich habe zuerst gedacht, Grenzen seien Gartenzäune, so hoch wie der 
Himmel. Aber das war dumm von mir, denn dann könnten ja keine Züge 
durchfahren....Eine Grenze ist auch keine Erde, denn sonst könnte man sich ja 
einfach mitten auf die Grenze setzen oder auf ihr herumlaufen, wenn man aus dem 
ersten Land 'raus muß und in das andere nicht 'rein darf. Dann würde man eben 
mitten auf der Grenze bleiben, sich eine Hütte bauen und da leben und den 
Ländern links und rechts die Zunge 'rausstrecken. Aber eine Grenze besteht aus 
gar nichts, worauf man treten kann. Sie ist etwas, das sich mitten im Zug abspielt 
mit Hilfe von Männern, die Beamte sind. (36) 
Kully attempts in this excerpt to reconcile the world, as she understands God created it, with the 
human organisations that impact her immediate reality. Poignantly she notes the contradiction 
between these two systems, “aus einem Land muß man 'raus, aber in das andere darf man nicht 
'rein. Doch der liebe Gott hat gemacht, daß Menschen nur auf dem Land leben können,” her 
inability to reconcile the two underscored by her use of “doch” (35). The intangibility of the 
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border strikes Kully, considering that, for the refugee, it is a major obstacle. Further, she notes 
that, unfortunately, a border is also “keine Erde,” for if it were, it could serve as the solution to 
the problem that it creates for the refugee; the refugee could simply exist on the border – an 
allusion, perhaps, to the fact that, in exile, the refugee often exists, on many levels, im 
Niemandsland.  As Brigitte Abel comments: 
The border in Kully’s quote here is visible only through the action of officials as 
they cross over the border, only through process rather than through any type of 
physical evidence…Even as the meaning of concepts such as ‘border’ […] are 
deconstructed through Kully’s perspective (‘eine Grenze besteht aus gar nichts’) 
[…] these meanings are imposed and enforced upon the situation by “Beamte.” 
(112) 
Kully’s interpretation of the border as incongruous with her notion of how the Judeo-Christian 
God created the world and intended humans to exist in it indicates her failed attempt to reconcile 
government organisations with a universal law stemming from that God.  Here Kully is perplexed 
by the incongruity that exists between two competing institutional orders: that of national 
governments and that which she perceives as a universal and unifying natural order.  Her inability 
to synthesize these two systems of law exposes, ultimately, that something is inherently amiss 
with exile.   
 
4.5   Chapter Summary 
 
The interplay between legally sanctioned space and notions of place in the world is a 
prevalent theme in many works of German exile literature of the NS-period.  The analysis of this 
chapter evidences incongruities between the legal jurisdiction over time and space through travel 
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and residency documentation and the inherent human need for sanctioned space, both physical 
and intellectual.  As discussed, a notion fundamental to Jenkins’ tripartite model of identification 
is that embodiment is a prerequisite for any identity.  Stateless refugees of the NS-period, to 
whom legally sanctioned space was denied, experienced the incongruity between statelessness 
and the inherent human need for space.  Many exile writers of the NS-period cast this paradox in 
a critical light, calling into question both the capacity of a government to strip an individual of a 
national identity through legal erasure as well as the possibility of a sense of belonging in the 
world for the stateless individual.  The designation of statelessness and the consequent existence 
of the refugee in a legal Niemandsland proves to have profound implications for the refugee’s 




5   Exile in Nirgendland: The Poetry of Mascha Kaléko 
 
A leitmotif in the exile poetry of Mascha Kaléko is her notion that, as a refugee, she is 
perpetually trapped in an in-between space that she refers to as Nirgendland.  Whereas the works 
discussed in the second and third chapters dealt predominantly with the legal complications faced 
by the refugee of the NS-period and the implications of statelessness for processes of 
identification, the focus in this chapter lies on a primary concern in Kaléko’s exile poetry: the 
devastating and irretrievable loss of home that she experiences as a result of her flight into exile.  
The NS-regime’s outlawing of her person and work represented for Kaléko a rupture in the 
institutional order that rendered her sense of belonging in the world tenuous.  In this chapter, an 
analysis of Kaléko’s poems that touch on the loss of home serves to illuminate her notion that, 
through exile, she has been expunged from the time-space continuum of home, a continuum into 
which it is impossible to reintegrate herself.  Her descriptions of this loss echo the sentiments of 
Carl Zuckmayer, who noted: 
Die Fahrt ins Exil ist ‘a journey of no return’.  Wer sie antritt und von der 
Heimkehr träumt, ist verloren.  Er mag wiederkehren –  aber der Ort, den er dann 
findet, ist nicht mehr der gleiche, den er verlassen hat, und er ist nicht mehr der 
gleiche, der fortgegangen ist.  Er mag wiederkehren, zu Menschen, die er 
entbehren mußte, zu Städten, die er liebte und nicht vergaß, in den Bereich der 
Sprache, die seine eigene ist.  Aber er kehrt niemals heim. (539) 
In Zuckmayer’s description of the impossibility of a complete return after exile, he refers to the 
fact that time and space prove inextricably intertwined.  The permanence of place is illusory, 
since place is carried perpetually along by the current of time and coalesces with time in the 
individual’s experience of a given space.  Many scholars have written on the perversion of time 
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and space in exile, often in the context of making a distinction between the traveler and the 
refugee (C. Kaplan, W. Koepke, E. Said, H. Schreckenberger, J. Vansant).  For the traveler, who 
voluntarily leaves home, home is a secured space to which he can return.  For the refugee, 
however, travel in exile is necessitated by socio-political and -historical forces over which he has 
no control, and the consequence of the limited nature of his agency in the process of traveling is 
that he finds himself perpetually stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of arrival and 
return.  In “On Time and Space in Exile – Past, Present and Future in a No-Man’s Land,” Wulf 
Koepke discusses in several subsections of his article the experience of the in-between space in 
which the refugee finds himself trapped: “Departure without Return,” “Disorientation and Non-
arrival,” “Waiting for the Impossible Return” (35, 42, 43).  Koepke references Zuckmayer’s 
description of the impossibility of a return home after exile (as quoted above) and explains that 
for many refugees of the NS-regime, the irreparability of their loss of home was often only 
evident to them after 1945, once a physical return seemed possible: 
[…] in 1945 a return to the old country seemed to be possible.  However, it was at 
this point that Zuckmayer realized: wherever he would go, his exile would be with 
him.  The waiting time turned into an endless “Zwischenzeit”, an “in-between-
time” without ending, except death.  It is indeed wrong and misleading to speak of 
an exile “between 1933 and 1945”.  For many writers at least, their real exile was 
just beginning in 1945; the awareness of an extraterritorial existence without end, 
wherever they tried to settle down – Switzerland, Italy, Israel for instance; even 
Austria and Germany remained “fremd”. (36-37)    
The profound effect of exile on the individual’s sense of belonging in the world that Koepke 
describes, particularly the notion of an unshakeable feeling of Fremdheit that exile indelibly 
impresses upon those who experience it, resonates with the exile poetry of Mascha Kaléko, who 
 118 
grieves in her works for the home irretrievably stolen from her by exile.  Her loss of home is 
exacerbated by the simultaneous reality that she cannot integrate herself into a new time-space 
continuum anywhere; her inability to reconstruct a sense of belonging in the world is most 
evident in her assertion, “Wohin ich immer reise, / ich komm nach Nirgendland.” (“Kein 
Kinderlied,” Werke 310).    
 Kaléko’s work is relevant to the current analysis in that many of her poems deal with a 
concept integral to the theoretical framework of this dissertation, namely that time and space are 
intrinsically tied to the processes of identification and especially to the individual’s notion of 
belonging in the world (Jenkins 48).  Her poems depict exile as a Nirgendland from which the 
refugee cannot escape, an in-between space analogous to the concept of Niemandsland.  Both 
terms, Nirgendland and Niemandsland, reference a tangible space in their inclusion of -land.  
This reference to a physical space parallels the fact that individual identity and selfhood are 
inextricably tied to embodiment.  As Jenkins explains, “the human body is simultaneously a 
referent of individual continuity, an index of collective similarity and differentiation, and a 
canvas upon which identification can play.  Identification in isolation from embodiment is 
unimaginable” (41).  The human body is the vessel in which the individual’s processes of 
identification occur, and the fact that the human body occupies a physical space necessitates that 
physical space serve as a prerequisite to the identity formation of the individual.  Although the 
two terms both begin with a negation, they diverge slightly in terms of what they negate.  In 
Niemandsland, the negation is of the person (nie negating man).  Niemandsland is applied 
throughout this dissertation for that reason; the process of legal erasure and the consequent 
designation of statelessness experienced by the refugee leaves him in an in-between space in 
which ruptures in the internal-external dialectic of identification intersect.  Statelessness 
represents a rupture in the institutional order as government entities, through their rejection of the 
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stateless refugee, refuse to engage him in the dialectic of identification; resulting from this lack of 
a sanctioned space in which to exist are ruptures in the interaction order, as refugees are legally, 
and often consequently, physically cut off from other individuals under the jurisdiction of those 
government entities.  These ruptures coalesce to form a space, both physical and intellectual, that 
exists outside of the bounds of the institutional and interaction orders, which in turn raises the 
question of the implications thereof for the individual order.  Nirgendland, however, diverges 
from Niemandsland in that nirgend, a reference to the adverb nirgends, is highly suggestive of 
place (nirgends – nowhere; compare to nirgendwo, in which -wo emphasizes the aspect of place 
(G.F.)).  Interesting, however, is that Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm notes 
in the entry for nirgend the possibility of a temporal element being ascribed to nirgend: “local, an 
keinem orte, an keiner stelle, wobei manchmal auch der temporale oder modale begriff (zu keiner 
zeit, auf keine weise) mitverstanden sein kann” (855).  If the addition of a temporal aspect to 
nirgend is considered, it is apparent that Nirgendland represents a space outside of the boundaries 
of time-space continua.  This resonates with the notion in Kaléko’s exile poetry that she can 
neither reintegrate into the time-space continuum of home, nor integrate herself into a new time-
space continuum in an attempt to reconstruct the sense of belonging that she lost through exile.  
The following analysis explores Kaléko’s depiction of this in-between space in her poems that 
most clearly represent her travels in Nirgendland.   
 
5.1 Expulsion from the Time-Space Continuum of Home 
 
Essential to a discussion of Kaléko’s irreparable expulsion from the time-space continuum 
that she felt to be her home is an understanding of that home itself.  Kaléko was born into a 
Jewish family on 7 June 1907 in Chrzanów, West Galicia (now Poland), but in 1914, at the 
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beginning of World War I, political instability in the region and the threat of pogroms prompted 
her family’s move to Germany.  This move signifies in Kaléko’s biography the first of several 
emigrations, and, as Karina von Tippelskirch points out, the experience of multiple emigrations 
over the course of a single lifetime is something that Kaléko shared with numerous other German 
writers in exile (158).  By 1918 Kaléko’s family resided in Berlin, which, although not her 
geographical origin, would become for her in the late 1920s and early 1930s the spatial reference 
point of her identity; it was in Berlin of this period that Kaléko found a sense of home and 
community within the literary circle of Berlin’s artistic Avant-garde, for whom the Romanisches 
Café served as a venue for intellectual exchange.  In 1929 Kaléko’s poetry was published for the 
first time in Querschnitt, and it was in these early works that she demonstrated her melancholic 
yet humorous style through her portrayal of der kleine Mann and the Berlin of that era.  Berlin, 
the city in which she was artistically engaged and achieved literary success, became for Kaléko 
her reference point of home.  She published in 1933 with much success Das Lyrische 
Stenogrammheft, followed by Das kleine Lesebuch für Große in 1934 (Nolte 1-4). 
Although her work was not initially banned by the NS-regime, as they did not know that 
she was a Jew, by August of 1935 Kaléko was excluded from the Reichschriftumskammer, and in 
January 1937 NS-authorities prohibited her publisher, the Rowohlt Verlag, from printing and 
distributing her work.  With her work banned and the situation in Germany rapidly deteriorating 
for Jews towards the end of the 1930s, Kaléko moved with her husband and son to New York 
City in September of 1938.  Their first years in New York were difficult for the family, as they 
faced the challenges of exile: loss of homeland, language, and intellectual community, financial 
constraints, difficulty securing work, and fear for family and friends back home.  As Irene Astrid 
Wellershoff explains, the flight into exile further represented for Kaléko a major issue in terms of 
identity: 
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Schon vor Beginn des Dritten Reiches durchzieht die Suche nach der eigenen 
Identität, die erschwert ist durch die Entzweiung von Individuum und Gesellschaft, 
von Ideal und Wirklichkeit, die Gedichte von Kaléko.  Doch im Grunde hat sie zu 
dieser Zeit eine angepaßte Identität gefunden, sie fühlt sich zu Hause in der 
Weimarer Republik und in Berlin, und sie hat sich zu einem kleinen Glück in 
dieser Gesellschaft bekannt – ihre frühen Gedichte laufen auf ein Einverständnis 
mit dem Bestehenden hinaus.  Doch die politischen Entwicklungen verhindern 
diese Anpassung, und Kalékos Grunderlebnis der Dissonanz und der ungesicherten 
Identität verschärft sich in tragischer Weise.  Kaléko wird durch die 
Judenverfolgung des nationalsozialistischen Staates aus der deutschen Gesellschaft 
ausgestoßen, diskriminiert und schließlich ins Exil getrieben.  Aus der Rolle der 
erfolgreichen Berliner Autorin wird sie in eine Randexistenz gedrängt, erst als 
Ausgeschlossene in ihrer eigenen Heimat, dann als arme Ausländerin in den USA, 
schließlich als Fremde und Vereinsamte in Israel.  Die Probleme des Exils, wie sie 
in ihrer Lyrik Ausdruck finden, sind für Kaléko zunächst Identitätsprobleme.  Vor 
allem ist es das von den Nationalsozialisten aufgezwungene Problem eines 
jüdischen Selbstverständnisses, dann die Fragen, ob oder inwieweit sie sich in den 
fremden Gesellschaften integrieren soll und wie sie sich zu ihrer alten Identität als 
Deutsche stellen soll. (146) 
Wellershoff summarizes here the identity conflict that informs Kalékos exile poetry.  It is this 
conflict that Kaléko attempts to negotiate through her exile poetry, in which she attempts to 
locate her identity in the Nirgendland of exile.  
 Several of Kaléko’s poems deal with the notion that exile represented for her the 
irretrievable loss of home, which, for her, was Berlin of the late 1920s and early 1930s.  In these 
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poems the passage of time in exile is depicted as an irreversible process that renders a return to 
the time-space continuum of home impossible.  This is especially evident in “Emigranten-
Monolog,” a poem that was first published in 1945 by the Schoenhof Verlag 
(Cambridge/Massachusetts) in Verse für Zeitgenossen, a collection of Kaléko’s exile poetry 
written prior to the end of WWII (Kommentar 48-49):   
Ich hatte einst ein schönes Vaterland,  
So sang schon der Refugee Heine. 
Das seine stand am Rheine, 
Das meine auf märkischem Sand. 
 
Wir alle hatten einst ein (siehe oben!) 
Das frass die Pest, das ist im Sturm zerstoben. 
O, Röslein auf der Heide,  
Dich brach die Kraftdurchfreude. 
 
Die Nachtigallen wurden stumm,  
Sahn sich nach sicherm Wohnsitz um, 
Und nur die Geier schreien 
Hoch über Gräberreihen. 
 
Das wird nie wieder wie es war, 
Wenn es auch anders wird. 
Auch wenn das liebe Glöcklein tönt, 
Auch wenn kein Schwert mehr klirrt. 
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Mir ist zuweilen so als ob 
Das Herz in mir zerbrach. 
Ich habe manchmal Heimweh. 
Ich weiss nur nicht, wonach... (Werke 186) 
In the first stanza the reference to Heinrich Heine and his work Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen 
is indicative of Kaléko’s affinity to Heine, whose work she admired and whose biography she 
perceived, to a certain extent, as being similar to her own (Kommentar 95).  Heine, a Jewish-born 
writer whose works were banned in Germany in 1835, explored in his writings, in particular 
Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen, the notion of Heimat in a critical light.  Kaléko compares in 
the first stanza her loss of home with that of Heine, with the reference to Vaterland indicating 
specifically the German historical context and her use of the preterite verb forms hatte and stand 
emphasizing the complete nature of that loss.  The loss of Vaterland can be seen here as not only 
the loss of a space within German geographical territory, but as a reference to a rupture in the 
institutional order as well; both Heine and Kaléko experienced the process of legal erasure, 
whereby a government organisation outlaws the person and the work of an individual whom it 
seeks to deny physical and intellectual space within the territory over which it has legal 
jurisdiction.  Kaléko refers to the location of her home within the shared Vaterland as lying “auf 
märkischem Sand,” which indicates not only the geographical area of Brandenburg and Berlin 
(märkisch), but serves as an allusion to the German idiom auf Sand bauen as well.  The idiom auf 
Sand bauen is used to express the notion that a foundation, whether physical or philosophical, is 
faulty and unsound, suggesting thereby its impermanence and inevitable disintegration.  In the 
application of this idiom to describe the location of Vaterland, Kaléko alludes to her experience 
as a refugee of great instability on the level of the institutional order.  
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Kaléko acknowledged in an interview with RIAS Berlin (Rundfunk im amerikanischen 
Sektor) on 9 December 1958 her sense of connection to Heine, as manifest in “Emigranten 
Monolog.”  To the interviewer’s comment, “nun gibt es einige Ihrer Kritiker, die Ihnen 
nachrufen, dass sie so ätzend scharf wie Heine sind, aber Heine war ja eigentlich auch ein 
Romantiker, wenn man’s genau nimmt, der hatte ja auch sehr viel Herz…,” Kaléko responded, 
“Na, das walte Gott. Das will ich wohl meinen.  Er war ja auch beides, er war lyrisch und er war 
satirisch.”  To the interviewer’s follow-up question, “also das ist ein Vorbild, dass Sie 
anerkennen würden?”, Kaléko answered, “ja, absolut, absolut.  Und ich anerkenne auch das, was 
die Kritiker an Heine herumkritisieren, das sollen sie ruhig an mir auch herumkritisieren.  Ich 
finde das wunderbar, dass man beide Ströme in sich vereinigt und beides hat” (Kommentar 95).  
This exchange demonstrates the stylistic nature of Kaléko’s writing, on how she depicts subjects 
such as the exile situation in a lyrical yet satirical-critical manner.  This is particularly evident in 
the second stanza of “Emigranten-Monolog,” in which she manipulates concepts of German-ness 
in her criticism of the NS-regime.  The third line (“O, Röslein auf der Heide”) is a reference to 
Goethe’s poem “Heidenröslein,” which conjures up the association of Goethe, the quintessential 
German poet, representative of humanistic and ethical values that characterized the Classical 
period of German literature (59).  This is then contrasted with a ‘new’ German-ness of the NS-
regime in the fourth line, in which the Kraft durch Freude organization is referenced.  Kraft 
durch Freude was an NS-organization that provided affordable vacations to German workers, and 
it was a major propaganda tool of the National Socialists (59).  The image of a Röslein destroyed 
under the foot of enthusiastic vacationers suggests the destruction of the associated German 
cultural tradition through the rise of the NS-regime.  It is thus through the manipulation of the 
reader’s associations that Kaléko formulates her critique.   
 125 
 In the third stanza, Kaléko references the situation of German writers in exile.  The first 
line of the third stanza (“Die Nachtigallen wurden stumm”) is a reference to the NS-regime’s 
silencing of writers, who, as indicated in the second line (“Sahn sich nach sicherm Wohnsitz 
um”), fled into exile.  The simple past of werden in the first line of this stanza, suggests a process, 
inherent in which is the passage of time.  Putting the verb in the simple past, however, indicates 
that the process is complete, and thereby suggests an end.  This is complemented by references in 
the third and fourth lines to death, which itself signifies an end.  Kaléko refers to the National 
Socialists as Geier, birds that feed off of cadavers and thus are typically associated with death.  
Her use of Gräberreihen in the final line of this stanza completes her association of the temporal 
with the physical: here death, a temporal reference, is embodied in the image of a cemetery.   
In the fourth stanza, Kaléko again employs werden in reference to the unstoppable 
passage of time.  The first line of this stanza (“Das wird nie wieder wie es war”) is a reminder 
that the process of change is bound to the passage of time through the impossibility of wieder and 
the return to how things were prior to the National Socialist rise to power.  Further, the 
alliteration of “w” in this line (“Das wird nie wieder wie es war” (emphasis G.F.)) underscores 
the notion of the impossibility of return.  In the fifth and final stanza of the poem, Kaléko 
describes the devastating realization that her desire to return to her former cultural home can 
never be satiated; the possibility of reintegration into the time-space continuum of that home is an 
illusion.  Her reference to Heimweh in the third line of this stanza touches on a basic human 
desire to belong and maintain a connection to home as a temporal-spatial reference point for the 
development of one’s identity.  In the final line of the poem, however, Kaléko acknowledges the 
impossibility of a return to the time-space continuum that represented home to her; she feels 
Heimweh, but she no longer knows where Heim lies.  
 126 
In “Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«,” which also appeared in Verse für Zeitgenossen 
(1945), Kaléko elaborates further on the experience of time and space in exile, exploring the 
question of how time and place coalesce to form a sense of space: 
In jenem Land, das ich einst Heimat nannte, 
Wird es jetzt Frühling wie in jedem Jahr. 
Die Tage weiss ich noch, so licht und klar,  
Weiss noch den Duft, den all das Blühen sandte,  
Doch von den Menschen, die ich einst dort kannte,  
Ist auch nicht einer mehr so wie er war. 
 
Auch ich ward fremd und muss oft Danke sagen.  
Weil ich der Kinder Spiel nicht hier gespielt,  
Der Sprache tiefste Heimat nie gefühlt 
In Worten, wie die Träumenden sie wagen.  
Doch Dank der Welle, die mich hergetragen,  
Und Dank dem Wind, der mich an Land gespült.  
 
Sagst du auch stars, sinds doch die gleichen Sterne,  
Und moon, der Mond, den du als Kind gekannt.  
Und Gott hält seinen Himmel ausgespannt,  
Als folgte er uns nach in fernste Ferne,  
(Des nachts im Traum nur schreckt die Mordkaserne) 
Und du ruhst aus vom lieben Heimatland.  (Werke 187) 
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In the first stanza of this poem, the inextricability of time and place is apparent in Kaléko’s 
description of Frühling (spring).  Frühling references a period of time within the larger time 
frame of a year, but Kaléko associates with that period of time experiences related to place, 
specifically the weather and reemergence of nature that are characteristic of spring.  From the 
perspective of Central Park in spring, Kaléko reflects on the fact that it is also spring in that space 
which was her home prior to exile (Heimat).  Although she is physically removed from that space 
of home, Kaléko still knows the experience of spring in that space (“Die Tage weiss ich noch, so 
licht und klar, / Weiss noch den Duft, den all das Blühen sandte,”).  In the first four lines of the 
first stanza, Kaléko ascribes to time a cyclical nature, as is evident when time is perceived in the 
context of the year and the associated predictable pattern of the four seasons.  The last two lines 
of this stanza allude to a different aspect of time, however, namely the linear aspect of time as 
perceived through a socio-historical lens.  Kaleko introduces this contradiction in her use of doch: 
“Doch von den Menschen, die ich einst dort kannte, / Ist auch nicht einer mehr so wie er war.”  
The comparison she draws is between the natural world, in which the cyclical nature of time is 
evident in the perpetually repeating pattern of the four seasons and their physical manifestations, 
and the socio-historical and -political human world, in which the unfolding of time is linear.  In 
these last two lines of the first stanza, Kaléko’s reference to the fact that the people whom she 
knew in the space of home are no longer the same makes clear that, through her flight into exile, 
Kaléko experienced an expulsion from the time-space continuum of home, the perpetual linear 
unfolding of which renders a return to that space impossible.  The second stanza references the 
dual nature of the foreignness that she feels; not only has she lost the shared experience of time 
and place with those people whom she knew in the space of home, she is also outside of the 
socio-historical and -cultural space shared by the people for whom New York, the physical 
location of her exile, represents home.  
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 In the last two lines of the second stanza, Kaléko metaphorically references the natural 
world as a means to reconcile, to a certain extent, the foreignness that she feels in the human 
world.  Here again she uses doch to introduce a shift in her discussion of time and place: “Doch 
Dank der Welle, die mich hergetragen, / Und Dank dem Wind, der mich an Land gespült.”  Her 
gratitude to elements of the natural world that carried her into exile, the waves and wind – both 
metaphors for the agency of others –, indicates her awareness that the political conditions within 
the socio-historical time-place continuum that she considered home necessitated that she leave 
that space and receive assistance for a potential start in a new institutional order.  In the third 
stanza, Kaléko seems to find solace in the notion that, despite occupying a space outside of the 
socio-historical time-place continua that compose the human world, she maintains, as a living 
entity whose being is the result of processes of the natural world and who occupies space in that 
world, a remnant sense of belonging thereto.  To this point she explains that although the 
language used to describe elements of the natural world, such as the stars and moon, differs 
among individual socio-historical time-place continua, the experience of those elements is 
universal.  In the third and fourth lines, “Und Gott hält seinen Himmel ausgespannt, / Als folgte 
er uns in fernste Ferne,” Kaléko emphasizes this notion of an over-arching, universal aspect of 
the individual’s experience in the natural world, an experience that the individual shares with all 
other living entities in that world and through which thus an inherent notion of belonging is 
evident.   
 Kaléko emphasizes the contrast of the human and natural worlds at the very end of the 
poem, the final line of which serves as an allusion to Kurt Tucholsky’s poem, “Parc Monceau,” 
which he wrote shortly after arriving in Paris from his native Germany in 1924 (Kommentar 60).  
In the first two lines of “Parc Monceau,” Tucholsky indicates in his contrast of Mensch with 
Zivilist, that there is a discrepancy between the individual’s experiences as a human-being, whose 
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existence is the result of processes of the natural world, and as a civilian, who occupies a space 
within the construct of a government organisation (“Hier ist es hübsch. Hier kann ich ruhig 
träumen. / Hier bin ich Mensch – und nicht nur Zivilist.”) (141-142).  In “Auf einer Bank im 
»Central Park«,” Kaléko appropriates Tucholsky’s concluding lines in “Parc Monceau” (“Ich 
sitze still und lass mich bescheinen / und ruh von meinem Vaterlande aus.”), to express a similar 
sense of peace that she has found in her sense of belonging to the natural world.  Although time 
unfolds linearly in the socio-historical human world, it does so within the overarching space of 
the cyclical natural world.  Kaléko contrasts these two spaces in her suggestion that the 
individual, in the fact that he exists and occupies a physical space in the world, cannot be 
expunged from the time-space continuum of the natural world except through death.  Rather, it is 
from the socio-historical and -political time-space continua that compose the human world that 
the individual can be forcibly removed, and it is in the space outside of these continua that the 
Nirgendland of exile exists.    
 
5.2 Insatiable Heimweh: The Simultaneous Impossibilities of Return and Arrival 
 
Corresponding to the prevalent theme in Kaléko’s work that exile renders reintegration 
into the time-space continuum of home impossible, is the leitmotif in her exile poetry of an 
insatiable Heimweh (homesickness) that plagues her in exile.  In “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste,” 
which was also included in Verse für Zeitgenossen (1945), a distinct shift in Kaléko’s perspective 
on the exile situation is apparent.  Whereas in “Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«” Frühling 
signifies a sense of peace and belonging in the natural world, in “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste” 
Kaléko employs Frühling as a medium through which to depict the experience of an ever-present 
Heimweh that haunts her in exile: 
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Liebes fremdes Land.  Heimat du, wievielte, 
Park so grün wie dort, wo als Kind ich spielte. 
Erster Duft im Strauch.  Schüchterne Platanen.  
Müsst ihr immer mich an daheim gemahnen? 
Alles um mich her blüht im Sonnenlicht. 
Doch der Frühling hier ist mein Frühling nicht. 
 
Sagtest du: daheim?  Räuber sind gekommen, 
Haben Licht und Luft und daheim genommen. 
Amsel, Fink und Star sitzen eingefangen. 
Hör noch, wie daheim Küchenmädel sangen: 
„Wenn der weisse Flieder –  
wieder blüht...“ 
Ach, er blühet leider nur im Lied. 
 
Lieber fremder Baum.  Weiss nicht deinen Namen,  
Weil wir von weither, aus dem Gestern, kamen. 
Wenn bei uns daheim dunkle Weiden weinen, 
Junge Birke lacht, weiss ich, was sie meinen. 
Fremder Vogel du – sangest süss, verzeih, 
Ist so trüb mein Herz.  Wartet auf den Mai. 
 
Träumt der Tor vom Mai: Alle Glocken klingen. 
Schwalben ziehn im Blau.  Kerkermauern singen. 
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Seht, die Bäume blühn, wo sie Wurzel schlugen. 
Mütter, wo sie einst ihre Kinder trugen, 
Wiegen sie zur Nacht.  Väter kehren heim. 
Und der Frühlingswind rauscht den alten Reim. (Werke 188-189) 
In the first line, Kaléko imbues into the poem an element of dissonance through contradictory 
associations.  The combination of the adjectives lieb (dear, beloved) and fremd (foreign, strange, 
unfamiliar) to describe the same place in the formulation “Liebes fremdes Land” creates a 
paradox in its application of seemingly incongruent descriptors, playing thereby on common 
associations with place.  Similarly discordant is the reference to multiple Heimatländer (“Heimat 
du, wievielte,”), which contradicts the assumption that the individual can have only one 
homeland.3  In the lines that follow, Kaléko describes Frühling as an incessant reminder of her 
insatiable Heimweh, a description strikingly different from that in “Auf einer Bank im »Central 
Park«”.  The experience of spring in exile approximates her experience of spring “daheim,” but it 
is not completely the same and therefore cannot replace her experience of spring in that time-
space continuum of home (“Doch der Frühling hier ist mein Frühling nicht.”).  As part of an 
interview with Sigrid Schenkenberger, broadcasted by Sender Freies Berlin (SFB) on 1 June 
1956, Kaléko read “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste” and gave prior to the reading a short 
introduction in which she described the context for the poem, specifically her exile in New York 
and the sense of estrangement that she felt while experiencing Frühling in a space other than 
home:  
Wir leben in Greenwich Village, das ist so eine Art Montmartre in New York und 
wir leben so ganz ordentlich, wir haben wunderbare Menschen gefunden und 
																																																						
3 Compare to Jacobowsky und der Oberst (Werfel 1942), in which the figure Jacobowsky makes 
a similar play on the term Vaterland: “[...] Frankreich ist mein fünftes und bestes Vaterland.  Ich 
kann Frankreich nicht so schnell verloren geben” (30).  See pp. 95-96 in Chapter 3. 
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haben auch Freunde und wir haben auch so etwas wie ein Heim gefunden und alles 
wäre recht schön und herrlich und das ist es auch bis vielleicht auf diesen Punkt, 
dass man so wenns Frühling wird, fühlt, es ist sehr schön und alles sehr fein, aber 
es ist doch nicht ganz unser Frühling, wir sind eben halt was andres gewöhnt und 
das hat mit Geographie nicht viel zu tun, es hat wohl mehr, na ich weiß nicht, ob 
man das Assoziationen der Kindheit oder was immer nennen soll, aber wir prägen 
doch der Landschaft etwas ein, was sie uns dann, wenn die Jahreszeiten wechseln 
in doppelter Weise wiedergibt.  Na ja, also das habe ich öfter beschrieben, so ein 
bisschen Heimweh spukt in allen meinen Emigrationsgedichten [...]  (Kommentar 
61) 
The notion that her exile experience in New York prior to the end of WWII approximated a sense 
of home and belonging is evident in her explanation that although they had found a space that 
was “etwas wie ein Heim,” it became apparent with the changing of seasons that, although the 
experience of spring in exile was, in and of itself, pleasant, the fact remained that it could not 
replace for Kaléko the experience of spring in the home that she had lost (“aber es ist doch nicht 
ganz unser Frühling”).  She explains that this is not primarily due to the discrepancy in place 
between experiencing spring in New York versus in Berlin (“das hat mit Geographie nicht viel zu 
tun”).  Rather, she does not have the same sense of connection and belonging to the natural 
environment of New York that she did to that of Berlin.  Her explanation “wir prägen doch der 
Landschaft etwas ein, was sie uns dann, wenn die Jahreszeiten wechseln in doppelter Weise 
wiedergibt,” alludes to a rupture in the dialectic of identification between the individual and 
physical space that he occupies in the natural world.  In Kaléko’s explanation, in which nature 
functions as a type of organisation, exile represents a rupture on the institutional level in the 
dialectic of identification between the individual and the natural world.  This notion contradicts 
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“Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«,” in which Kaléko finds solace in her remnant sense of 
belonging to the natural world, a belonging derived from her self-identification as a living entity 
whose being is the result of processes of the natural world and who occupies space in that world. 
“Frühlingslied für Zugereiste” underscores Kaléko’s heightened awareness of how 
extensive the rupture is.  Frühling in the former daheim, Germany, is ambiguous because it still 
includes the imprisonment of those voices deemed undesirable by the institutional order there.   
In the second and third stanzas, Kaléko touches on how the inextricability of time and space 
renders reintegration into the time-space continuum of daheim impossible.  She creates again an 
element of cognitive dissonance in her explanation that Räuber stole Licht und Luft und daheim, 
playing on the common association of robbery with tangible items.  Her description that “Amsel, 
Fink und Star sitzen eingefangen” heightens this sense of perceptive friction in the poem, in that 
the image of birds sitting trapped is the antipode of the paradigmatic image of birds in free flight.  
An element of time is added to the place component of home in the third stanza, in which she 
explains that she has come from faraway, from yesterday (“Weil wir von weither, aus dem 
Gestern, kamen.”).  In this line the inextricability of time and space is evident in the 
materialization of the temporal reference yesterday in aus dem Gestern, a play on the common 
German verb phrase kommen aus that is used to express one’s place of origin.  The irretrievability 
of time passed, here, in the form of Gestern – from which she was uprooted unlike the blooming 
trees –, emphasizes the irreparable loss of daheim that exile represented for Kaléko.  Her only 
remnant of home exists in her memories and dreams, which serve, in turn, to only exacerbate her 
Heimweh.  Kaléko openly grieves her loss of home in such references as “er blühet leider nur im 
Lied” and “Ist so trüb mein Herz,” allusions to her ever-present awareness that exile has rendered 
her reintegration into the time-space continuum of daheim impossible.  
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 The prevalent theme in Kaléko’s poetry published in Verse für Zeitgenossen (1945) of the 
irreparable loss of home after exile was confirmed for Kaléko in 1956 during her first trip back to 
Berlin after WWII.  In “Wiedersehen mit Berlin,” Kaléko weaves together her impressions of the 
Berlin of 1956:   
Berlin, im März. Die erste Deutschlandreise, 
seit man vor tausend Jahren mich verbannt. 
Ich seh die Stadt auf eine neue Weise, 
so mit dem Fremdenführer in der Hand. 
Der Himmel blaut. Die Föhren rauschen leise. 
In Steglitz sprach mich gestern eine Meise 
im Schloßpark an. Die hatte mich erkannt. 
 
Und wieder wecken mich Berliner Spatzen! 
Ich liebe diesen märkisch-kessen Ton. 
Hör ich sie morgens an mein Fenster kratzen 
am Ku-Damm in der Gartenhauspension, 
komm ich beglückt, nach alter Tradition, 
ganz so wie damals mit besagten Spatzen 
mein kleines Tagespensum durchzuschwatzen. 
 
Es ostert schon. Grün treibt die Zimmerlinde. 
Wies heut im Grunewald nach Frühjahr roch! 
Ein erster Specht beklopft die Birkenrinde. 
Nun pfeift der Ostwind auf dem letzten Loch. 
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Und alles fragt, wie ich Berlin denn finde? 
– Wie ich es finde? Ach, ich such es noch! 
 
Ich such es heftig unter den Ruinen 
der Menschheit und der Stuckarchitektur. 
Berlinert einer: „Ick bejrüße Ihnen!“, 
glaub ich mich fast dem Damals auf der Spur. 
Doch diese neue Härte in den Mienen ... 
Berlin, wo bliebst du? Ja, wo bliebst du nur? 
 
Auf meinem Herzen geh ich durch die Straßen, 
wo oft nichts steht als nur ein Straßenschild. 
In mir, dem Fremdling, lebt das alte Bild 
Der Stadt, die so viel Tausende vergaßen. 
Ich wandle wie durch einen Traum 
Durch dieser Landschaft Zeit und Raum. 
Und mir wird so ich-weiß-nicht-wie –  
vor Heimweh nach den Temps perdus ... 
 
Berlin im Frühling. Und Berlin im Schnee. 
Mein erster Versband in den Bücherläden. 
Die Freunde vom Romanischen Café. 
Wie vieles seh ich, das ich nicht mehr seh! 
Wie laut „Pompejis“ Steine zu mir reden! 
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Wir schluckten beide unsre Medizin, 
Pompeji ohne Pomp. Bonjour, Berlin! (314-315) 
Although Berlin was the city that Kaléko considered her cultural home and in which she 
established an intellectual sphere of influence in Berlin’s Avant-garde literary scene centered 
around the Romanisches Café, the dominant tone in “Wiedersehen mit Berlin” is that of 
estrangement.  Kaléko describes the incomplete nature of her return home and the simultaneous 
feelings of familiarity and alienation.  In the first stanza, she indicates that seemingly much time 
has passed since her flight into exile; “vor tausend Jahren” serves as a reference to the NS-
propaganda slogan of the Tausendjähriges Reich as well as an indication of the depth of temporal 
separation that she feels from Berlin (Kommentar 121).  Despite her notion that she is a tourist in 
the place that used to represent for her home (“Ich seh die Stadt auf eine neue Weise, / so mit 
dem Fremdenführer in der Hand.”), it is apparent in the first three stanzas that she still feels a 
sense of connection to the natural world of Berlin.4  The enduring nature of this connection is 
represented in her description of her lasting relationship with the various birds native to Berlin.  
The concluding lines of the first stanza create a juxtaposition between this sense of an enduring 
connection to the natural world of Berlin and the foreignness that she points out in the beginning 
lines of the poem; in these last two lines she describes that a chickadee had recognized her in the 
Steglitz district, where she had lived in 1938 prior her flight into exile (Kommentar 121).  The 
chickadee not only addresses her, but, as is suggested in Kaléko’s use of erkennen, is able to 
recognize and identify her (“In Steglitz sprach mich gestern eine Meise / im Schloßpark an. Die 
hatte mich erkannt.”).5  Her connection to Berlin via her relationship with the city’s birds is 
																																																						
4 Compare to discussion of Kaléko’s sense of an enduring belonging in the natural world in “Auf 
einer Bank im »Central Park«”.  See pp. 121-123 in this chapter.    
5 The use of erkannt here follows a theme in Kaléko’s poetry relating to the topic of home: 
unerkannt in “Einmal möcht ich dort noch gehn” (Werke 213); erkannt in “Kein Kinderlied” 
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further emphasized in the second stanza.  This is evident in “Und wieder wecken mich Berliner 
Spatzen!”, in which her use of wieder is suggestive of the repetitive and cyclical nature of time in 
the natural world.  This is echoed in later lines, specifically “nach alter Tradition, / ganz so wie 
damals […]”, in which she depicts her relationship with the birds to be exactly that which it was 
prior to exile.  Interesting is that she describes her enduring sense of connection to the birds in the 
context of place-references, Ku-Damm and märkisch6, that are tied specifically to the human 
world of Berlin, (“am Ku-Damm in der Gartenhauspension,” “diesen märkisch-kessen Ton”).  
Striking is that these references, in which her remnant sense of belonging is apparent, are specific 
to places in the human world, from which she ultimately feels completely estranged.  
It is at the end of the third stanza that the tone of the poem shifts, and her sense of being a 
foreigner in Berlin returns.   Despite her enduring connection to the natural world, her return and 
reintegration into Berlin is incomplete, as is indicated at the end of the third stanza, in which she 
expresses being unable to find the city (“Und alles fragt, wie ich Berlin denn finde? / – Wie ich es 
finde? Ach, ich such es noch!”).  Here Kaléko plays on the dual meaning of the verb finden; 
asked what she thinks of the city, she replies that she has yet to locate it.  The fourth and fifth 
stanzas serve to elaborate on her inability to find the Berlin that she left behind upon her flight 
into exile.  Kaléko’s nominalization of Damals in “Berlinert einer: „Ick bejrüße Ihnen!“, / glaub 
ich mich fast dem Damals auf der Spur” parallels her formulation “weil wir von weither, aus dem 
Gestern, kamen” in “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste,” and similarly serves as an allusion to the 
inextricability of time and and tangible place.  It is in the fourth stanza that a disruption in the 
interaction order of the internal-external dialectic becomes visible.  Her formulation of her search 
for Berlin indicates that her inability to find Damals is due to the devastating effect of WWII on 
																																																						
(Werke 310).  In these examples Kaléko employs erkannt to describe being, or not being, 
recognized by others.   
6 See p. 117 in this chapter.  
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the people of Berlin, evident in both “Ich such es heftig unter den Ruinen / der Menschheit und 
der Stuckarchitektur” and “neue Härte in den Mienen.”  This failed search suggests that exile 
represented for Kaléko an expulsion from the time-space continuum of pre-WWII Berlin (a point 
in time to which she cannot return), the consequence of which is the impossibility of reintegration 
into the time-space continuum of Berlin.  This impossibility is the result of an irreparable rupture 
in the interaction order; Kaléko can no longer identify with the people of Berlin on whom the 
experience of war left an indelible and devastating impression.  The impossibility of reintegration 
into the time-space continuum of home once one has been expunged from that continuum is 
further evident in the fifth stanza of the poem.  The Berlin that Kaléko was forced to leave behind 
in the late 1930s exists only in her memories (“In mir, dem Fremdling, lebt das alte Bild / der 
Stadt, die so viel Tausende vergaßen.”).  The effect of this cognitive disconnect between her 
memories of Berlin and the city that she finds in 1956 results for Kaléko in a profound sense of 
estrangement: “Ich wandle wie durch einen Traum / Durch dieser Landschaft Zeit und Raum.”  
Kaléko ascribes to her experience in the Berlin of 1956 the quality of a dream; she is removed 
from this time-place continuum and perceives it as if it were an alternate reality.  Her desire to 
reconcile this estrangement results in her longing for lost time, manifest in the lines “Und mir 
wird so ich-weiß-nicht-wie – / vor Heimweh nach den Temps perdus ...”.  Temps perdus is a 
reference to the multivolume novel by Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search 
of Lost Time, published between 1913 and 1927) (Kommentar 123).  The irretrievability of time 
passed suggests an inherent futility in Kaléko’s search for the time that separates her from the 
Berlin she once knew.   
As discussed, despite Kaléko’s lasting sense of connection to the natural world of Berlin, 
the time gap between her flight into exile and her first trip in 1956 created a rupture for her on the 
level of the interaction order; the devastation of WWII changed the people of Berlin, and the lack 
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of that common experience resulted in an irreparable rupture between Kaléko and the people with 
whom she once felt connected.  In a letter to her husband Chemjo Vinaver on 11 March 1956, 
Kaléko comments on the changed nature of the people of Berlin: 
Mein ‘Heimweh’ nach Berlin ist ein bischen gedaempft. […] Die Gesichter….Die 
Gesichter…. Nirgends ausser in Berlin sah ich so viele misstrauische Gesichter, so 
viel verhaermte Gesichter und Augen, denen man schreckliches ansieht, das sie 
sahen und selber durchmachten!  Nein, besser sind sie nicht geworden durch den 
Krieg und alles vorher und nachher […] aber hier leben, nein, ich koennte das 
kaum. (#142 in Briefe I 280) 
Kaléko’s sense of estrangement from the people of Berlin is readily apparent in this letter and 
resonates with the notions of foreignness and alienation that she expresses in “Wiedersehen mit 
Berlin.”  Her description to Vinaver of the changed nature of the people whom she encounters 
parallels her formulation in the poem of her search for Berlin “unter den Ruinen / der 
Menschheit.”  In an interview with Journalist Alfred Joachim Fischer in Jerusalem during 
October 1973, Kaléko’s response to the question of why she waited until 1956 to travel back to 
Berlin touches on her worry that in doing so her fears would be realized: “Ich hatte einfach 
Angst,...ich hatte einfach Angst, vor dem, was sich mir da bieten würde.  Ich konnte mir gar 
nichts unter dem vorstellen, was sich da inzwischen entwickelt hatte. [...] Berlin bleibt für mich 
immer ein wunder und ein guter Punkt in meinem Leben” (Kommentar 121).  Kaléko’s trip to 
Berlin in 1956 confirmed for her the fears that she depicted in her exile poetry leading up until 




5.3 Affinities in Nirgendland 
 
The analysis of Kaléko’s exile poetry has evidenced thus far that exile represented for 
Kaléko the expulsion from the time-place continuum of home, resulting from which were the 
simultaneous impossibilities of return and reintegration into the continuum of home and arrival 
and, thereby, integration into a new continuum.  The intellectual and physical space occupied by 
Kaléko is thus an in-between space, a space outside of these time-place continua rooted in the 
human world.  Kaléko refers to this in-between space as Nirgendland, and the current analysis 
has sought to explore this concept of Nirgendland as relevant to the overarching theme of exile in 
Niemandsland that informs this dissertation.  The notion of an in-between space manifest in 
Kaléko’s poetry begs the question of if and to what extent Kaléko’s Nirgendland overlaps with 
Homi K. Bhabha’s conception of the “Third Space.”  Lutz Winckler applies Bhabha’s theory of 
the Third Space in the context of German exile literature of the NS-period, specifically Seghers’ 
Transit, and concludes, “Der ‘dritte Raum’, in dem die kulturell entwurzelten Individuen agieren 
und miteinander kommunizerien, ist ein kultueller Hybrid” (204).  Winckler’s formulation of a 
cultural hybrid as experienced in exile is a reference to Bhabha’s use of the term hybridity in his 
theoretical conception of the Third Space.  In “The Location of Culture,” Bhabha rejects the 
notion that cultures, as manifest in the nation construct and its corresponding “People,” are 
homogeneous entities that derive their validity from an “originary Past” and thus exist 
independently of one another (45-56).  Bhabha calls into question the linear and insular 
development of a given culture over time and suggests that through the process of “enunciation,” 
in which individuals and groups interact in different social contexts, the possibility of an 
international culture in the Third Space emerges: 
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For a willingness to descend into that alien territory—where I have led you—may 
reveal that the theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open 
the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism or 
multiculturalism of the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation 
of culture’s hybridity. To that end we should remember that it is the “inter”—the 
cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the in-between, the space of 
the entre that Derrida has opened up in writing itself—that carries the burden of 
the meaning of culture. It makes it possible to begin envisaging national, 
antinationalist, histories of the “people.” It is in this space that we will find those 
words with which we can speak of Ourselves and Others. And by exploring this 
hybridity, this “Third Space,” we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as 
the others of our selves. (56) 
Bhabha’s theory of the Third Space rests heavily on the notion of the in-between, a space in 
which it is possible for Ourselves and Others to negotiate, through the processes of enunciation, a 
hybrid, international culture.  This concept of the Third Space resonates most clearly with 
Kaléko’s exile work in her poem “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express” (589).  This poem, 
dedicated to a black woman whom Kaléko saw while on the New York subway, evidences the 
hybridity of the Third Space:    
Dunkles Mädchen eines fremden Stammes,  
Tief im Dschungel dieser fremden Stadt,  
Deiner Augen schwarzverhangne Trauer 




Immer möchte ich dich leise fragen: 
Weißt du, daß wir heimlich Schwestern sind? 
Du, des Kongo dunkelbraune Tochter,  
Ich, Europas blasses Judenkind. 
 
Vor der Schmach, die Abkunft zu verstecken,  
Schützt dich, allen sichtbar, deine Haut. 
– Vor der andern Haß, da sie entdecken, 
Daß sie dir »versehentlich« vertraut. (Werke 5897) 
In consideration of the spatial location of the in-between, two aspects of the Third Space manifest 
themselves in “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express.”  New York serves as the location in which 
Kaléko experiences the in-between space of exile, Nirgendland, as evident in her reference to the 
city as fremd (“Tief im Dschungel dieser fremden Stadt”).  The Third Space of New York 
materializes in the subway car, a microcosm of New York, which in turn serves as the Third 
Space in which Kaléko negotiates sameness and otherness in her one-sided conversation with the 
black woman.  Although skin-color and specific historical occurrences differentiate Kaléko from 
the black woman, they share the experience of being forcibly uprooted due to legally-sanctioned 
and implicated racism, which in turn set them down separate paths to this moment in which those 
paths intersect.  In the case of Kaléko, her sense of otherness results not only from her experience 
as Jew in NS-Germany, but also from the prejudices against Eastern-European Jews that she 
																																																						
7 “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express” was originally published in 1946 in Aufbau (No. 48, 29 
November 1946) (Kommentar 589).  Kaléko later reworked the poem, and the version quoted 
here is the one that was published by J. Rosenkranz along with 54 other poems from Kaléko’s 
Nachlass (Kommentar 248).   
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experienced in Germany when her family settled there in 1914 after fleeing Galicia (Nolte, von 
Tippelskirch).  As Rosenkranz explains:  
[Kaléko] erwähnte ihre Herkunft ungern, da es in Westeuropa als Makel galt, aus 
Galizien zu stammen.  Das emanzipierte, liberale Westjudentum blickte auf die 
Ostjuden herab, die für übertriebene Religiosität, Armut und Ghettoisierung 
standen.  MK spielt hier auf die ähnliche Situation der Schwarzen in den USA an, 
die damals noch um Anerkennung und Gleichberechtigung kämpften.  
(Kommentar 151) 
Kaléko’s assertion that she and the black woman are “heimlich Schwestern” represents her 
negotiation of sameness in the Third Space of the subway car.  In terms of Bhabha’s theory of the 
Third Space, Kaléko engages in the process of enunciation, however rhetorically, in her 
discernment of where her notion of self, and the factors contributing thereto, overlap with that of 
the black woman.  It can be argued that the rhetoric nature of Kaléko’s enunciation reduces her 
sense of shared sameness to an act of projection, but, although one-sided, Kaléko’s one-sided 
conversation with the black woman does resonate with Bhabha’s notion of an in-between space 
in which a culture of hybridity is negotiated.    
 This analysis of “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express” in the theoretical framework of 
Bhabha’s Third Space begs the question of how and to what extent this analysis is congruous 
with the overarching theoretical framework of this dissertation.  In this poem Kaléko finds 
sameness in the shared experience of otherness, and thereby negotiates a sense of belonging 
within the Third Space of the subway car that she shares with the black woman.  The question of 
whether or not the refugee can reestablish for himself a sense of belonging, either through 
reintegration into the time-space continuum from which he was expunged or integration into a 
new time-space continuum, informs the analysis and argumentation of this dissertation.  
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Bhabha’s theory of the Third Space serves an alternate analytical perspective for Jenkins’ 
dialectic of identification, in which the same poem would serve as an example of Kaléko’s 
attempt to reestablish a sense of belonging through the interaction order, her conception of a 
sameness shared with the black woman thus an attempt to reconcile, to some extent, the ruptures 
that exile created for her on the level of the interaction order.      
It is in the poem “Kein Kinderlied,” from which the term Nirgendland derives, that the 
implications of exile on the refugee’s sense of belonging are most evident, particularly on the 
level of the interaction order:   
Wohin ich immer reise, 
ich fahr nach Nirgendland. 
Die Koffer voll von Sehnsucht, 
die Hände voll von Tand. 
So einsam wie der Wüstenwind. 
So heimatlos wie Sand: 
Wohin ich immer reise, 
ich komm nach Nirgendland. 
 
Wohin ich immer reise,  
Zu Schiff und mit der Bahn,  
Spricht man auf harte Weise 
Ein fremd Kannitverstan. 
Vom »allerhöchsten Kreise« 
Hinab zum kleinsten Mann –  
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Wohin ich immer reise, 
Ich komme nirgends an. 
 
Die Wälder sind verschwunden, 
die Häuser sind verbrannt. 
Hab keinen mehr gefunden. 
Hat keiner mich erkannt. 
Und als der fremde Vogel schrie, 
bin ich davongerannt. 
Wohin ich immer reise,  
ich komm nach Nirgendland. (3108)   
Numerous references to ruptures in the interaction order are evident in “Kein Kinderlied,” most 
notably in the second stanza.  A complete and irreparable rupture is depicted in Kaléko’s 
formulation, “Wohin ich immer reise, / Zu Schiff und mit der Bahn, / Spricht man auf harte 
Weise / Ein fremd Kannitverstan. / Vom »allerhöchsten Kreise« / Hinab zum kleinsten Mann –”, 
with the totality of the rupture emphasized in her inability to communicate with anyone, neither a 
person of the highest circle nor der kleine Mann, the most average person.  In her description of 
the languages of the Other, she creates an element of redundancy in her formulation “Ein fremd 
Kannitverstan9.”  This redundancy, to the extent that it adds a further dimension to the 
foreignness of Kannitverstan, seemingly parallels Kaléko’s formulation of a further removed 
Third Space of Nirgendland.  Kaléko’s exile poetry, a space without geographical location, 
																																																						
8 “Kein Kinderlied” first appeared in 1958 without the middle stanza.  Here the poem is quoted 
with all three stanzas, as it was published on 24 May 1964 in Der Tagesspiegel (No. 5684) 
(Kommentar 119).  
9“Kannitverstan” is an allusion to the calendar story of the same name by Johann Peter Hebel, 
published in 1808 (Kommentar 119).  
 146 
functions for her as a Third Space in which she interacts with the world, exploring affinities in an 
attempt to renegotiate a sense of belonging in that world.   
 
 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
 
Kaléko’s exile poetry conveys her unshakeable feeling of being fremd in the human world 
and her awareness that this persistent notion of Fremdheit is the result of the destabilizing 
influence of exile on her processes of identification.  Kaléko’s sense of estrangement evidences 
itself in the frequent depictions in her work of the irretrievable loss of home through exile and the 
consequent tenuousness of the refugee’s belonging in the world.  This loss of home is 
exacerbated by the reality that integration into a new time-space continuum is also impossible.  
Stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of return home and arrival somewhere new, 
Kaléko formulates her existence in the space of the in-between Nirgendland.  The analysis of this 
chapter evidences that it is in Kaléko’s exile poetry that Nirgendland materializes, a Third Space 
that provides her with a forum in which to interact with the world from which exile rendered her 





The analysis of this dissertation evidences that the experience of the refugee from the NS-
regime, as manifest in select works of German exile literature of this period, was defined by his 
attempt to reconcile the incongruous yet simultaneous realities of legal invisibility and human 
embodiment.  Through processes of legal erasure, the refugee is rendered stateless and thereby 
finds himself in a precarious in-between space, a Niemandsland in which the sub-dimensions of 
this experience in the in-between – the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile 
– overlap and coalesce.  An analysis of the depiction of Niemandsland in select works of German 
exile literature of the NS-period serves in this dissertation as means to explore the question of 
how and to what extent the Niemandsland of exile affected the refugee’s sense of belonging and 
place in the world.   
Wulf Koepke’s work on the perversion of time and space in exile, specifically his article, 
“On Time and Space in Exile – Past, Present and Future in a No-Man’s Land,” provides both an 
analytical foundation for the implications of exile for the refugee’s experience of time and space 
in the context of German exile literature of the NS-regime, as well as a point of departure for the 
analysis of this dissertation.  Building on Koepke’s reference to Niemandsland in the title of his 
article, this dissertation evidences that the warped nature of time in exile, marked by the 
paradoxical simultaneity of rushed flight and indefinite waiting, is an integral aspect of the 
refugee’s experience in the in-between space of Niemandsland.  As outlined in the introduction, 
the contribution of this dissertation lies in its pursuance of the question that Koepke implores his 
fellow scholars to answer in the conclusion of his article: “The legacy of the exiles has not yet 
been adequately understood, and it may just fade away in the turmoils of the ‘postmodern’ 
mentality of the 21st century.  Yet the perception of time and space of the ‘exterritorial man’ is so 
close to the life and mind of the present age that it cannot and should not be ignored” (49).    The 
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analysis of select German autobiographical and literary works of the NS-period within a unified 
analytical framework evidences that the existence of the refugee in the space of the in-between, 
the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and 
coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense of 
belonging and place in the world.   
The four chapters of this dissertation explore the varying implications of legal erasure and 
statelessness for the refugee’s sense of belonging in the world within the theoretical framework 
of Jenkins’ tripartite model of identity, in which the individual, interaction and institutional 
orders engage one another in a continual and dynamic process which Jenkins terms the internal-
external dialectic of identification.  Chapter One provides the relevant historical foundation 
necessary for an analysis in the subsequent three chapters focused on the implications of 
processes of legal erasure and statelessness for the refugee on the level of the institutional order.  
Its discussion evidences that the refugee of the NS-period faced innumerable challenges in his 
pursuit of the legal right to exist, which was complicated by the political and socio-economic 
factors of the period 1933-1945.  The NS-regime economically and socially isolated those 
individuals whom it perceived to be racially or ideologically incongruent with its interpretation of 
the German Geist.  German Jews thus became a target for eradication under the NS-regime, 
despite the fact that prior to Hitler’s rise to power, German Jews were well integrated into 
German society and enjoyed financial and social success.  Many Jews belonged to the educated 
middle-class and were professionals and business owners.  When it became apparent through NS-
legislation that the Jews were a target for eradication, they joined the thousands of German 
political refugees who fled abroad.  Few realized that the NS-regime would remain in power as 
long as it did, however, and many Jews initially remained in Germany.  The great restrictions on 
the ability of refugees to transfer capital abroad further prevented some trying to emigrate.  As 
 149 
the 1930s developed, however, it became evident that the situation in NS-Germany was 
deteriorating as Hitler amassed power, and as refugees tried to flee with what little resources they 
had, few nations were willing or able to provide them with the asylum that they needed.  As 
evident in the proceedings of the League of Nations and the failed High Commission for 
refugees, no nation took the lead in solving the refugee crisis, which contributed to the 
comprehensive failure of the international community to intervene on behalf of refugees from the 
NS-regime.  Nations were primarily concerned with their own interests, and the unemployment of 
the world-wide economic depression of the 1930s was a domestic issue that affected many 
nations, who were not able to economically absorb the middle-class German refugees.  Further, in 
the 1930s many nations did not want to provoke Germany, and thus the source of the refugee 
crisis was never dealt with.  Nevertheless, refugees of the NS-regime flooded consulates in an 
attempt to secure for themselves a legally-sanctioned space in the world. 
Chapter Two, a case-study of Egon Schwarz’s autobiography Keine Zeit für Eichendorff, 
serves to provide insight into the irreparable rupture that exile represents for the refugee on the 
level of the institutional order.  Schwarz’s exile experience was defined by numerous ruptures in 
the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of identification, and his experiences in 
legal, geographical and socio-historical Niemandsländer indelibly affected his worldview.  The 
process of legal deletion that Schwarz experienced as a refugee is among the most inhumane 
which human societies over the course of history have ever devised, and its impact on the 
processes of his identity formation are evident.  Schwarz expresses that since exile, his sense of 
belonging in the world has remained tenuous, underscored by the notion that at any given 
moment, his world can be irreconcilably altered by over-arching socio-historical and -political 
forces over which he has no control.  Schwarz’s experience in Niemandsland left him with the 
unshakable notion that any sense of belonging is fundamentally tenuous, and all rights, 
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possessions and identities associated with the belonging to a given place at a given time can 
suddenly be taken away by the greater historical forces to which one is subject.  It is 
demonstrated that the constant of the Niemandsland that dominates Schwarz’s experience in the 
world is, ironically, where his sense of belonging in the world lies. 
Chapter Three focuses on the legal dimension of Niemandsland, specifically how 
statelessness affects the individual’s sense of belonging to the national community from which he 
has been legally expunged.  The incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural and 
historical ties that endure between the stateless individual and his national community of origin is 
discussed relative to an analysis of excerpts of select works of German exile literature.  The 
selected works are representative of the diversity of German writers’ responses to the experience 
of statelessness in exile from the NS-regime across several genres.  The tendency of German 
exile writers of the NS-period to depict a latent paradox inherent in statelessness is interpreted as 
a means through which to deconstruct nation-based identities and thereby call into question the 
capacity of a government to strip an individual of an identity.  The contribution of this chapter 
lies in its discussion of the selected works within a unified analytical framework informed by the 
concept of exile as an in-between space where legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer 
intersect.  
Chapter Four explores Mascha Kaléko’s formulation of the in-between space of exile in 
her exile poetry, in which exile represents a perpetual journey through Nirgendland.  Through an 
analysis of the centrality of Nirgendland to Kaléko’s depiction of exile, it is evident that exile 
represented for her the irretrievable loss of home, a loss exacerbated by the simultaneous 
impossibility of reconstructing that sense of home in a new place representative of a new 
institutional order.  The analysis focuses on Kaléko’s attempts to negotiate a sense of belonging 
and connection to the world from the space in-between the simultaneous impossibilities of a 
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return home and an arrival somewhere new.  In turn, Kaléko’s exile poetry is interpreted as the 
medium through which her notion of Nirgendland materializes into a Third Space that provides 
her with a forum in which to attempt to renegotiate the sense of belonging in that world that she 
lost through exile.   
The findings of this dissertation prove that the existence of the refugee in the space of the 
in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile 
overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense 
of belonging and place in the world.  The greater implications and relevance of such findings are 
evident if one reconsiders Dorothy Thompson’s distillation in 1938 of the refugee crisis: “It is a 
fantastic commentary on the inhumanity of our times, that for thousands and thousands of people 
a piece of paper with a stamp on it is the difference between life and death, and that scores of 
people have blown their brains out because they could not get it” (Dwork and van Pelt28).  
Thompson underscores here the paradox latent in statelessness, evident in the necessity for the 
refugee to reconcile the incongruous yet simultaneous realities of legal invisibility and human 
embodiment to survive.  The precariousness of the refugee’s existence in the in-between space of 
statelessness is an issue of obvious yet profound relevance for the current world of the 21st 
century, validating Koepke’s imperative to continually seek to understand the situation of the 
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